dissenting.
In Puckett, the supreme court held that “[i]t would be against public policy to allow the insurance company ... to avoid liability by way of a breach” of a clause excluding “coverage ... if the aircraft ... airworthiness certificate is not in full force and effect” because that requirement “amounts to nothing more than a technicality.” Puckett v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 678 S.W.2d 936, 938 (Tex.1984). In this case, on the other hand, the policy’s open pilot warranty formed the “basis of the bargain” between the parties — the antithesis of a mere “technicality.” Indeed, according to the AIG underwriter who worked on Holt’s policy, Alan Baker, AIG takes “a good close look at what type of pilots would be operating the aircraft and what type of uses the aircraft would be involved in”; and a particular pilot’s qualifications and training are factors routinely considered in determining whether and how much to modify a policy’s “base rate” premium.
Because this case does not involve a requirement that is a mere “technicality,” I would hold Puckett does not apply and reverse the trial court’s judgment and render judgment in AIG’s favor. I therefore dissent.