dissenting.
This is a simple condemnation case made complex and confusing by today’s majority opinion. The City of Houston condemned a portion of a private school’s property, owned by an order of Catholic nuns, in order to extend a major thoroughfare. The only question for the jury to decide was the proper amount of just compensation required to restore the school to its original pre-taking utility. After a three week trial, during which 23 experts testified, the trial court submitted to the jury one broad form question which inquired as to what amount would justly and reasonably compensate the condemnee.1 The jury answered: $18,-451,398. The City did not complain in its *620motion for new trial (nor does it now complain) that the verdict was excessive.2
The trial court did not submit a compensation question to the jury based on the market value measure of damages, because, as the City concedes, the property had no ascertainable market value. Both the Duchesne Academy and the City had proposed alternative compensatory standards to the trial court; neither relied on the market value test. Today, however, the Court second guesses the jury, sends the parties back to the trial court for another trial, and adopts an absolute rule that the market value method of compensation must be used in all condemnation cases, even if a property cannot be valued by the market value approach. In so doing, the Court misreads the United States Supreme Court’s opinions regarding the substitute facilities doctrine. Further, it makes an impermissible distinction between public and private condemnees and ignores Texas precedent by abolishing the substitute facilities doctrine as an alternative remedy for condemnees in Texas.3
The court of appeals held that the jury’s award conferred a “windfall on Duchesne because it included the cost to acquire land adjoining the school campus.” 811 S.W.2d at 738-39. The trial court, however, instructed the jury to consider the cost of land reasonably necessary to restore the campus to its pre-condemnation use and utility. By including the cost of the adjacent land, the jury determined that the land was required to restore the campus to its pre-taking utility.4 Thus, there is no windfall, because the fact-finder deemed the acquisition of adjacent land reasonably necessary to make Duchesne whole.
The “cost to cure” measure of compensation urged by the City differs from the “cost to cure” definition adopted by the court of appeals. The City’s experts defined cost to cure as “the cost to return a property to its original functional utility.” The court of appeals, however, disregarded this definition and adopted its own, defining cost to cure as “an appraisal technique used to arrive at the taken property’s market value and the diminished market value of the remainder, which included the cost to replace improvements taken, damaged, *621or destroyed, after they have been appropriately depreciated.” 811 S.W.2d at 739. However, none of the City’s appraisers considered depreciation to be a factor in determining the amount of just compensation. Thus, the court of appeals apparently confused the “cost approach” for deriving market value with the “cost to cure,” a method for determining damages to the remainder.
The City persuaded the court of appeals into believing that the substitute facilities doctrine no longer exists, and thus the court reversed the trial court’s judgment, an error which this Court now affirms by saying that substitute facilities is a “waning doctrine.” At 610. Recent opinions of the United States Supreme Court indicate that the substitute facilities doctrine is quite viable, and that a condemned tract potentially may have no market value. For all of the above reasons, I dissent.
I.
What remains of Duchesne Academy now sits wedged into the intersection of Memorial Drive and Chimney Rock Road, two major thoroughfares in the City of Houston. The partial taking destroyed the school’s chapel, day-care facility, lower school playground, major entrance and drive, and largest parking lot. The City and the school agreed that full restoration of the school’s pre-taking utility required replacement of these demolished facilities. The City also conceded that it would have to restore or replace all the buildings on the remainder that had been damaged by the taking.
At trial, the City argued that the remainder provided sufficient land upon which to reconstruct the damaged or demolished school buildings, but the school disagreed urging that additional adjacent land was required. Duchesne demonstrated through extensive and varied expert testimony that air and noise pollution would so severely afflict the eastern half of the remainder so as to render it unusable for educational purposes. The City’s architect agreed that noise pollution from Chimney Rock Road would have a serious impact on the fine arts building and the lower school building. He also noted that the lower school building, which was not taken, would need to be replaced because of its close proximity to the extended Chimney Rock Road. And the fine arts building, which now sits 5.5 feet from Chimney Rock, has suffered, as the City admitted, extensive damage which requires significant repair.
The City’s flawed design of Chimney Rock further exacerbates the disruptively intrusive effects the boulevard’s traffic flow will have upon Duchesne’s educational environment. The City’s design originally anticipated a use-level at 20,000 vehicles per day. Chimney Rock’s current capacity, however, is approximately 38,000 vehicles per day. Thus, the road’s present use already exceeds its originally projected capacity. Further, the evidence at trial conclusively demonstrated that the City failed to meet its own prescribed minimum requirements regarding the following essential elements of road design: (1) angle of intersection; (2) intersection sight distance; (3) radius of curve; (4) width of right of way; (5) width of pavement; (6) width of median; (7) width of shoulder; and (8) setback distance. An expert with 20 years experience in road design testified that the Chimney Rock extension was the worst “design of any modern day design [he has] ever seen anywhere.” The bottom line is that these defects contributed to the creation of a continuing threat to the students’ physical well-being on what remains of Du-chesne’s campus.
The City consented to replace a substantial number of the school’s original buildings with new facilities, acknowledging that the standard market value approach to measuring damages could not apply because the school had no market value.5 *622The City submitted a “cost to cure” measure of damages that contemplated the demolition and reconstruction or repair of the damaged buildings within the confines of the remainder. Duchesne, contending that the remainder could not sufficiently accommodate the City’s approach, submitted a substitute facilities measure of damages, which anticipated acquiring adjacent property. Thus, the key question for the jury was whether restoring the school to its original utility required the purchase of additional land.
II.
The Texas and United States Constitutions guarantee landowners just and adequate compensation for any governmental taking.6 In Texas, compensating a con-demnee usually involves paying an amount equal to the market value of the land taken plus the difference between the market value of the remainder before and after the taking. See, e.g., State v. Windham, 837 S.W.2d 73 (Tex.1992); Callejo v. Brazos Elec. Power Coop., Inc., 755 S.W.2d 73, 76 (Tex.1988); State v. Carpenter, 126 Tex. 604, 89 S.W.2d 979, 980 (1936) (on motion for rehearing). Determining the market value thus is essential to applying the standard compensation method.
Market value is “the price the property will bring when offered for sale by one who desires to buy, but is under no necessity of buying.” Carpenter, 89 S.W.2d at 197, 201-02. This Court recognized in Carpenter the potential need for alternative measures of just and adequate compensation in takings cases, stating that market value compensation “cannot be reached in every case by following the general rules [of market value compensation] here outlined.” Id. at 201-02. We later approved of a definition of market value in City of Austin v. Canizzo, 153 Tex. 324, 267 S.W.2d 808 (1954), which clarified how juries should determine a condemned property’s market value. That definition reads as follows:
the term ‘market value’ is the price which the property would bring when it is offered for sale by one who desires but is not obliged to sell, and is bought by one who is under no necessity of buying, taking into consideration all of the uses to which it is reasonably adaptable and for which it either is or in all reasonable probability will become available within the reasonable future.
Id., 267 S.W.2d at 815; see also United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 374, 63 S.Ct. 276, 280, 87 L.Ed. 336 (1943) (market value of condemned property is what a willing buyer would pay a willing seller); Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 255, 54 S.Ct. 704, 708, 78 L.Ed. 1236 (1934) (purpose of Just Compensation Clause is to put eon-demnee “in as good a position pecuniarily as if his property had not been taken”); cf. United States v. Cors, 337 U.S. 325, 332, 69 S.Ct. 1086, 1090, 93 L.Ed. 1392 (1948) (Court “refused to make a fetish even of market value, since that may not be the best measure of value in some cases”).
The Court lists in its opinion four approaches used in Texas for compensating condemnees, citing as authority a treatise by Judge Madison Rayburn, who also filed an amicus brief in this case supporting Duchesne’s position. At 616. The Court’s list omits by ellipsis some language essential to understanding these approaches. In full, as they appear in Judge Rayburn’s treatise, they are:
(1) Comparative market sales;
(2) Replacement cost less depreciation, or otherwise stated as giving a reasonable equivalent by substitution, reconstruction, removal, re-establishment or re-erection;
(3) Capitalization of income, or economic approach, using the ordinary, prudent *623business man and his economic 'practices or customs; and
(4) Real, actual or intrinsic value, to some extent included in some of the items heretofore mentioned, but which might include value to the individual involved that would be special to him, such as the actual value of a phosphate quarry to a fertilizer manufacturer that was adjoining.
At 616 citing 1 Rayburn on Condemnation § 16.00 (1987) (emphasis added to omitted language).7
Approach (2) is broader than the standard “cost approach” in that it conceives of a cure “by substitution, reconstruction, removal, re-establishment or re-erection.” Cf The AppRAIsal of Real Estate 349 (9th ed. 1987) (discussing standard cost). The scope of this approach subsumes the substitute facilities measure. Approach (4) also is relevant, because it recognizes that the “real, actual or intrinsic value” of a condemned tract “might include value to the individual involved that would be special to him.” This cuts against applying the standard market value measure, as interpreted by the Court, which seeks to obviate the influence of particular uses or values in assessing damages. See R.A. Epstein, Takings: Private Property and the Power of Eminent Domain 183 (1985) (“[t]he central difficulty of the market value formula for explicit compensation, therefore, is that it denies any compensation for real but subjective values”); Laura H. Burney, Just Compensation and the Condemnation of Future Interest: Empirical Evidence of the Failure of Market Value, 1989 B.Y.U.L.Rev. 789, 790 (1989) (“the fair market value standard has assumed the position of the pagan god of just compensation despite the protest of heretics promoting economic efficiency and fairness”). See generally J.G. Durham, Efficient Just Compensation as a Limit on Eminent Domain, 69 U.Minn.L.Rev. 1277, 1278-79 (1985) (just compensation requirement is essential check on eminent domain powers because market value “often does not adequately measure all the costs that the property owner” suffers).
III.
The identifying features of a special purpose property are: (1) the property has physical features peculiar to its use; (2) the property has no apparent market; and (3) it has no feasible economic alternate use. J.D. Eaton, Real Estate Valuation in Litigation 162 (1982). As a registered nonprofit educational institution serving over 4,000 students, Duchesne is a special purpose property that is not frequently traded in the market place, and thus it has no market value.8 If a special purpose proper*624ty like Duchesne is condemned, the absence of an ascertainable market value will require the use of an alternative remedy to ensure just compensation to the con-demnee. See, e.g., City of Meriden v. Highway Commissioner, 169 Conn. 655, 363 A.2d 1094, 1097 (1975) (“[w]hen the property is of a kind seldom exchanged, however, it lacks a ‘market price,’ and recourse must be had to other methods of valuation”); County of Cook v. City of Chicago, 84 Ill.App.2d 301, 228 N.E.2d 183, 187 (1967) (“market value basis is not the legal standard for property taken when applied to a special use such as a church, college, cemetery, clubhouse, or terminal of a railroad”) (citing City of Chicago v. Farwell, 286 Ill. 415, 121 N.E. 795 (1918); City of Wichita v. Unified School Dist. No. 259, 201 Kan. 110, 439 P.2d 162, 166 (1968) (“school houses ... are special purpose properties not ordinarily bandied about in the market place, and hence a test other than market value must be employed in ascertaining their worth”); Commonwealth of Ky. v. City of Winchester, 431 S.W.2d 707, 710 (Ky.App.1968) (“strict adherence to the time honored market value approach in all types of condemnation cases is not wise”).
Despite ample authority to the contrary, the Court today disposes of the idea that a special purpose property has no market value; therefore, under the Court’s analysis, the substitute facilities measure never could apply. The Court’s discussion focuses upon the United States Supreme Court’s most recent decisions in this area, namely, United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. 506, 99 S.Ct. 1854, 60 L.Ed.2d 435 (1979) (“Lutheran Synod”) and United States v. 50 Acres of Land, 469 U.S. 24, 105 S.Ct. 451, 83 L.Ed.2d 376 (1984); but these cases do not support its conclusion. Further, they are factually distinguishable from the case now before us because market value was established in both cases.
In Lutheran Synod, the United States government condemned land that included a non-profit Lutheran summer camp. The Court refused to apply the substitute facilities measure of damages, because it found that the record contained evidence that the camp had a market value. Specifically, the record revealed that similar camp properties previously had been bought and sold in the prevailing market. In fact, the jury found that the camp’s market value was $740,000. See Lutheran Synod, 441 U.S. at 513 n. 8, 99 S.Ct. at 1858 n. 8. The Court thus refused to apply the substitute facilities doctrine because an ascertainable market value existed for the camp (and not because a private entity, as matter of law, cannot benefit from the doctrine).
In its opinion, this Court states that the Supreme Court was “[ujnable to ascertain [in Lutheran Synod ] any rationale requiring the suspension of the normal rules for determining just compensation” and thus “held that the fair market value measure applied.” At 607. The normal rules call for applying the market value approach if market value is ascertainable. Since the record contained evidence that the camp had a market value, there was no need for the Supreme Court to find a rationale to apply an alternative measure of damages. Thus, it was the record in Lutheran Synod, and not the identity of the petitioning party, that led the Court to refuse to apply the substitute facilities doctrine. Additionally, this Court is incorrect in asserting that the Supreme Court rejected in Lutheran Synod the possibility that the doctrine could be applied to a non-profit private entity. At 611 n. 7. This repeats the error of focusing on the condemnee’s identity rather than on whether a market value for the condemned tract exists.
In 50 Acres, the Supreme Court again refused to apply the substitute facilities doctrine because the record contained evidence that the condemned property in issue possessed a market value. In assessing damages, the jury in 50 Acres arrived at two figures, one calculating the market value for the condemned land, a city dump, and the other determining the cost of applying the substitute facilities doctrine. Id., 469 U.S. at 28, 105 S.Ct. at *625454. The city argued that the government was constitutionally compelled by the Just Compensation Clause to apply the substitute facilities doctrine, even though an ascertainable market value for the condemned land existed. The Supreme Court disagreed holding that the substitute facilities measure could not apply. The Court noted that:
[t]his case is not one in which an exception to the normal measure of just compensation is required because fair market value is not ascertainable. Such cases, for the most part, involve properties that are seldom, if ever, sold in the open market. Under those circumstances, ‘we cannot predict whether the prices previously paid, assuming there have been prior sales, would be repeated in a sale of the condemned property.’ (citation omitted). In this case, however, the testimony at trial established a fairly robust market for sanitary landfill properties, (citation omitted), and the jury’s determination of the fair market value of the condemned landfill facility is adequately supported by expert testimony concerning the sale prices of comparable property. (citations omitted).
Id. at 30, 105 S.Ct. at 455. Private schools in the City of Houston, like Duchesne, are “seldom, if ever, sold on the open market.” Further, unlike the jury in 50 Acres, the jury in this case did not find an ascertainable market value for the condemned property.
Rather than constricting the substitute facilities doctrine, 50 Acres left open the possibility for its expansion. The Court observed that the constitutional mandate of just compensation could require a court to award damages based on substitute facilities, even if an ascertainable market value exists, if the condemnee can show that “payment of market value in a particular case is manifestly unjust and therefore inconsistent with the Just Compensation Clause.” 50 Acres, 469 U.S. at 37, 105 S.Ct. at 458 (O’Connor, J., concurring). This does not describe a “waning doctrine.” At 610. In her concurrence in 50 Acres, Justice O’Connor admits to the possibility that a public condemnee could recover through the substitute facilities measure even if the record contained evidence of a market value for the condemned property. This unusual outcome could only occur if paying the condemnee the market value would “deviate[] significantly from the make-whole remedy intended by the Just Compensation Clause.” 469 U.S. at 37, 105 S.Ct. at 459 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
Instead of analyzing the language in 50 Acres, the Court simply “reject[s] Du-chesne’s contention that 50 Acres somehow implies that the substitute facilities doctrine can be applied to takings of private property_” At 610. The relevant language in 50 Acres reveals, however, that the substitute facilities measure of damages can be applied to private as well as public condemnees if no market value exists for the condemned land. But this Court now proposes that the market value measure must always provide the remedy for a damaged private condemnee, ignoring in the process precedent which established that some condemned tracts may not have an ascertainable market value. See, e.g., State v. South Main Baptist Church, 361 S.W.2d 898, 901 (Tex.Civ.App.—Houston 1962, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (jury found condemned land had no market value); State v. Richardson, 215 S.W.2d 359, 361 (Tex.Civ.App.—Eastland 1948, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (same); City of Trinity v. McPhail, 131 S.W.2d 803, 806 (Tex.Civ.App.—Galveston 1939, no writ) (market value test does not apply if “jury finds that property involved has no market value”); see also City of Austin v. Cannizzo, 153 Tex. 324, 267 S.W.2d 808, 812 (1954) (“where a property has no market value its intrinsic value may be shown”).
IV.
Today’s opinion compounds the error the court of appeals made in concluding that “the substitute facilities measure is not intended to be applied to private landowning condemnees,” because private con-demnees, unlike public condemnees, are un*626der no “obligation to continue the function performed on the taken property.” 9 811 S.W.2d at 738. The United States Supreme Court abrogated this “public duty requirement” for the substitute facilities doctrine, probably because of inherent equal protection problems, when it said that the “obligation to maintain public services ... does not justify a distinction between public and private condemnees for the purpose of measuring just compensation.” 50 Acres, 469 U.S. at 34, 105 S.Ct. at 457. The Court went on to say that “[ejven though most private condemnees are not legally obligated to replace property taken by the Government, economic circumstances often force them to do so.” Id. Thus, a public con-demnee’s legal “obligation to replace a condemned facility ... is no more compelling than the obligations assumed by private citizens.” Id.; see also Michael H. Schill, Intergovernmental Takings and Just Compensation: A Question of Federalism, 137 U.Pa.L.Rev. 629, 889 (1989) (arguing that Just Compensation Clause provides more protection from unfair burdens of takings for private condemnees than public).10
In light of this clear language, I do not understand how the Court can say that “nothing in Lutheran Synod or 50 Acres supports the application of the substitute facilities doctrine to private schools.” At 609. This statement is particularly inappo-site given that the outcome in these two cases turned not on the plaintiffs’ identities, but on the fact, as the Court admits, that the trial court’s records in both cases contained evidence that the condemned properties possessed market values. At 609.
A Texas court of appeals anticipated the United States Supreme Court’s abandonment of the public/private distinction regarding takings’ remedies. See City of San Antonio v. Congregation of the Sisters of Charity, 404 S.W.2d 333 (Tex.Civ.App.—Eastland 1966, no writ). In that case, the court said that the proper measure of damages for taking part of the land of a private school is the same as it is in like cases where land of a public school is taken. Id. at 337. That court also acknowledged the equal protection problems such distinctions might present. Id. at 335. Sisters of Charity progressed from the first application of the substitute facilities doctrine in Texas in State v. Waco Indep. School Dist., 364 S.W.2d 263, 264 (Tex.Civ.App.—Waco 1963, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (applying doctrine to a public school). In allowing the purchase of adjacent land for school building reconstruction, the court in Waco stated that the purpose of the substitute facilities doctrine was to “restore the remainder of the campus to a utility equal to that which the campus had prior to the condemnation.” Waco, 364 S.W.2d at 267. This language is relevant to the case at bar, because it precisely describes the City’s purpose in arguing for the “cost to cure” measure. Cf. Board of Educ. v. Commonwealth, 528 S.W.2d 657, 658 (Ky.App.1975) (construed substitute facilities measure applied in Waco to include “cost to cure”); see also City of Tulsa v. Mingo School Dist. No. 16, 559 P.2d 487, 494 (Okla.App.1976) (estimating restoration cost of demolished buildings amounted to *627applying substitute facilities measure).11 Thus, Texas precedent, as well as the United States Supreme Court’s most recent writing on the subject, supports the manner in which the trial court applied the substitute facilities/“cost to cure” measure.
V.
The Court’s opinion neither presents nor analyzes the principal issue in this case, namely, whether the substitute facilities measure of damages, as applied here, could include the acquiring of adjacent land. The City framed its objection to the substitute facilities’ part of the jury charge by complaining about this potential acquisition. The City’s counsel noted that the:
City of Houston objects because only the cost to cure limited to the remainder can be considered, and Question 1 allows the Jury to consider the cost of acquiring the adjoining 7.91 acres known as the Memorial Creole apartments as a substitute facilities (sic).
The City’s objection reveals that the focus of this dispute rested on whether acquisition of adjacent land was necessary to restore Duchesne’s original utility. The jury affirmatively answered this fact question. The City’s refusal to include adjacent land in its proposed remedy is thus the only substantive difference between the “cost to cure” measure and Duchesne’s substitute facilities measure.
The City’s chief appraiser implicitly identified the City’s “cost to cure” proposal with substitute facilities when he noted that the City’s restoration plans would provide “bigger and better buildings” which were “vastly superior ... by millions of dollars” to the old buildings. He emphasized that the new facilities would be “worth ten times more than existing buildings.” He even went so far as to testify that the “cost to cure,” under other circumstances, could include acquiring adjacent property, if such acquisition was needed to restore the condemned land to its original utility. This testimony echoed what the City’s counsel told the jury during voir dire, when he said that the City intended to provide Duchesne with “a better facility than [Duchesne] had previously.”
By equating the “cost to cure” with the “cost approach,” the Court repeats the error made by the court of appeals. 811 S.W.2d at 738-39. The former is a method for measuring damages to a remainder in terms of the cost to repair or restore; the latter is a way to determine the market value of a condemned tract when no market data or comparable sales exist. The cost approach requires separate valuation of the land and improvements less depreciation. See The AppRaisal of Real Estate 349 (9th ed. 1987). The City did not obtain these separate valuations, probably because it recognized that the remainder had no market value; and it did not adduce any evidence as to depreciation, an essential element of the cost approach. Thus, the Court’s discussion of this method of valuation is not relevant.12
*628The City did ask for a partial remedy based on the “cost to cure” the remainder. See 4 Nichols on Eminent Domain § 12B.11[1] (3rd ed. 1987) (cost to cure is method for measuring damages to remainder caused by partial taking of special purpose property where damaged property can be restored by repair or reconstruction). The “cost to cure” measure, as developed by the City, resembled Duchesne’s substitute facilities measure in that the City anticipated removing damaged buildings and reconstructing new and improved facilities on the remaining portion of Duchesne’s campus. The “cost to cure” and substitute facilities measures are similar but “[t]he cost of reproduction refers to the cost of duplication with the same or similar materials and appearance, and is not necessarily the same as the cost of replacement, which is considered a substitute or equally functional facility.” See 4 Nichols on Eminent Domain § 12B.11[3] (3rd ed. 1987) (discussing Model Eminent Domain Code on cost of reproduction).
One key distinction between “cost to cure” and substitute facilities is that the former confines its remedy to the remainder. See St. Patrick’s Church v. State of N.Y., 30 A.D.2d 473, 294 N.Y.S.2d 275, 277 (1986)) (citing Nichols) (“cost to cure” allowed “because cure was to occur within the bounds of the claimant’s lands”). If full restoration of the condemnee’s property requires “action outside of the remainder tract, this restoration cost, or cost to cure, cannot be considered.” J.D. Eaton, Real Estate Valuation in Litigation 180 (1982). Yet the “cost to cure” and substitute facilities measures both conceive of restoring the damaged condemnee’s property with new construction. The City proposed a hybrid, agreeing to replace Du-chesne’s damaged facilities with better ones (going beyond “cost to cure”) but refusing to agree to the acquisition of adjacent land (falling short of substitute facilities).
The City specifically pleaded that it would provide replacement facilities of greater value than existed before the taking. Rather than simply estimating the costs of reproducing or repairing those facilities damaged or destroyed by the taking, the City instead proposed to replace them. By offering to restore the campus in a way that substantially would enhance Duchesne’s worth, the City submitted a remedy that can best be categorized as a substitution facilities measure of damages. Hence, the trial court properly permitted the jury to decide the real question in this case, namely, whether restoring Duchesne School to its original utility required the acquisition of adjacent land.13 Considering all of these factors, particularly the noise and air pollution generated by 38,000 vehicles per day, the proximity of the road to existing buildings and the flawed design of the roadway, I do not believe that the submitted issue was defective.
VI.
Since the trial court properly applied the substitute facilities doctrine, the issue of whether the City waived application of the market value measure by failing to preserve error is not relevant. Nonetheless, *629since the Court remands this cause for a new trial, a brief discussion of the issues submitted by the City is appropriate.
The City submitted two questions and instructions that attempted to invoke the market value test.14 The City’s submissions are not in “substantially correct” form as required by Tex.R.Civ.P. 278, because they failed to properly provide the market value test as prescribed by State v. Carpenter and its progeny. That is, the City failed to include in its measure of damages the amount of loss derived from the value of the remainder before the taking less its value after the taking. More to the point, the trial court properly refused the question, because the City had already acknowledged during the trial that Du-chesne was a special purpose property for which no willing seller or willing buyer existed. Allowing these questions and instructions would be inconsistent with the City’s testimony.
The trial court recognized that this special case required an alternative measure of compensation. Both the City and Du-chesne argued for measures that contemplated the replacement of Duchesne’s taken or damaged buildings with new facilities. Thus, even if the substitute facilities measure did not apply, the market value method could not apply because, as the City concedes, the property has no ascertainable market value.
VII.
“The just compensation to which an owner is entitled when his property is taken by eminent domain is regarded in law from the point of view of the owner and not the condemnor. In other words, just compensation in the constitutional sense is what the owner has lost, and not what the con-demnor has gained.” 3 Nichols on Eminent Domain § 8.61 (3rd ed. 1987); see also Northern Natural Gas Co. v. Johnson, 278 S.W.2d 410 (Tex.Civ.App.—Amarillo 1954, writ ref’d n.r.e.); cf. City of Meriden v. Highway Commissioner, 169 Conn. 655, 363 A.2d 1094, 1097 (1975) (substitute facilities doctrine “has no true relationship to ‘valuation,’ but is instead a measure of just ‘compensation’ ”).
The City of Houston obtained a benefit through this condemnation process, namely, the new Chimney Rock extension. But Duchesne lost a great deal of its original capacity to provide an effective and safe learning environment to its 4000-plus students. Just compensation requires the City to make Duchesne whole by restoring that lost capacity.
I agree with the Court that the market value test should guide the measuring of compensation for partial takings of special purpose properties but only when some market value for the property is ascer*630tainable. At 617; see also 1 Rayburn on Condemnation § 16.04 (1987). In the rare case when no market value exists, courts must resort to alternative measures of compensation such as the substitute facilities doctrine. That is precisely what happened in this case. In its opinion, the Court says that “[although presenting unique and sympathetic facts, this case does not justify a departure from the market value concept.” At 617. If this very unique situation does not merit application of the substitute facilities doctrine, then no case will. The Court’s abrogation of the substitute facilities doctrine has some serious constitutional implications, because it deprives the citizens of Texas of a method of Just Compensation which the United States Supreme Court recently recognized as viable in 50 Acres. Thus, I would not be surprised if today’s decision is subjected to further federal review.
Disregarding our dispute over the applicability of the substitute facilities doctrine, the Court nevertheless should uphold the jury’s verdict. The trial court submitted the question to the jury in broad form. See Tex.R.Civ.P. 277 (“[i]n all jury cases the court shall, whenever feasible, submit the cause upon broad-form questions”). Neither the question nor the written instructions referred to the “substitute facilities” or “cost to cure” measures of damages. Cf. Department of Highways & Public Trans. v. King, 795 S.W.2d 888, 894 (Tex.App.—Beaumont 1990) writ denied per curiam 808 S.W.2d 465 (Tex.1991) (“trial court given broad discretion in determining sufficiency of instructions and definitions”). We previously have said “that trial courts are permitted, even urged, to submit the controlling issues of a case in broad terms so as to simplify the jury’s chore.” Texas Dept. of Human Services v. E.B., 802 S.W.2d 647, 649 (Tex.1990). Here, the trial judge properly followed that directive, giving to the jury, without complication, an acceptable broad issue on just compensation. He appropriately recognized that the jury, having engaged in a three week in-depth education on all the aspects of this case, was best qualified to ascertain what amount would justly make Duchesne whole; that is, what amount would achieve both the City’s and Du-chesne’s collective goal of restoring the school to its original pre-taking utility. Thus, he submitted a single question that broadly asked exactly that.
In my opinion, the court of appeals erred in reversing the trial court’s judgment based on the invalidity of substitute facilities doctrine, because the court’s broad form submission did not prescribe what basis — whether substitute facilities, cost to cure, or market value — the jury should use to reach its result. Additionally, this Court has denied Duchesne the just compensation it received when the trial court properly submitted the case to the jury. Thus, I dissent.
COOK, J., joins this opinion.
. The question read:
What do you find from a preponderance of the evidence was the reasonable cost on February 18, 1988, of land, if any, and improvements, if any, reasonably necessary to restore the remaining land and improvements at Du-chesne Academy to substantially the same function and use that existed at Duchesne Academy before the City’s taking of 1.479 acres of land and improvements thereon for construction and use of Chimney Rock Road? (emphasis added).
. The City did not pray for remittitur in its motion for new trial. During the hearing on the motion, the trial judge asked City's counsel, "[I]f I reduce it from $18 million to $12 million,
I would have to draw a judgment on that. Aren’t you asking to have it reduced?” The City’s counsel replied, "No, your honor."
. Throughout the opinion, the Court emphasizes that Duchesne is a “private” school. One cannot help but get the impression that if this were a "public” school, the court would re-instate the jury verdict. Yet such a distinction is unconstitutional.
The court of appeals justified its decision on the basis that "the institutional objectives [of private schools] ... may not correspond with community needs.” 811 S.W.2d at 738. I disagree. Accredited private schools serve a useful public purpose. They provide an excellent education, in which students are taught about God and moral values, respect for self and others, responsibility and discipline, without fear or apology. They also serve to relieve the overcrowding in public schools. As a consequence, private schools allow for more tax dollars per child to be spent in public schools. Thus, contrary to the court of appeals’ opinion, the institutional objectives and continued existence of these private institutions are not inimical to community values and needs.
The court of appeals’ suggestion that private schools are not legally obligated to spend compensation recovered in a condemnation proceeding — implying that they could take the money and run — does not justify treating them differently. In condemnation law, there is nothing that obligates any condemnee, whether public or private, to spend a compensatory award in any prescribed fashion. As the United States Supreme Court noted in United States v. 50 Acres of Land, 469 U.S. 24, 34, 105 S.Ct. 451, 457, 83 L.Ed.2d 376 (1984) the:
obligation [of public condemnees] to replace a condemned facility ... is no more compelling than the obligations assumed by private citizens. Even though most private con-demnees are not legally obligated to replace property taken by the Government, economic circumstances often force them to do so.... [There is no justification for] a distinction between public and private condemnees for the purpose of measuring "just compensation.”
.The City did not challenge the factual or legal sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jury’s verdict. Thus, the fact that acquiring the adjacent land was necessary to restore Duchesne to its original utility is conclusively established for purposes of this appeal. Vawter v. Garvey, 786 S.W.2d 263, 264 (Tex.1990).
. The Court mistakenly asserts that the City argued for the "market value test” at trial and provided an accepted alternative measure for ascertaining that market value. At 615. The record does not support this assertion. The City and Duchesne agreed that the school was a special purpose property which was not bought and sold on the market place and thus had no *622market value under the accepted test. Consequently, some alternative measure of damages was necessary.
. The United States Constitution provides that no private property shall "be taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S. Const. amend. V. The Texas Constitution says that "[n]o person’s property shall be taken, damaged or destroyed for or applied to public use without adequate compensation being made." Tex. Const, art. I, § 17.
. Judge Rayburn filed one of seven amicus briefs supporting Duchesne. The Court attacks, in footnote 13 of its opinion, Judge Rayburn’s position on the absence of market value by extracting a specific quotation from his treatise that appears to facially conflict with his brief. At 628 (citing 2 Rayburn on Condemnation at § 19.-01). The sentences preceding the quotation, however, provide some context. They say that the special purpose properties which are:
peculiarly susceptible to being valued by the intrinsic method, are those of churches, institutions and public buildings. Practically all other property of a real character, in its final analysis has a ready market value, in addition to its intrinsic value, or worth.
2 Rayburn on Condemnation § 19.01 (1987). (emphasis added); cf. West Texas Hotel Co. v. City of El Paso, 83 S.W.2d 772 (Tex.Civ.App.—El Paso 1935, writ dism’d) (intrinsic value of property determined by considering location, cost, improvements, use of property, expected future use). Judge Rayburn goes on to say that courts can derive compensation for condemned special purpose properties by “allowing the introduction of evidence as to what it would cost to replace the buildings and improvements, less its present depreciation, and substitute a similar property....” 2 Rayburn on Condemnation § 19.01 (1987). He also notes elsewhere in his treatise that "[w]here property, such as public or private school, has no market value capable of forming baseline by which to measure adequate compensation, trial court [w]as correct in submitting single issue of reasonable cost of acquiring substitute school facilities to jury.” 1 Id. at § 1.14(8) (citing State v. Waco Indep. School Dist., 364 S.W.2d 263, 264 (Tex.Civ.App.—Waco 1963, writ refd n.r.e.), and City of San Antonio v. Congregation of the Sisters of Charity, 404 S.W.2d 333 (Tex.Civ.App.—Eastland 1966, no writ)).
. At trial, the City’s chief appraiser testified that it is "general knowledge” that "schools are not sold in the open marketplace,” and therefore “Duchesne ... would be classified as a special *624purpose property," a conclusion confirmed by the City's other expert appraiser.
. The City agreed during voir dire that such public/private distinctions were impermissible.
Counsel for Duchesne: [W]e think that it may be the City's position that they will treat private schools differently than public schools; and if that’s wrong, [City’s counsel] can tell me I’m wrong right now.
Counsel for City: Well, yes, you are wrong. I say that everybody, under the Constitution, is entitled to equal treatment....
. The Court noted that:
[t]he text of the Fifth Amendment certainly does not mandate a more favorable rule of compensation for public condemnees than for
private parties. To the contrary, the language of the Amendment only refers to compensation for "private property,” and one might argue that the Framers intended to provide greater protection for the interests of private parties than for public condemnees. That argument would be supported by the observation that many public condemnees have the power of eminent domain, and thus, unlike private parties, need not rely on the availability of property on the market in acquiring substitute facilities.
50 Acres, 469 U.S. at 31, 105 S.Ct. at 455 (emphasis added).
. City of Tulsa v. Mingo School Dist. No. 16 resembles the case before us in several important ways. It also involved the partial taking of a school’s property for a motor way, the noise from which, upon completion and use, degraded the school’s educational environment. The trial court properly applied the substitute facilities doctrine to restore the school to its original utility by refurbishing the structures with soundproofing. As in our case, the city agreed at trial that the school had no market value, but then urged on appeal that the market value test should be used. 559 P.2d at 493. The court of appeals found the city’s position untenable in light of the record and recognized the need for an alternative measure of compensation. The court noted that:
[t]he courts in the majority of jurisdictions which have dealt with this problem have responded to the need for a substitute to the usual market value approach to compensation by adopting special rules for both the measure of compensation and the evidence admissible in condemnation proceedings involving special purpose property.
Id.
. The cost approach is most useful for valuing condemned property "when the land value is well supported and the improvements are new or suffer only minor accrued depreciation....” Id. Neither of these prerequisites exist in this case, which may account for the City’s failure to invoke it. Furthermore, ”[w]hen value estimates derived with the cost approach are not supported by market data, they must be regarded with caution.” See The Appraisal of Real Estate 350 (9th ed. 1987). Indeed, "the cost *628approach may be of limited effectiveness in valuing improved property.” Id.
. In footnote 10 of its opinion, the Court distinguishes the substitute facilities doctrine from the "cost to cure" measure by citing Nichols on Eminent Domain which says that "the cost approach has been used in lieu of the substitution approach so that depreciation may be taken into account. Also, damages to improvements on the remaining property have been recognized, usually in the form of cost to cure.” (emphasis added in majority opinion). 4 Nichols on Eminent Domain § 12C.01[4][e] (3d ed. 1987). Nichols distinguishes between the cost approach and the "cost to cure,” but the Court treats them as different names for the same concept. The City’s "cost to cure” measure contemplated not just recompense for damaged buildings on the remainder, but the removal and reconstruction of damaged or destroyed buildings; that is, the construction of substitute facilities which would be worth substantially more than the original buildings. The Court cites Nichols again in the same footnote for the proposition that the proper measure of damages for a partial taking of a special purpose property is the market value measure (value of tract taken plus loss in value of remainder). I agree that this measure should apply when the tract in issue has a market value; but the parties to this suit agreed that Duchesne has no market value.
. The City’s two refused questions and instructions read:
QUESTION NO. ONE FROM A PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE, WHAT DO YOU FIND WAS THE MARKET VALUE OF THE LAND CONDEMNED BY THE CITY OF HOUSTON FROM THE RELIGIOUS OF THE SACRED HEART OF TEXAS ON FEB. 18, 1988, CONSIDERED AS SEVERED LAND?
ANSWER: $_
INSTRUCTION:
YOU ARE INSTRUCTED THAT THE TERM "MARKET VALUE" IS THE PRICE WHICH THE PROPERTY WOULD BRING WHEN IT IS OFFERED FOR SALE BY ONE WHO DESIRES, BUT IS NOT OBLIGED TO SELL, AND IS BOUGHT BY ONE WHO IS UNDER NO NECESSITY OF BUYING IT, TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION ALL OF THE USES TO WHICH IT IS REASONABLY ADAPTABLE AND FOR WHICH IT EITHER IS OR IN ALL REASONABLE PROBABILITY WILL BE-
COME AVAILABLE WITHIN THE REASONABLE FUTURE.
QUESTION NO. TWO
WHAT DO YOU FIND WAS THE DAMAGES (sic), IF ANY, TO THE REMAINDER OF THEIR PROPERTY, EXCLUDING THE LAND CONDEMNED, RESULTING FROM THE CONDEMNATION OF THE LAND CONDEMNED, ON FEB. 18, 1988.
ANSWER: $_
INSTRUCTION:
IN ANSWERING QUESTION NO. TWO, YOU SHALL EXCLUDE INCREASE IN VALUE, IF ANY, AND DECREASE IN VALUE, IF ANY, BY REASON OF BENEFITS OR INJURIES RECEIVED BY RELIGIOUS OF THE SACRED HEART IN TEXAS IN COMMON WITH THE COMMUNITION (sic) GENERALLY, AND NOT PECULIAR TO IT IN CONNECTION WITH ITS OWNERSHIP, USE, AND ENJOYMENT OF THEIR REMAINING PROPERTY.