dissenting. It appears to me the majority opinion is an attempt to restore authority in the chancery courts to issue writs of mandamus. This Court ended such authority in the case of Nethercutt v. Pulaski County Special School District, 248 Ark. 143, 450 S.W.2d 777 (1970). There the school board had declined to renew the contract of Nethercutt and he filed suit in chancery seeking a “mandatory injunction” directing the school board to execute and deliver his contract for the current year. He also sought a writ of mandamus restoring him to his former position and ordering the board to pay his back salary. The school board demurred on the ground that chancery did not have jurisdiction of the matter alleged in the complaint. The complaint was amended but the board stood on its demurrer and the chancellor dismissed the amended complaint. This Court affirmed the chancellor’s holding that he did not have jurisdiction to hear the petition for mandatory injunction and mandamus.
Although the General Assembly had enacted legislation authorizing chancery courts to rule on petitions for mandamus, (see Ark. Stat. Ann. § 33-101 (Repl. 1962)), this Court in Nethercutt stated:
It appears this is the first time we have been asked to focus our attention upon the constitutionality of this statute [Act 54 of 1939]. We must agree that the provision of this act, with respect to the jurisdiction of the chancery court in the case at bar, is in violation of Article 7, §§ 11 and 15 of our Constitution. . . . The writ of mandamus is a common law writ and a remedy at law which was unknown to equity procedure. . . .
The legislature can neither enlarge nor diminish the jurisdiction of chancery courts and any attempt to do so is unconstitutional. ... It follows, therefore, that jurisdiction of writs of mandamus, being traditionally common law writs, is restricted to and vested solely in our circuit or law courts.
The majority attempts to avoid the issue of the proper forum to entertain a petition for a writ of mandamus by labeling the relief sought a “mandatory injunction.” Nethercutt also tried to get around the mandamus writ by calling his complaint a “mandatory injunction.” This Court called it correctly when it stated: “Obviously, it is the thrust of appellants’ complaints that by mandamus appellee be compelled to renew appellants’ teaching contracts and pay them according to the contractual terms for the ensuing school year. We hold that such an action is not cognizable in equity.” Therefore, equity does not have jurisdiction to issue a writ of mandamus even though the language of the complaint called the relief sought by the name of a mandatory injunction.
This court has held since Goings v. Mills, 1 Ark. 11 (1837), that mandamus will lie only to enforce a clearly established right for which there is no other adequate remedy. An injunction is preventative and affords relief against future acts. Comer v. Woods, 210 Ark. 351, 195 S.W.2d 542 (1946). Mandamus will not lie to determine future rights. Its purpose is to enforce an established right or to enforce the performance of a duty. Boone County v. Apex of Arkansas, Inc., 288 Ark. 152, 702 S.W.2d 795 (1986). Chandler v. Perry-Casa Public Schools District #2, 286 Ark. 170, 690 S.W.2d 349 (1985). Mandamus will also not lie to compel a specific course of action if the matter is within the discretion of the public official or body. Lewis v. Conlee, 258 Ark. 715, 529 S.W.2d 132 (1975). Whether a matter is within the discretion of a board, agency, or court, mandamus is cognizable only in the circuit court. Williams v. Board of Education, 274 Ark. 530, 626 S.W.2d 361 (1982); Springdale School District v. Jameson, Judge, 274 Ark. 78, 621 S.W.2d 860 (1981); and Fortman v. Texarkana School District #7, 257 Ark. 130, 514 S.W.2d 720 (1974).
In Springdale School District v. Jameson, Judge, supra, a teacher was attempting in circuit court to compel a school district to reinstate him in his job. The school district moved to dismiss, or in the alternative, to transfer to chancery. The circuit court denied both motions. The school district then sought a writ of prohibition from this Court. In denying the petition for a writ we stated that the prayer for reinstatement was in the nature of a petition for a writ of mandamus. A writ of mandamus is defined at Ark. Stat. Ann. § 33-102 (Repl. 1962) as an order “granted upon the petition for an aggrieved party or the State when the public interest is affected, commanding an executive, judicial or ministerial officer to perform an act, or omit to do an act, the performance or omission of which is enjoined by law.” We held that a mandamus action is cognizable in circuit court and not in chancery, citing Nethercutt.
In Chandler v. Perry-Casa Public Schools, supra, we affirmed the holding by the circuit court that mandamus would not lie to compel a school board to assign a teacher to specific duties. Citing Jameson, supra, we explained that the school board had not failed or refused to do an act which was plainly its duty.
In the case before us the appellee seeks to establish her right to reenter school. Although she labeled her prayer for relief a mandatory injunction, she is obviously, like Nethercutt, seeking mandamus to compel the board to readmit her to school. It is clear that circuit courts have the authority to compel a public entity to act. The majority cites only Safferstone v. Tucker, 235 Ark. 70, 357 S.W.2d 3 (1962),for the proposition thatcourtsof equity also have such power. In Safferstone students were seeking in chancery to prevent their transfer to another school; however, Safferstone predated Nethercutt, and its prayer, which was denied, was not seeking to enforce an established right, but to prevent a future action.
The result of the majority’s decision is that a chancery court may compel a public body to act. The majority recognizes the law and the precedent but it mistakenly gives chancery courts jurisdiction which belongs to circuit courts. Since the chancery court does not have subject matter jurisdiction, it is not necessary to determine whether the board’s action was capricious, arbitrary, or contrary to the law.
Hickman and Dudley, JJ., join this dissent.