dissenting.
I cannot agree that the remarks made by the prosecutor during voir dire were authorized by the Court of Criminal Appeals in either Frausto v. State, 642 S.W.2d 506 (Tex.Cr.App.1982); Martinez v. State, 588 S.W.2d 954 (Tex.Cr.App.1979); or Bevill v. State, 573 S.W.2d 781 (Tex.Cr.App.1978) (en banc). Instead, the remarks made by the prosecutor were error because those statements informed the jury that the accused had been convicted of a felony, which is contrary to the legislative intent behind a bifurcated trial. Thus, I conclude that he was denied a fair trial. Accordingly, I would reverse and remand for a new trial. Consequently, I dissent.
The statements with which we are concerned were made by the State’s attorney while qualifying potential jurors on the range of punishment applicable to the offense. The prosecutor told the jury panel that normally the minimum punishment for the offense was five years, but that under “certain circumstances” a minimum punishment of fifteen years was required. The State’s attorney then stated: “These circumstances could come about if the jury found that the defendant had been previously convicted of a felony.” At this point, appellant objected to any further mention of prior felony conviction but was overruled. Earlier, appellant had filed a motion in limine in which he sought to prevent any mention, either directly or indirectly, of a prior felony conviction, asserting that any such reference would deny him a fair trial. After his objection during trial was overruled, the State’s attorney reiterated that the sentence was to be enhanced if a prior conviction was shown, and then qualified the jury on the enhanced sentence.
I agree with appellant that the comments of the State’s attorney during voir dire *487impaired his right to an impartial jury. It is elementary that a person is to be convicted of a crime solely on the basis of whether the facts showed he committed the offense with which he is presently charged. Reference to prior convictions or illegal conduct are generally not permitted because a jury, being informed of such conduct before it determines guilt, might convict a person not because they believed him guilty of the present charge, but because he had committed another offense or because they thought he was a “bad” person. To avoid this potential for prejudice, Texas adopted its bifurcated criminal trial system with separate hearings on guilt and on punishment. Miller v. State, 623 S.W.2d 491, 493 (Tex.App. — Beaumont 1981). The restriction in the Code of Criminal Procedure which prohibits reading of the enhancement paragraphs of the indictment prior to the punishment stage, also seeks to preserve impartiality on the part of the jury. TEX. CODE CRIM.PROC.ÁNN. art. 36.01, § 1 (Vernon 1966). These legislative safeguards will be frustrated if the prosecution is able to imply, while qualifying the jury panel on the applicable range of punishment, that the defendant had a prior felony conviction. Indeed, the statements made by the prosecutor in this case would cause a reasonable juror to wonder why the prosecutor would mention that the sentence could be enhanced for a prior felony conviction unless the defendant did in fact have such a conviction. Thus, I would hold that the defendant was denied a fair trial.
The majority asserts, however, that certain Court of Criminal Appeals decisions authorize its holding, i.e., Bevill v. State, 573 S.W.2d 781 (Tex.Cr.App.1978) (en banc), and Martinez v. State, 588 S.W.2d 954 (Tex.Cr.App.1979). In my view, these decisions do not support the majority’s holding although they do concern informing the jury panel on voir dire of the range of punishment upon enhancement. In Bevill, prior convictions were alleged in the indictment for burglary of a building. During voir dire, the trial judge permitted the prosecutor to inform the jury that, if they found one enhancement paragraph true, the sentence would be 5 to 99 years or life and, if both paragraphs were found true, a life sentence would automatically be imposed. That court reversed the conviction, holding that it was error to inform the jury that a life sentence would be imposed if both paragraphs were found true. The court reasoned that the jury only had to make a factual determination of the truth of the enhancement paragraphs because the judge would impose the enhanced sentence. The jury had no need to know the effect of their answers. That court noted, however, that if one or two enhancement paragraphs were alleged, the jury might find only one enhancement paragraph to be true. Under this circumstance, the jury would impose the enhanced sentence. Thus, the Bevill court concluded only that it was proper for both parties to qualify the jury on the full “range” of punishment. Bevill, supra at 783.
Martinez elaborated on the rule stated in Bevill that the jury shall be informed of the range of punishment permitted if one enhancement paragraph is found to be true. Martinez was charged with burglary of a habitation enhanced by one prior conviction. The defendant made a motion seeking to “inform the jury panel of the full range of punishment in the event that the allegations of the indictment are proven.” The trial court denied the motion. The Court of Criminal Appeals held that the trial court abused its discretion in overruling the defendant’s motion. The court stated that both parties are afforded the right to qualify the jury on the “law applicable to punishment” since any prejudice toward an appropriate punishment may prompt challenge for cause or use or a peremptory strike. The court noted that voir dire is the only opportunity the parties have to examine the potential jurors on the different punishments the jury may impose. That court recognized that the necessity to voir dire the jury panel on the applicable range of punishment was the rationale of Bevill. Thus, the State is permitted to explain the range of punishment applicable where one prior felony conviction was alleged in the *488indictment, and if the jury found the enhancement paragraph true, it would be required to impose the enhanced sentence. The Martinez court saw no conflict between the rule in Bevill and article 36.01 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure which prohibits reading of the enhancement paragraph of the indictment until the punishment stage of the trial. In that court’s words “one can ‘inform’ generally of applicable punishment without ‘reading’ the precise allegation for enhancement, and thereby avoid what some have regarded as jeopardizing the presumption of innocence.” Martinez, 588 S.W.2d at 956. This statement is the touchstone of my dissent.
Bevill and Martinez illustrate a conflict which may arise between two settled rules of criminal law. The first rule is that it is the prerogative of both parties to examine the juror on the full range of applicable punishments. The second rule is that an individual’s past felony record should not be placed before the jury until it becomes relevant during the punishment stage. As noted earlier, Texas’ bifurcated criminal trial system and the prohibition of the Code of Criminal Procedure against reading the enhancement paragraphs of the indictment prior to the punishment phase both seek to preserve the second rule. Thus, I read Be-vill and Martinez to adhere to the first rule of fully informing the jury of the applicable range of punishment, without jeopardizing the second rule which seeks to preserve the presumption of innocence.
This result may be accomplished by reading Bevill and Martinez narrowly. The precise question before the Bevill and Martinez courts was whether the jury could be qualified on the full range of applicable punishment. The Court of Criminal Appeals answered in the affirmative. However, neither the Bevill court nor the Martinez court was presented with the question presently before us. That question is whether a prosecutor should be permitted while qualifying the jury on the applicable punishment to imply that a defendant has a prior felony conviction. I do not read Bevill and Martinez as blanket approval for such conduct. Each opinion simply holds that a party may generally inform the jury of the range of applicable punishment during voir dire. Neither case defines how a party should impart this information. In my view, a prosecutor can qualify the jury generally on the full range of punishment without jeopardizing the presumption of innocence. For example, a prosecutor may inform the jury panel that under certain circumstances, the circumstances to be left unspecified, they may be called upon to impose a minimum fifteen rather than a five year sentence. In this way the prosecutor will be assured that the jury has no bias toward the applicable punishment and yet the impartiality of the jury in determining guilt will be preserved.
The majority reads Bevill and Martinez as blanket approval for the type of statements made in this case. I fear the results of such a broad reading. If the prosecutor can make the type of statements made in this case, the bifurcated trial system becomes a meaningless formality as does the rule that the enhancement portion of the charge may not be read until the punishment stage of the trial. If the situation which occurred in this case is allowed to persist, only chaos will result. First of all, the statements made by the prosecutor in this case are not even a correct statement of the law. Simply because the State shows that the defendant has a prior felony conviction is of no relevance. What the State must do is prove that the enhancement paragraphs are true. Does this mean that, in order to properly state the law and generally inform the jury of the range of applicable punishment, the prosecutor must be allowed to mention that enhancement paragraphs exist? If this is the situation, does not defense counsel have the right to examine the jury on the elements which the State must prove for the enhancement paragraphs to be true? If so, how could such a situation be reconciled with the policy underlying the bifurcated trial system and the rule prohibiting enhancement paragraphs being read to the jury before the punishment phase? Only by limiting Bevill and Martinez to their narrowest holdings may these problems be avoided and the *489legislative policy as to bifurcated trials be preserved.
Neither do I read Frausto v. State, 642 S.W.2d 506 (Tex.Cr.App.1982), to authorize the majority’s holding in this case; instead, Frausto supports this dissent. Frausto concerned a situation where the prosecutor informed the jury panel during voir dire that the indictment contained enhancement paragraphs and explicitly informed the jury of the nature of the offenses contained in those paragraphs. The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed on the basis of these comments. The court in Frausto emphasizes the dangers inherent in permitting the jury to be informed prior to its determination of guilt that the defendant has a prior felony conviction. The court states that “a prosecutor may inform the jury panel of the range of punishment applicable if the State were to prove a prior conviction for enhancement purposes, but it may not inform the jury of any of the specific allegations contained in the enhancement paragraph of a particular defendant’s indictment.” Frausto, 642 S.W.2d at 509. I would read this language narrowly as I read Bevill and Martinez. The jury may be informed of the applicable range of punishment without implying that the appellant has a previous felony conviction. I reiterate that this may be done by simply informing the jury that under certain circumstances an enhanced sentence may be imposed but leave those circumstances unspecified. The majority reads the quoted language from Frausto broadly and as approval for the type of implication created in this case. To follow the majority’s approach will endanger the entire purpose of a bifurcated hearing. Accordingly, I must dissent.