dissenting in part and joining the judgment.
The Dallas County Magistrates Act may have intended “to relieve the heavy docket congestion of Dallas County district courts,” Howard v. State, 690 S.W.2d 252, 254-255 (Tex.Cr.App.1985). But quite obviously legislators did not pause long enough to consider that appeals attacking one or another provision of that Act, and complaining of manners of administering it, would create heavy docket congestion in the Dallas Court of Appeals and in this Court. Seemingly weary of them Judge Teague begins the opinion of the Court, “This is another Dallas County Magistrate’s [sic] Act case.” And so it is, this particular one coming here for the second time.
While appellant presented three grounds for review, the core proposition upon which they stand or fall is that it is fundamental error for a judge of a district court of Dallas County to assign a case to a magistrate without a written order of referral specifying the duties of the magistrate pursuant to former article 1918c, § 4(c), V.A. C.S., and therefore conducting subsequent proceedings violates prescribed jurisdiction of the district court in Article V, § 8, and denies due course of law guaranteed by Article I, § 19, both of the Constitution of the State of Texas, and in the latter also by Article 1.04, V.A.C.C.P.
As I understand it the opinion faults the court of appeals for declining to entertain what is perceived as a jurisdictional question sought to be raised in that court for the first time on motion for rehearing, to-wit: “jurisdiction or authority of the magistrate to act [without a written order of referral];” finds that such a question may be raised at any time; and noticing in the statement of facts an opening remark of a magistrate that he has “an Order by a District Judge referring this case to me for a hearing,” the majority then proceeds to answer the question it just held in effect the court of appeals should have. For reasons about to be given I do not agree that the court of appeals was in error, and thus do not reach the procedural question of remanding the cause in deference to that court for its own answer, as we ordinarily do.
The Court has said that “magistrates act as agents of the district courts, and have no authority of their own.” Howard v. State, 690 S.W.2d 252, 254 (Tex.Cr.App.1985). The majority view in this Court is that the Act does not require a referring district judge “to name a particular magistrate or issue an order of referral separately for each case” — a general order of referral is sufficient to authorize a magistrate to act. Ex parte Stacey, 709 S.W.2d 185 (Tex.Cr.App.1986) (Miller, J., concurring at 190-191; Opinion on State’s Motion for Rehearing, at 192).*
Therefore, authority to conduct a proceeding prescribed in § 4 and to do the acts permitted by § 5 is delegated to a magistrate by the judge of district court when he *794refers the case. A magistrate has general jurisdiction, subject matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction because a district court has referred a matter to and the defendant appears to participate in the proceeding before the magistrate. Since a separate, specific order of referral is not required by the prevailing interpretation to authorize a magistrate to act as agent for the district court having jurisdiction of the case, whether such an order is extant becomes an utterly irrelevant inquiry.
For those reasons the district court below did not err in the respects asserted in the first and second grounds for review, and contrary to the third ground for review, the Dallas Court of Appeals did not err in overruling appellant’s motion for rehearing. The grounds of review falls because the central proposition formulated ante is not of a jurisdictional nature.
Accordingly, I join the judgment of the Court.
As the writer continues to read it, § 4(c) of the Act mandates that a judge of district court with jurisdiction of a case "shall issue an order of referral specifying the duties of the magistrate” to be performed in the particular proceeding involved, in order effectively to refer a case and delegate authority to conduct the proceeding. Wilson v. State, 698 S.W.2d 145 (Tex.Cr.App.1985) (Clinton, J., dissenting at 149-150); Kelly v. State, 724 S.W.2d 42 (Tex.Cr.App.1987) (Clinton, J., dissenting at 53, n. 4). Just as jurisdiction of district court over a particular case is not invoked until an appropriate charging instrument is filed, so also authority of a magistrate to perform certain duties in conducting a particular proceeding does not attach until a specific order of referral of a given case is issued. The majority sees the point, but it is content merely to "continue to recommend” that a separate order of referral be issued and filed among the papers in the case. At p. 792; Kelley v. State, 724 S.W.2d 42, 48, n. 3. So far its recommendation seems to have fallen on deaf ears.