(concurring).
I am in accord with the conclusion reversing the judgment of the trial court and dissolving the temporary injunction on material facts pertaining to this appeal. The underlying basis for the injunction as revealed by this record was to hold appellant’s property in status quo pending the outcome of a tort action pending in the District Court of Kaufman County, in which suit Gladys W. Reese et al. (referred to in the record here as Reese and Bell) seek damages against Pan-Aire, Inc., the sole defendant in said suit. The suit in the Kaufman County case is for unliquidated damages arising from alleged negligence on the part of Pan-Aire, Inc., its agents and servants, in dusting poisonous substances over cultivated fields to eradicate destruc-■ five crop insects, from which operation the said Reese and Bell suffered the loss of their turkeys.
The opinion of this Court in dissertation of alleged fraud and fraudulent transactions, in which appellees are not concerned, manifestly is calculated to and in all probability will prejudice the defendant’s rights and issues which will arise in the Kaufman County suit as well as in the suit pending in Dallas County wherein Pera Naumovich, instituted suit against his son, Nickey Nau-movich, and Pan-Aire, Inc., for debt and foreclosure of lien; and in which suit Reese and Bell were not parties and had no interest whatsoever in the subject matter of said suit.
In the Dallas County suit the record shows that the defendants concede liability, debt, and valid enforceable liens. There is no controversial issue involved in that suit. In consequence, the plaintiff having timely moved for summary judgment, not controverted by the defendants, it was incumbent as a matter of law upon the trial court to give the plaintiff a speedy trial on the motion and enter such judgment as the facts may warrant.
In my opinion, the pleadings of Reese and Bell in this independent injunction suit, as set out in the Court’s opinion, and the evidence thus related, have no probative force in the determination of this appeal; Reese and Bell are interlopers in the Dallas County suit. Furthermore the opinion, wherein is stated “The question as to whether ancillary relief under the facts here could be granted in the Kaufman County case, or in 58,161, 58,168 (Dallas County), is not material to our decision and is not passed upon”, affirmatively indulges the inference that ancillary relief under such disclosed pleadings and facts “could be granted in the Kaufman County case, or in causes 58,161, 58,168,” which inference is extrajudicial pronouncement. The record does *421not reveal that such question is raised in this appeal; hence the question not being before the trial court, is not before us; therefore, whatever course may be available to the parties is of no concern to this court, and in my opinion should have no place in this decision. The implication that such could be done, is calculated to lead the trial courts into error. Thus the pronouncement of the erroneous premise that Reese and Bell could obtain relief in ancillary proceedings which they were unable to obtain in the direct proceedings, as held, is untenable.
In the affirmance of the judgment of the trial court, I noted my dissent; and, on the motion for rehearing, the majority, having reversed their original decision, I am in accord; but am unwilling to sustain the dissertation of fraud and fraudulent facts and the inferential pronouncement which may and probably will prejudice the pending causes; and, if adhered to by the trial court, would only result in reversible error.