dissenting.
The charge should be viewed as a whole and review should not be limited to parts of the charge standing alone. Daniel v. State, 486 S.W.2d 944 (Tex.Cr.App.1972); Cain v. State, 154 Tex.Cr.R. 284, 226 S.W.2d 640 (1950).
In McCary v. State, 477 S.W.2d 624 (Tex.Cr.App.1972), we were confronted with the contention that the following charge removed all “elements of scienter” from the jury’s consideration:
“ ‘Now bearing in mind the foregoing definitions and instructions, if you believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant, Forrest Edward McCary, Jr., did on or about the 27th day of November, 1968, as alleged in the indictment, in the County of Dallas and State of Texas unlawfully possess State’s Exhibit No. 7, and that State’s Exhibit No. 7 contained heroin, then you will find the defendant guilty as charged in the indictment and so say by your verdict, but if you do not so believe, or if you have a reasonable doubt thereof, you will acquit the defendant and say by your verdict, “Not Guilty.” ’ ”
Reading the charge as a whole, we failed to find reversible error.
In Rivas v. State, 496 S.W.2d 600 (Tex.Cr.App.1973), although the paragraph of the charge applying the facts to the law omitted the element of voluntariness, we affirmed the conviction because the definition of murder in the court’s charge included that element.
In the instant case, the court’s charge, in defining possession, limits voluntary possession to cases in which the possessor acts knowingly:
“Possession means actual care, custody, control or management. Possession is a voluntary act if the possessor knowingly obtains or receives the thing possessed or is aware of his control of the thing for a sufficient time to permit him to terminate his control.”
The charge then proceeds to define knowingly.
We should hold that, considered as a whole, the charge adequately defined the issues and protected appellant’s rights.
The judgment should be affirmed.
Before the court en banc.