On Motion for Rehearing.
Appellees C. P. Bordages and wife have filed a vigorous motion for rehearing in which they challenge the soundness of our original disposition of this case and have called our attention to certain errors in our original opinion. These errors will be corrected and the corrected opinion will be substituted for our original opinion. Notwithstanding the vigorous motion for rehearing and the capable manner in which it has been presented, we adhere to our original rulings. These appellees also complain of the failure of this court to specifically pass upon and discuss certain alternative points urged in their brief. These appellees specifically complain of our failure to discuss and specifically pass upon their alternative counter-points Nos. 2, 3 and 4. Appellees Point No. 1 contends that the finding of the jury in Special Issues Nos. 26, 27 and 28 are in irreconcilable conflict with their answer to Special Issue No. 31. We feel that this point was sufficiently discussed in our original opinion and for the reason therein 'stated the same is overruled. Appellees’ alternative Point of Error No. 2 is as follows : “The court committed error to ap-pellees’ prejudice in overruling and re- • fusing to sustain its objection to Special Issue No. 26 on the ground that such issue was a repetition of Special Issue No. 31, and thus’ a comment on the weight of the evidence and gave undue emphasis to plaintiffs’, as well as the original defendants’ theory of the case.”
Appellees’ Alternative Counter-Point No. 3 is as follows: “The court committed error to appellees’ prejudice in overruling and refusing to sustain its objections to Special Issue No. 26 on the ground that such issue was too vague and indefinite and made no specific inquiry as to where or at what time or place Mrs. Bordages failed to give any signal.” Appellees’ contentions are to the effect that the pleadings did not justify the submission of Special Issue No. 26 for the reason that appellants had alleged certain specific acts of negligence, all of which were found in favor of the appellees Bordages and wife, and that the court should not have submitted Special Issue No. 26, which inquired of the jury whether Mrs. Bordages failed to give an adequate or sufficient signal of her intention to turn, before the collision in question, contending that this allegation is purely a general allegation of negligence without specifying in what manner Mrs. Bordages was guilty of negligence; that such issue should not have been submitted to the jury over their objection which will be hereinafter set out, and that, even though the same was submitted and the finding of the jury was against such appellees, the trial court was authorized to disregard such finding on the theory that it was a general finding contrary to the specific findings, and that such general findings of negligence' should yield to a contrary finding on specific acts of alleged negligence. In discussing these points we feel that it is necessary to set out certain portions of the pleadings of the parties. The acts of negligence alleged against the appellees Bordages and wife, by the appellants are found in paragraph No. S of appellants’ answer and cross-action, and are as follows:
“At the time and place of said accident the said automobile belonging to the defendant C. P. Bordages, was being operated and driven by his wife, Lucie Marie Bordages; also defendant herein, in the furtherance of the business of C. P. *211Bordages and wife, Lucie Marie Bordages, defendants herein, as set forth herein so as to render the defendants, C. P. Bordages and wife, Lucie Marie Bordages, legally responsible for the negligence of Lucie Marie Bordages, who was operating and driving said automobile on such occasion, and the said defendant, Lucie Marie Bor-dages, on such occasion, was then and there guilty of acts, wrongs and omissions, each and all amount to negligence, which acts, wrongs, omissions and negligence, jointly and severally, were a proximate cause of such collision and being more particularly set forth as follows:
(a) In failing to keep a proper lookout;
(b) In turning suddenly in front of the bus;
(c) In failing to hold her left arm straight out so as to give a signal of her intention to turn;
(d) In failing to give an adequate or sufficient signal of her intention to turn;
That each and all of the foregoing acts, wrongs and omissions on the part of the said Lucie Marie Bordages, who was then and there driving the automobile belonging to her husband, C. P. Bordages, in the furtherance of the business of the defendants, C. P. Bordages and wife, Lucie Marie Bordages, jointly and severally, proximately caused said collision and the injuries and damages of the plaintiff hereinafter set forth.
And further in this connection, plaintiff would show that under the law of the road of the State of Texas, the defendant, Lucie Marie Bordages, before turning, stopping, or changing the course of her automobile, was first required to see that there was sufficient space for such movement to be made in safety and to give plainly visible or audible signal to any other vehicle which might be affected by such turning, stopping or changing course, and plaintiff would show that defendant, Lucie Marie Bor-dages, failed to heed or obey the terms and provisions of said law of the road, being Article 801, Subdivision “K”, Penal Code, Criminal Statutes of Texas, 1925, in that she did not look to see whether or not any other vehicle would be affected by the changing of course of her automobile, and further, violated said regulation in not giving plainly visible or audible signal of her intention to turn, and such violation of said statute proximately caused said collision and the injuries and damages to the plaintiff, Jessie Guidry, hereinafter set forth.”
To this cross-action the appellees Mr. and Mrs. Bordages filed only a general denial. No exception was made to the allegation as to her failing to give an adequate or sufficient signal or of her intention to turn. The exception made to the submission of this issue to the jury is as follows: “Said issue is too vague and indefinite in that it does not inquire as to where or at what time and place Mrs. Bordages failed to give such signals.” As we construe this objection it does not include or cover the complaint that it was submitting a general issue of negligence. As we construe this objection it only complained of the submission of the issue because it did not inquire as to where or at what time and place Mrs. Bordages failed to give such signal. Therefore, we are confronted with the proposition that the appellants plead that Mrs. Bordages failed to give an adequate or sufficient signal of her intention to turn, to which there was no objection on the ground that it was too general, followed by a submission by the court to the jury of such issue without any objection that it was a submission of negligence generally. As we understand the contention of the appellees, we are requested to either, affirm or reverse and remand this cause when neither the pleadings nor the charge were objected to for the reasons now urged. Appellees contend that this being a general finding that, it must give way to the specific findings, and in support of this contention they cite the case of Harbin v. City of Beaumont, Tex.Civ.App., 146 S.W.2d 297. As we construe the holding in the case of Pearson v. Doherty, by our Supreme Court, 143 Tex. 64, 183 S.W.2d 453, the rule announced in the Harbin case, which followed Cuniff v. Bernard Corp., Tex.Civ.App., 94 S.W.2d 577, also by this court, is overruled.
*212In the Cuniff case the substance of the holding was to the effect that if the jury makes a specific finding in conflict with the general finding that the specific finding must be given effect. As we understand the opinion in the Pearson case, this ruling is disapproved. We held in our original opinion that the finding of the jury to Special Issue No. 31 was not in conflict with their finding to Special Issue No. 26 and for that reason gave full effect to the jury’s findings to Special Issues Nos. 26, 27 and 28. In the event there was a conflict we would not be authorized to disregard the finding to Special Issue No. 26 and give effect to the other findings of the jury on more specific acts of negligence. The rule as announced in the Pearson case, supra, is: “The rule is that there is no priority of findings, either in degree or importance, and where two findings with respect to a material fact are such that both cannot be true, then neither can stand.” [143 Tex. 64, 183 S.W.2d 455.]
Appellees’ Alternative Point of Error No. 4 is as follows:
“The court erred to appellees’ prejudice in overruling and refusing to sustain its objection to Special Issue No. 40 of the court’s charge, and particularly to that part which included future mental pain, on the ground that such issue failed to confine the jury to such mental pain as they might find from a preponderance of the evidence Jessie Guidry would in reasonable probability sustain in the future.”
We felt that what we said in our original opinion was sufficient to dispose of this point. However, on motion for rehearing the appellees Mr. and Mrs. Bor-dages urged that their objection to Special Issue No. 40 covered matters which were not discussed by us. Upon an examination of the record we find that Sub-Section c, under objection No. 16, does raise an additional objection to that which is covered by their point of error or the argument under such point. However, after due consideration, we are of the opinion that Special Issue No. 40 to which the objection was lodged is not subject to the objection made. The objection being: “Said instructions do not confine the jury to such mental pain, if any, as they may find from a preponderance of the evidence the plaintiff, Jessie Guidry, will in reasonable probability sustain in the future as a direct and proximate result of the negligence, if any, of the third party defendants.” Special Issue No. 40 as submitted to the jury confines the jury to damages resulting from injuries, if any, sustained by Jessie Guidry in the collision in question. Other issues submitted to the jury made inquiry as to whether the collision in question was the result of negligent acts on the part of ap-pellees. The jury having found that the collision in question was the result of the negligent act of these appellees, it necessarily follows that any injuries received by the plaintiff was the result of and proximately caused by the negligence of these appellees as well as the negligence of appellant Airline Motor Coaches. This we feel is sufficient limitation upon the jury in awarding damages to the appellee Guidry as against Mr. and Mrs. Bordages, and that the rule announced in the case of Standard Paving Company v. Pyle, Tex.Civ.App., 131 S.W.2d 200 and the case of Anderson v. Reichart, Tex.Civ.App., 116 S.W.2d 772, and other cases cited by these appellees does not apply.
We feel that what we have said here, together with what we said in the original opinion, sufficiently discusses the points raised; all of appellees Bordages’ alternative points of error are overruled’ and their motion for rehearing is denied.