(concurring).
I agree that the judgment should be reversed, but I file this opinion to state my reasons for reversal.
Appellee, Musebeck Shoe Company, Inc., sued appellant, J. C. Hilton, upon a sworn account. Upon trial to the court, judgment was entered by the district court of Travis County in favor of appellee for $4,109.91 and attorneys’ fees.
In answer to appellee’s petition, appellant filed a plea in abatement to the effect that the goods set forth in appellee’s petition were not sold to appellant but rather to a corporation, Hilton Foot-So-Port Shoes, Inc. In addition, appellant pleaded in paragraph IV of his answer that “ . the claim alleged in Plaintiff’s Original Petition which is the foundation of Plaintiff’s action, including Exhibit ‘A’ is not just or true in whole or in part.” Both the plea in abatement and the pleading in paragraph IV were supported by an oath by appellant that such were “in every respect true and correct.”
After proving up attorneys’ fees and introducing appellant’s answer, appellee rested. Appellant opened his case by calling J. C. Hilton and tendering his testimony to show that the goods were, indeed, sold to the corporation rather than to him and that it was the debt of the corporation rather than his own. Counsel for appellee objected to the tender of this testimony upon the basis that inasmuch as appellant’s answer was not in conformance with Tex.R.Civ.P. 185, appellant could not defend by proving the debt was owed by the corporation. Presumably under the impression that appellant’s answer was in compliance with Rule 185, the court overruled appellee’s objections and allowed appellant to fully develop his defenses.
After judgment was entered for appellee, the court filed findings of fact and conclusions of law, among which was the conclusion that appellant’s answer did not conform to Rule 185.
It occurs to me that the court correctly concluded that appellant’s answer did not conform to Rule 185. That Rule, as amended in 1971, requires one resisting a suit on a sworn account to “ . . . file a written denial, under oath, stating that each and every item is not just or true, or that some specified item or items are not just and true . . . .” Duncan v. Butterowe, Inc., 474 S.W.2d 619 (Tex.Civ.App.1971, no writ); Solar v. Petersson, 481 S.W.2d 212 (Tex.Civ.App.1972, no writ).
Though some defenses against a sworn account may be proved in the absence of a sworn denial, the defense that the account was wrongfully charged against the defendant, and that he did not owe it, may not be proved in the absence of such a de*345nial. Collins v. Kent-Coffey Mfg. Co., 380 S.W.2d 59 (Tex.Civ.App.1964, writ ref’d); First National Bank of San Angelo v. Sheffield, 475 S.W.2d 820 (Tex.Civ.App. 1972, no writ); Yelton v. Bird Lime & Cement Co., 161 S.W.2d 353 (Tex.Civ.App. 1942, writ ref. w. o. m.).
Appellant’s fifth point of error is that the court erred in entering personal judgment against appellant because there was,, no evidence to support the judgment. A reading of the statement of facts shows that after proving up attorneys’ fees and introducing appellant’s answer appellee rested. Appellee never offered into evidence its sworn account.
In order to prove a cause of action on a sworn account, the account must be offered in evidence. Johnson v. Walker, 330 S.W.2d 508 (Tex.Civ.App.1959, no writ); Chisos Mining Co. v. Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co., 142 S.W.2d 549 (Tex.Civ.App. 1940, writ dism’d jdgmt. cor.).
As there is no evidence to support the judgment, appellant’s fifth point of error should be sustained.