(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent because I think that a plain reading of the statute requires a finding that the dog owner statute applies to this case. Thus, the case should be remanded for trial on the question of whether there was a proximate cause between the dog’s actions and the injury. That is a question of fact for a jury to decide. If there was, then liability attaches, and the only remaining question is damages.
While I agree with the majority opinion that the legislative history of the statute indicates that the legislature was primarily concerned with dog-bite cases, in drafting this statute, it was not so limited because the statute indicates that liability will attach “if a dog, without provocation, attacks or injures any person * * The statute does not say “attacks and injures;” it says “attacks or injures.”
Moreover, other states with similar statutes have held the owner liable in very similar circumstances. In Illinois, a similar statute reads as follows:
If a dog or other animal, without provocation, attacks or injures any person who is peaceably conducting himself in any place where he may lawfully be, the owner of such dog or other animal is liable in damages to such person for the full amount of the injury sustained.
Ill.Ann.Stat, ch. 8, para. 366 (Smith-Hurd 1975 & Supp.1990). The Illinois courts have interpreted this statute to create two forms of liability on the part of dog owners: one, by an aggressive violent action designed to inflict injury and, two, by an action which is in itself harmless but which, under a particular set of facts, results in injury. Chittum v. Evanston Fuel & Material Co., 92 Ill.App.3d 188, 191, 48 Ill.Dec. 110, 112-13, 416 N.E.2d 5, 7-8 (1980); Forsyth v. Dugger, 169 Ill.App.3d 362, 365, 119 Ill.Dec. 948, 950, 523 N.E.2d 704, 706 (1988).
Under chapter 8, paragraph 366, the plaintiff must demonstrate four elements: “(1) injury caused by an animal owned by the defendants; (2) lack of provocation; (3) peaceable conduct of the injured person; and (4) the presence of the injured person in a place where he has a legal right to be.” Forsyth, id. at 365, 119 Ill.Dec. at 950, 523 N.E.2d at 706. In addition, the Illinois courts also note that an “animal causes the injury of the person if it is the proximate cause of the injury.” Id. In regard to causation, the Illinois courts held that “[t]he question of whether the injury was caused by the same independent act of the *67plaintiff or others is a question of fact to be decided by the jury.” Taylor v. Hull, 7 Ill.App.3d 218, 219, 287 N.E.2d 167, 168 (1972). In Taylor, a driver was injured when he lost control of his car after striking the defendant’s dog, which was running loose on a road. The Taylor court held that the facts disclosed that the dog performed an “overt act and was not a mere passive force.” Id. at 220, 287 N.E.2d at 168 (construing an older, but substantially similar, version of the Illinois dog-bite statute). See also Bailey v. Bly, 87 Ill.App.2d 259, 281 N.E.2d 8 (1967) (the court refused to apply the statute to a woman who tripped over defendant’s dog, stating that there must be behavior on the part of the dog which caused injury and that liability may not be imposed “as pure penalty for dog ownership.” Id. at 262, 231 N.E.2d at 9).
Finally, the Illinois courts have also noted that chapter 8, paragraph 366 is not an absolute or strict liability statute; thus, the common law defenses apply. Vanderlei v. Heideman, 83 Ill.App.3d 158, 160-61, 38 Ill.Dec. 525, 526-27, 403 N.E.2d 756, 757-58 (1980).
The Oklahoma dog-bite statute now reads as follows:
The owner or owners of any dog shall be liable for damages to the full amount of any damages sustained when his dog, without provocation, bites or injures any person while such person is in or on a place where he has a lawful right to be.1
Okla.Stat.Ann. tit. 4, § 42.1 (West 1990).
The Oklahoma Supreme Court requires four elements to establish liability under section 42.1: “(1) ownership; (2) lack of provocation; (3) injury to the plaintiff by the accused dog; and (4) lawful presence of the plaintiff on the defendant’s premises at the time of the attack.” Hampton v. Hammons, 743 P.2d 1053, 1058 (Okla.1987); Hood v. Hagler, 606 P.2d 548, 550 (Okla.1979). Though Oklahoma has not had to decide cases where there are attenuated circumstances like those involved here or in the Illinois cases, under the fourth prong of the test, it requires an “attack.” Id. Thus, it appears that the Oklahoma court reads its statute narrowly.
The Wisconsin Court of Appeals has recently expanded the reading of the Wisconsin dog-bite statute, which provides as follows:
(1) Liability for injury, (a) Without Notice. Subject to s. 895.045 [contributory negligence statute], the owner of a dog is liable for the full amount of damages caused by the dog injuring or causing injury to a person, livestock or property.
Wis.Stat.Ann. § 174.02 (West 1989). In Meunier v. Ogurek, 140 Wis.2d 782, 412 N.W.2d 155 (Ct.App.1987), a woman was driving a tractor when the neighbor’s dog ran under the rear axle. Startled, the woman “popped” the clutch. The tractor rolled over backward, and the woman was killed. The Wisconsin court interpreted the following statute as creating strict liability on the part of the dog owner:
The owner of a dog is liable for the full amount of damages caused by the dog injuring or causing injury to a person, livestock or property.
Wis.Stat. § 174.02(1)(a) (1981) (emphasis added). The court found the statute unambiguous and concluded that the statute sets forth the conditions under which a dog owner is liable for damages caused by the dog. 140 Wis.2d at 786, 412 N.W.2d at 156.
The Wisconsin court in Becker v. State Farm, 141 Wis.2d 804, 416 N.W.2d 906 (Ct.App.1987), had an opportunity to interpret a later version of the same statute, which read:
The owner of a dog may be liable for the full amount of damages caused by the dog injuring or causing injury to a person, livestock or property.
*68Wis.Stat. § 174.02(l)(a) (1983) (emphasis added). In Becker, a dog escaped from its penned enclosure and darted onto a roadway, causing the plaintiff to drive off the highway. The plaintiff claimed injury as a result of the accident.
The court found the “may be liable” language ambiguous, holding that the intent of the legislature, in changing the: language, was to clarify that comparative negligence applied to the strict liability provisions of the statute. Id. at 814-15, 416 N.W.2d at 911. The court found, however, that the statute does not carve out an exception for an “innocent act” by a dog. The court noted the following:
Finally, Lincoln contends that failure to create this exception will lead to absurd and unreasonable results in certain hypothetical cases. For instance, Lincoln argues that under a “no exception” strict liability approach, an owner would be liable to a person who trips over a sleeping dog or who is injured when startled by the mere playful barking dog. * * 4 Harshness of result in certain extreme situations is a social price sometimes paid for the perceived benefits of the strict liability policy.
Id. at 817, 416 N.W.2d at 912. Thus, it appears that the Wisconsin courts hold that an owner of a dog is liable for injuries caused by the dog whether the dog is engaging in an act of aggression or not.
Moreover, in this case, the owners knew of the dog’s habit of attempting to crawl into the front seat of the car, thus making it a still stronger case of liability.
Accordingly, I would affirm the court of appeals and remand to the trial court for determination of proximate cause as previously stated.
. At the time the Minnesota Legislature was considering its dog-bite statute, the Oklahoma statute read as follows:
The owner or owners of any dog which shall, without provocation, bite or injure any person * * * shall be liable for damage to any person bitten or injured by such dog to the full amount of the injury sustained.
Okla.Stat. tit. 4, § 42.1 (1947). See Minutes of the House Judiciary Committee for February 7, 1951.