(dissenting), The underlying facts of *475this.case are set forth in detail in People v Catania, 140 Mich App 755; 366 NW2d 38 (1985). The pertinent facts may be briefly stated.
Defendant was convicted by a jury of possession of cocaine with intent to deliver, MCL 333.7401(1), (2)(a)(iv); MSA 14.15(7401X1), (2)(a)(iv), and possession of marijuana with intent to deliver, MCL 333.7401(1), (2)(c); MSA 14.15(7401)(1), (2)(c). Defendant received a concurrent sentence of eight to forty years for the possession of cocaine offense and five to eight years for the possession of marijuana offense.
Leave to appeal was granted in this case to determine whether defendant’s consent to entry to his house by a police informant was rendered invalid where the consent was obtained by deceptions as to the informant’s identity and purpose.
We would hold that an entry without a warrant effected by ruse constitutes an unreasonable and illegal search under Const 1963, art 1, § 11, when there was no rational basis to suspect that criminal activity was afoot in defendant’s home at the time the entry took place. The record in this case is devoid of any evidence concerning why the governmental authorities selected defendant’s home to conduct such an entry. We would therefore remand this case to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing.
I. FACTS
On March 10, 1981, JoAnn Ward, described as a very attractive eighteen-year-old, was a confidential police informant for the Berrien County Metro Narcotics Squad. Ms. Ward was also the sister-in-law of one of the narcotic squad detectives assigned to defendant’s case. On the evening of March 10, Ms. Ward was directed to go to a *476residence located at 2106 Russell Road for the sole purpose of inducing the occupant to sell her some drugs. Upon arrival at the site, Ms. Ward knocked on the back door and defendant answered. Ms. Ward feigned car trouble and sought entry into defendant’s home to use his telephone. She did not identify herself as a police agent. Defendant admitted Ms. Ward and directed her to the phone. After making a bogus phone call, Ms. Ward engaged in conversation with defendant and presented herself as a "party girl.” She did not bring up the subject of drugs, however, defendant invited Ward to smoke a "joint” with him. Ms. Ward and defendant then smoked a joint which was provided by defendant. Ms. Ward then asked defendant if he knew where she could obtain some "coke,” defendant responded: "What do you think you fell into here?”
Ms. Ward left defendant’s home and reported her findings to the authorities. On the basis of the information obtained from Ms. Ward, an affidavit was sworn out, and a search warrant issued. The search warrant authorized the police to search defendant’s residence for a "quantity of . . . marijuana.” During the search, officers discovered a garbage bag containing what was later identified as marijuana. A plastic bag containing a white powdery substance later identified as cocaine, a large amount of currency, and triple beam scales were also discovered. Defendant was placed under arrest for possession of marijuana. A second search warrant was issued for the cocaine and 19.2 grams of cocaine were seized.
II. ANALYSIS
Relying on the United States Supreme Court holdings in Katz v United States, 389 US 347; 88 S *477Ct 507; 19 L Ed 2d 576 (1967), and Hoffa v United States, 385 US 293; 87 S Ct 408; 17 L Ed 2d 374 (1966), the majority concludes that there has been no violation of the Michigan or United States Constitution in this case. In reaching this conclusion, the majority overlooks the fact that the record is devoid of any evidence concerning the basis upon which the authorities selected defendant’s home to conduct the initial ruse entry without a warrant.
In Berger v New York, 388 US 41, 53; 87 S Ct 1873; 18 L Ed 2d 1040 (1967), the United States Supreme Court held:
"The security of one’s privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the police — which is at the core of the Fourth Amendment — is basic to a free society.” Wolf v Colorado, 338 US 25, 27 [69 S Ct 1359; 93 L Ed 1782] (1949). And its "fundamental protections . . . are guaranteed . . . against invasion by the States.” Standard v Texas, 379 US 476, 481 [85 S Ct 506; 13 L Ed 2d 431] (1965). . . . "The basic purpose of this Amendment, as recognized in countless decisions of this Court, is to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by governmental officials.” At 528.
The home is afforded the full range of Fourth Amendment protection. Lewis v United States, 385 US 206, 208; 87 S Ct 424; 17 L Ed 2d 312 (1966), citing Amos v United States, 255 US 313; 41 S Ct 266; 65 L Ed 654 (1921) (Bottles of whiskey testified about by government’s witnesses, revenue agents, were seized by the agents within the curtilage of defendant’s house and store, during his absence. Because the agents did not obtain a search warrant prior to conducting the search of defendant’s home, the Court held that defendant’s *478Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights had been violated. Defendant’s wife permitted the agents to enter the home. The evidence which was seized was returned to the defendant.).
On the basis of the holding in Berger, we would hold that before a ruse entry into one’s home without a warrant can withstand a Fourth Amendment challenge, there must be a showing that there was a rational basis to suspect that criminal activity was afoot at the home. Entries without warrants effected by ruse which are not based on objective and articulable facts concerning suspected criminal activity, constitute arbitrary intrusions which cannot be tolerated under the Fourth Amendment or Const 1963, art 1, § 11.
In a case with facts similar to the facts presented here, State v Ahart, 324 NW2d 317 (Iowa, 1982), the Iowa Supreme Court was asked to determine whether the ruse entry without a warrant by a law enforcement officer violated any of defendant’s Fourth Amendment or state constitutional rights. The facts presented in the Ahart case were as follows. Two law enforcement officers drove a car to defendant’s home and feigned car trouble. One of the two officers knocked on defendant’s door and told the person who opened the door that his car had broken down and that he needed to call his boss. The officer was admitted and pretended to make a credit card phone call to someone. While making the phone call, the officer observed marijuana and drug paraphernalia in plain view. The officer then left the defendant’s home and drove away from the area. Several days later a search warrant was issued and a subsequent search of defendant’s home took place. Marijuana was discovered and seized during the search. In response to defendant’s constitutional challenge *479to the entry by ruse without a warrant, the Iowa Supreme Court stated:
While we recognize that a warrantless entry effected by ruse must often be allowed if the government is to ferret out "those organized criminal activities that are characterized by covert dealings,” Lewis, 385 US at 210-11; 87 S Ct at 427; 17 L Ed 2d at 316, we are equally cognizant that the security of one’s home against arbitrary intrusion by the police is at the core of the fourth amendment and basic to our society. Berger v New York, 388 US 41; 87 S Ct 1873; 18 L Ed 2d 1040; 68 Am Jur 2d, Search[es] and Seizure[s], § 2 (1973) .... Consequently, not all warrantless entries gained by ruse are valid. Certainly, such an entry is not allowable if it is arbitrary. [324 NW2d 319.]
Because the court could not determine whether, at the time the police sought entry into defendant’s home, they had reason to believe that criminal activity was afoot in the Ahart home, the entry without a warrant was found to violate both the United States Constitution and the Iowa Constitution. See also Guidry v State, 671 P2d 1277 (Alas, 1983) (where the Alaska Supreme Court used a rational basis to suspect criminal activity is afoot standard as part of its reason for upholding the challenged ruse entry without a warrant under the Alaska Constitution).
In the instant case, Ms. Ward gained entry into defendant’s home by ruse. Defendant consented to Ward’s entry on the basis of a deception as to her identity and purpose. The police directed Ms. Ward to attempt entry by ruse into defendant’s home for the sole purpose of gathering evidence concerning defendant’s involvement in narcotics trafficking. The record is devoid, however, of any *480evidence suggesting reasons why defendant was targeted by the police for such an investigation.
During trial the prosecution attempted to question the Deputy Sheriff of the Berrien County Sheriff’s Department, Steven Marschke, concerning the reason why Ms. Ward was sent to defendant’s home. For reasons which are unclear to this Court, the trial court would not allow the admission of this evidence into the record. An affidavit was prepared by Officer Marschke which details facts concerning defendant’s involvement in narcotics trafficking. This affidavit, however, is dated March 8, 1985, which is after the Court of Appeals opinion in this case was published.1 The affidavit therefore cannot properly be considered by this Court.
We recognize "the necessity for some undercover police activity” and that "in the detection of many types of crime, the Government is entitled to use decoys and to conceal the identity of its agents.” Lewis, supra at 208-209. However, before the authorities can validly carry out an entry without a warrant effected by ruse under the United States Constitution or the Michigan Constitution, there must be a showing that there was a rational basis to believe that criminal activity was afoot at the defendant’s home. The reasons given by the authorities to support their belief that criminal activity has taken place in the past or is presently taking place must be based on objective and articulable facts.
CONCLUSION
Ruse entries without warrants which are not based on a reasonable suspicion that criminal *481activity has taken or is taking place constitute arbitrary intrusions into one’s privacy. Arbitrary intrusions into a person’s privacy are not allowable under the Fourth Amendment or art 1, § 11, and will not validate subsequent searches without warrants.
We would reverse and remand this case to the circuit court for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.
Cavanagh, J., concurred with Archer, J.The Court of Appeals opinion was released February 19,1985.