dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from that portion of the majority opinion sustaining summary judgment in favor of defendants. It is true that Plaintiff failed to present this Court, or the trial court, with the medical records upon which its expert witnesses based their opinions. Plaintiff urges that its experts did not base their affidavits on the hospitalization records of Ms. Gallegos, but rather “on their personal knowledge as experts in their fields and said opinions were made only upon review of the medical charts supplied by Sun Towers Hospital and were not referenced to and did not constitute part of the Summary Judgment Affidavit.... ” I believe this is an inaccurate reflection of the summary judgment response. Dr. Krumlovsky and Nurse Williams had no personal knowledge of Ms. Gallegos’ condition or treatment: their understanding of events was based solely upon the treatment records which plaintiff did not include in her summary judgment response. It is permissible for an expert to base an opinion on such documents. Tex.R.Civ.Evid. 703. Nevertheless “[s]wom or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith.” Tex.R.Civ.P. 166a(f); Chandler v. El Paso National Bank, 589 S.W.2d 832, 835 (Tex.Civ.App.—El Paso 1979, no writ). Plaintiff should have included the relevant medical charts in her summary judgment proof.
I believe it is important, however, that defendants raise this defect for the first time on appeal. They voiced no objection to plaintiffs failure to include the medical records in the summary judgment proof in the trial court. Defendants each objected to plaintiffs expert affidavits as “vague, indefinite, and conclusory,” but they did not protest plaintiff’s failure to submit the medical records to the court. In addition to requiring that “[sjworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached ...,” the summary judgment rules state:
Defects in the form of affidavits or attachments will not be grounds for reversal unless specifically pointed out by objection by an opposing party with opportunity, but refusal, to amend. Tex.R.Civ.P. 166a(f).
That procedure was not followed here, and I believe that the rule is equally applicable to summary judgment movants urging us to affirm a judgment, as it is to parties seeking a reversal. Ridgway’s, Inc. v. Payne, 853 S.W.2d 659, 662 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, no writ); Walkoviak v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 580 S.W.2d 623, 627 (Tex.Civ.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.). I do not agree that omission of underlying documents upon which opinions are based is a defect which can be raised for the first time on appeal. Summary judgment should not rest solely upon plaintiffs failure to include the medical records in her response where defendant made no specific objection to the omission and plaintiff was afforded no opportunity to remedy the defect.
Moreover, I believe the majority is mistaken in its conclusion that expert affidavits opposing summary judgment must meet the same strict criteria as an expert’s affidavit supporting summary judgment. The non-movant’s controverting affidavit is adequate if it presents some probative evidence of the fact at issue. Trapnell v. John Hogan Interests, Inc., 809 S.W.2d 606, 611 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1991, writ denied). So long as the expert’s conclusions are based on facts reasonably relied upon by experts in that field that would be admissible at trial, and the expert raises fact question on those issues movant seeks to disprove, such an affidavit will defeat summary judgment. Id.
I conclude that plaintiffs affidavits meet this criteria. Although Dr. Krumlovsky does not set forth a standard of care for every aspect of Ms. Gallegos’ treatment, he does state a relevant standard of care for those *447aspects of the treatment which he concludes were deficient: overmedication, failure to rule out drug toxicity upon admission, and failure to timely call a physician or supervisor when the patient’s condition deteriorated. This court has previously held that summary judgment in favor of a defendant doctor was sufficient where the supporting affidavit was uneontroverted and where it simply made the conclusory statement that affiant was familiar with the standard of care and defendant doctor met that standard. Smith v. Ponton, 855 S.W.2d 849, 852 (Tex.App.—El Paso 1993, no writ). To require more of the non-movant in a summary judgment proceeding than this Court has required of a movant doctor is most arbitrary. I reject such a double standard.
Finally, I note that the affidavit of Dr. Alvarez is completely silent as to the standard of care and acts or omissions of defendants Sun Towers and Ana Maria Medina. Dr. Alvarez was not present the night Ms. Gallegos died. His affidavit does not even mention nurse Medina’s name. I do not agree that this affidavit establishes those two defendants are not liable as a matter of law, in the face of expert opinions that the nursing services received by Ms. Gallegos did not meet the relevant standard of care.
All defendants rely heavily upon Dr. Alvarez’ conclusion that Ms. Gallegos suffered from end stage renal disease, other multisys-tem diseases, and died as the result of those conditions, “[gjiven her condition and past medical history, no applicable standard of care could have prevented her death.” Thus, all three defendants argue, they established that Ms. Gallegos’ death was not caused by any act or omission on their part, and they were all entitled to summary judgment for that reason. I believe, however, that plaintiffs controverting affidavits create a fact issue on causation. I would find that it was error for the trial court to grant summary judgment to these defendants. I would sustain plaintiffs Points of Error One and Two, and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings.