George Combs allegedly was injured when he slipped and fell on an icy sidewalk as he was leaving the restaurant operated by the movant, Corbin Motor Lodge. The incident occurred about 7:30 p.m. on December 27, 1983. In Combs’ words the weather was terrible, so bad in fact that Interstate Highway No. 75 near the restaurant had been closed to traffic. He had walked upon the sidewalk on entering the restaurant and knew that it was extremely slick.
Summary judgment was entered for movant relying upon Standard Oil Company v. Manis, Ky., 433 S.W.2d 856 (1968), which held that natural outdoor hazards which are as obvious to an invitee as to the owner of the premises do not constitute an unreasonable risk to the former which the landlord has a duty to remove or warn against.
The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment and remanded for further proceedings. We granted discretionary review and now reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals.
Without question the rule enunciated in Standard Oil Company v. Manis, supra, if it is still valid, absolves the mov-ant from liability in this case. The respondents contend, however, that Standard Oil Company v. Manis, supra, is no longer valid in view of our recent holding in Hilen v. Hays, Ky., 673 S.W.2d 713 (1984). Hilen v. Hays, held that contributory negligence is no longer an absolute bar to a recovery in negligence actions.
Respondents state that Standard Oil Company v. Manis, supra, is predicated upon the assumption of risk of injury by one who walks upon premises covered by natural hazards such as ice and snow. They further contend that in the negligence context we abolished the defense of assumption of risk in Parker v. Redden, Ky., 421 S.W.2d 586 (1967), which held in essence that in negligence cases the defense of assumption of risk is essentially the same defense as contributory negligence.
Standard Oil Company v. Manis, supra, involved a slip and fall upon an icy sidewalk, as does this case, and it could be argued that the user of the premises was contributorily negligent and that his claim *946could have been barred under the law as it existed at that time. The decision, however, did not turn upon a bar of contributory negligence, which in itself implies negligence upon the part of the defendant, but rather upon the fact that the defendant itself was not negligent.
The Standard Oil Company v. Manis decision was based upon the ground that the risk was as obvious to the person injured as to the owner of the premises and that it occurred outdoors as a result of natural hazards.
“(In substance this opinion stands for the proposition that a person charged with negligence is not bound to foresee the negligence of another.)”
Standard Oil Company v. Manis, supra at 858.
“In substance the foregoing three cases established the rule that natural outdoor hazards which are as obvious to an invitee as to the owner of the premises do not constitute unreasonable risk to the former which the landlord has a duty to remove or warn against.”
Standard Oil Company v. Manis, supra at 858.
“As we have heretofore noted, the hazard faced by appellee was created by natural elements. It was outside, and exposed in broad daylight. Appellee was thoroughly familiar with the structure. He was fully aware of the accumulation of ice and snow in the area. He saw that the level part of the walkway was wet, indicating that melting ice had been there. That there might be on the platform unmelted ice, or refreezing water, was a distinct possibility. Under the circumstances we are of the opinion defendant could not have reasonably foreseen that appellee would proceed without exercising commensurate caution.
“There was no duty on appellant to stay the elements or make this walkway absolately (sic) safe. Nor was there a duty to warn appellee that the obvious natural conditions may have created a risk. If a ‘glare of ice’ existed on the platform, whatever hazard it constituted was as apparent to appellee as it was to appellant. We are unable to find a breach of duty by the latter. See Nance v. Ames Plaza, Inc., 177 Neb. 88, 128 N.W.2d 564.”
Standard Oil Company v. Manis, supra at 859.
The holding in Standard Oil Company v. Manis, supra, denied liability not because of the contributory negligence of the plaintiff therein but because there was no duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff, and consequently there was no negligence on the part of the defendant. Obviously, the court in Manis, supra, considered injuries occurring outdoors as a result of natural conditions, such as ice and snow, to be in a special category and promulgated a rule of law applicable to those situations. Within the last six months we have denied discretionary review in a similar case relying upon Standard Oil Company v. Manis, supra. Ashcraft v. People’s Liberty Bank and Trust Company, Inc., Ky.App., 724 S.W.2d 228 (1987).
There are persuasive considerations which favor the rule enunciated in Standard Oil Company v. Manis, supra. There are also some reasonable arguments for a different ruling. We do not think the law in this area, as it exists today, reaches an absurd result or that a change in the present law is compelled in order to avoid grave injustices. Unless the need to change the law is compelling, the majority of this court is of the opinion that stability in the law is of sufficient importance to require that we not overturn established precedent which itself is based upon a reasonable premise. .
Respondents contend that summary judgment was not proper because a genuine issue of fact is presented as to whether the hazard was open and obvious. The deposition of respondent George Combs contained his testimony that the weather was terrible, that the interstate highway was forced to close, and that just prior to the fall he had traversed the sidewalk in question and knew that it was slick. We do not believe there is a genuine issue as to whether the risk was open and obvious.
*947The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed with direction that the judgment of the trial court be reinstated.
STEPHENS, C.J., and GANT, STEPHENSON and WINTERSHEIMER, JJ., concur. LAMBERT, J., dissents by separate opinion in which LEIBSON, J., joins.