(concurring in part; dissenting in part).
ISSUE ONE
I concur. Appellee was destitute; she wanted to leave Germany with the children *488of the marriage. She signed an agreement under duress and without knowing her rights. She was physically and emotionally abused and not in a free, open, and voluntary mental state when she signed an exec-utory contract. Nor was she represented by counsel. Child custody and property settlement agreements are not, per se, binding upon the trial courts in South Dakota. Rather, they are evidence which may be considered. McGee v. McGee, 415 N.W.2d 812 (S.D.1987). No abuse of discretion.
ISSUE TWO
I respectfully dissent. In my opinion, the trial court abused its discretion in ordering monthly child support payments to remain the same after one of the two minor children reaches the age of majority. Under the decision of the trial judge, Appellant will be paying child support, in effect, for the eldest minor child until he is an adult at the age of 22 years. There exists clear error in this aspect of the trial decision due to the decision that child support was determined to be $750.00 per month until both minor children reached majority. This is contrary to the spirit of our holding in Birchfield v. Birchfield and opposed to the holding in Bruning v. Jeffries, 422 N.W.2d 579 (S.D.1988). No evidence was introduced what the youngest child’s financial needs would be following emancipation of the eldest. Therefore, there is a lack of evidence and no reason to support the trial court on this issue. It is clearly an abuse of discretion. Herndon v. Herndon, 305 N.W.2d 917, 918 (S.D.1981). Twenty-two years of age is not a minor child. This Court has only advanced the age to nineteen due to educational circumstances. Birchfield, supra, at 894, 895. “We simply cannot extend a statute where its plain language dictates the result.” Birchfield, at 895, citing, State v. Galati, 365 N.W.2d 575 (S.D.1985) and Ogle v. Circuit Court, 89 S.D. 18, 227 N.W.2d 621 (1975).
ISSUE THREE
I respectfully dissent. Again, in my •opinion, there is an exceedingly unfair result created by the reasoning power of the trial court, emanating from its role to use its discretion; therefore, this failure to exercise sound discretion on “alimony credit” should be likewise reversed.
Basically, Appellant should have been given credit for making monthly payments of $1,000.00 to his wife for 13 months prior to trial. First, we should observe that Appellant agreed to continue these $1,000.00 monthly payments between the trial date and decision if he received a credit for any alimony award granted to his wife. I must call a spade a spade. This trial judge, knowing these circumstances, entered a judgment 17 months after hearing the evidence.
As a result, Appellant has had his rights sacrificed on the altar of delay. It is not right. We should not tolerate this type of injustice. Under Herndon, it is a clear abuse of discretion.
Furthermore, the trial court’s decision is opposed to the general rule in this country that credit for payments, under these circumstances, is equitable and fair. Peters v. Peters, 15 Utah 2d 413, 394 P.2d 71 (1964); Rickus v. Rickus, 184 Neb. 833, 172 N.W.2d 628 (1969).
ISSUE FOUR
Again, the trial court erred for it used a “projected” length of military service to determine which portion of Appellant’s retirement benefits his wife should receive. Therefore, I respectfully dissent on this issue, also.
Clearly, the trial court failed to follow this Court’s recent decision on the division of retirement plans in Hautala v. Hautala, 417 N.W.2d 879 (S.D.1988) (see footnote 1). The trial court sustained Appellant’s objection to a line of testimony — all speculative — based upon a 30 year retirement; but, thereupon, reversed itself in its decision. There was no testimony that Appellant would retire upon 30 year’s service. Again, this was an abuse of discretion. Guesswork is the base of the division. In Hautala, the military pensioner did not contest the projections; here, the judge *489reached out and seized upon 30 years as if he could compel the Appellant to serve in the military for that length of time.
ISSUE FIVE
An award of attorney’s fees to the wife was fair in light of the fact, that under my theory, she prevails on issue one.
I am authorized to state that Chief Justice MILLER joins in this special writing.