¶ 28. (dissenting). The majority opinion concludes that Hampton made a prima facie showing that his plea was not knowing, voluntary and intelligent because the circuit court did not personally tell him during its colloquy that it was not bound by the plea agreement, notwithstanding Hampton's signing a plea questionnaire that his trial lawyer had read to him that represented to the court that he knew that the circuit court was not bound.1 Then, after concluding that the plea colloquy was defective, the majority also concludes that Hampton has the right to an evi-dentiary hearing on his motion to withdraw his plea because his lawyer's statement appended to the motion contends that Hampton would testify that he did not understand that the circuit court was not bound by his plea agreement with the State. However, even if I were to assume that the circuit court had an obligation to *476personally tell Hampton during its colloquy that it was not bound by his plea agreement,2 Hampton's motion is insufficient to support a right to a hearing because it alleges only a conclusion or "ultimate fact," rather than setting forth evidentiary facts, which if proved true, would show why he did not understand then what he claims now not to have understood. Therefore, because I conclude that the circuit court's decision not to grant a hearing on Hampton's motion was discretionary and because the record demonstrates a rational exercise of discretion, I would affirm the circuit court's order. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
Standard of Review.
¶ 29. We independently review whether a plea was knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently entered as a question of constitutional fact. State v. Bollig, 2000 WI 6, ¶ 13, 232 Wis. 2d 561, 605 N.W.2d 199. As part of that analysis, we begin by determining whether a defendant made a prima facie case sufficient to show that the circuit court violated Wis. Stat. § 971.08 (1999-2000), as interpreted by the Wisconsin Supreme Court or this court. If we conclude that the defendant made a prima facie case, we examine the motion and supporting affidavits to determine whether, as a matter of law, a hearing is required. State v. Bentley, 201 Wis. 2d 303, 310, 548 N.W.2d 50, 53 (1996). However, if the motion fails to allege sufficient evidentiary facts which *477if proved would entitle the defendant to withdraw his plea, the circuit court has the discretion to deny the motion without a hearing. Id. at 310-11, 548 N.W.2d at 53.
Sufficiency of Hampton's Pleadings.
¶ 30. I agree that the circuit court did not directly bring up the effect of Hampton's plea bargain in relation to the sentence it could impose for his crime, before accepting his plea. I also agree that it is the obligation of the circuit court to assess whether Hampton understands that the circuit court is not bound to follow the plea agreement in its sentencing decision. However, in order to have the right to an evidentiary hearing on his motion, Hampton was required to state those facts in his petition, which if proved to be true, would entitle him to withdraw his plea. The supreme court has consistently held that conclusory allegations are insufficient to require a hearing on a postconviction motion for plea withdrawal. Bentley, 201 Wis. 2d at 313, 548 N.W.2d at 54 (citing Levesque v. State, 63 Wis. 2d 412, 217 N.W.2d 317 (1974)). As the supreme court explained in Levesque, "[a] statement of ultimate facts which may be sufficient to sustain a complaint against a demurrer is not sufficient for a petition for postconviction relief, a petition to withdraw a plea or a motion for a new trial." Levesque, 63 Wis. 2d at 422, 217 N.W.2d at 322.
¶ 31. In Levesque, a defendant who sought to withdraw his guilty plea was denied an evidentiary hearing. His motion provided:
(1) Levesque's conduct did not constitute burglary as defined in sec. 943.10(l)(a), Stats.; (2) the court did not adequately ascertain the defendant understood the nature of the offense charged; and (3) Levesque at the *478time of the arraignment was not able to understand the proceedings against him due to a mental disease or a mental defect.
Id. at 418, 217 N.W.2d at 320. The court's opinion addressed only the third contention, Levesque's purported lack of understanding due to a mental disease or defect. The court concluded that the motion was insufficient to require a hearing because Levesque had not alleged evidentiary facts to support his assertion that he did not understand. Id. The court explained that he had alleged only "legal grounds" for his motion, id., or "ultimate facts." Id. at 422, 217 N.W.2d at 322. As was explained again in Bentley, motions to withdraw a plea after sentencing cannot rely on conclusory allegations, hoping to supplement them with evidentiary facts at a subsequent hearing. Bentley, 201 Wis. 2d at 313, 548 N.W.2d at 54.
¶ 32. Here the only affidavit to support Hampton's motion is the hearsay statement of his attorney attesting to what Hampton would say if he were called at a hearing. It states in relevant part that:
3.a. At the time he entered his Alford plea, he did not know that the court was not bound by the State's recommendation and was free to sentence him to whatever sentence it deemed appropriate.
b. Had he known that the court was not bound by the State's recommendation, he would not have pled guilty but would have asserted his right to a jury trial.
¶ 33. Aside from the obvious evidentiary problems with providing a hearsay statement to the circuit court, the allegations made on Hampton's behalf are conclusory, self-serving statements, facially insufficient to require the circuit court to hold a hearing. In my *479view, the majority errs because it refuses to apply Levesque, a plea withdrawal case cited in Bentley, that requires Hampton to provide the circuit court with sufficient evidentiary facts to entitle him to withdraw his plea if those facts are proven, before he is entitled to a hearing on his motion. Bentley, 201 Wis. 2d at 313, 548 N.W.2d at 54. Hampton did not carry that burden. Furthermore, when faced with Hampton's motion, the circuit court carefully explained why it was exercising its discretion to deny the motion without a hearing. Accordingly, because I conclude that Hampton did not have a right to a hearing and that the circuit court did not erroneously exercise its discretion in denying his motion without a hearing, I would affirm its order. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
The plea questionnaire states:
10. I understand that the Judge is not bound to follow any plea agreement or any recommendation made by the District Attorney, my attorney, or any presentence report. I understand that the Judge is free to sentence me to the following minimum (if applicable) and maximum possible penalties in this case.
It then lists the penalty for the crime charged, second degree sexual assault, as 20 years in prison and a $10,000 fine. Additionally, his trial attorney attested on the form that he had discussed and explained the contents of the questionnaire to Hampton and that Hampton acknowledged his understanding of each item in the questionnaire.
I have significant doubts about the majority's analysis of the manner in which a circuit court must undertake its obligation to assess whether the defendant knew it was not bound by the plea agreement. However, because I would affirm the circuit court even if I were to conclude that the court's colloquy with Hampton was inadequate, I do not address this issue.