(concurring in reversal). The instant *354appeal was submitted January 6, 1971. The Court’s majority opinion was delivered to the writer July 23, 1971. It is time now for a third dissent (1967, 1968 and 1971) against reasoning I cannot support, hence preparation and submission this 17th day of August, 1971, to the other Justices, of the ensuing separate opinion for reversal.
The jurisprudential ghost of deceased John C. Jordan1 returns again, this time under the name of deceased Orville E. Bugg. This time, looking as it does at an inevitably recurrent question, the Court should — but probably will not — firmly declare:
1. That no pecuniarily injured beneficiary of an alleged cause for wrongful death may, by his or her separate, unilateral and finally effective personal acquittance of the accused wrongdoer, destroy or otherwise conclude the pleaded cause.
2. That any such beneficiary, having thus personally acquitted the accused wrongdoer, has accomplished no more and no less than outright elimination of himself or herself as such beneficiary.
Four statutory provisions — all in force when the plaintiff-fiduciary’s pleaded cause for wrongful death arose; also in force when she as claimant sought and obtained statutory redemption of her claim for workmen’s compensation as a § 5 of part 2 (MCLA §412.5 [Stat Ann 1968 Rev §17.155]) dependent of the decedent — join in particularly precise support of the foregoing conclusions of law and their application to the agreed controlling facts. Such provisions are § 2922 of PA 1961, No 236, known as the wrongful death act (CLS 1961, *355§ 600.2922 as amended by PA 1965, No 146 [Stat Ann 1971 Cum Supp § 27A.2922]); § 115 of chapter 2 of PA 1939, No 288, known as the probate statute governing distribution of the proceeds of rights of action for wrongful death (CL 1948, § 702.115 as amended by PA 1965, No 181 [Stat Ann 1971 Cum Supp § 27.3178(185)]); § 22 of part 2 of the workmen’s compensation law (CL 1948, § 412.22 as amended by PA 1965, No 44 [Stat Ann 1965 Cum Supp § 17.172]), and § 1 of part 6 of the workmen’s compensation law (CL 1948, § 416.1 [Stat Ann 1968 Rev § 17.212]). References to these provisions will hereafter be made according to compiler’s section numbers as same stood prior to the revision of 1969, effected by act 317.
The first two sections above, 600.2922 and 702.115, have been known pretty well to the profession since the amendments of 1965. Section 600.2922 was fully quoted in 1971 O’Neill v. Morse, 385 Mich 130, 144, 145. Section 702.115 was fully quoted in 1970 Breckon v. Franklin Fuel Company, 383 Mich 251, 260-262, 276, 277.
Of the remaining sections cited, one (§416.1) is of pointed instant significance. For convenience it is quoted here:
“Sec. 1. If the employe, or his dependents, in case of his death, of any employer subject to the provisions of this act files any claim with, or accepts any payment from such employer, or any insurance company carrying such risks, or from the commissioner of insurance on account of personal injury, or makes any agreement, or submits any question to arbitration under this act, such action shall constitute a release to such employer of all claims or demands at law, if any, arising from such injury.”
As for application of § 412.22 above, the incontestable demonstrative evidence of adjudicatory *356action taken by Mrs. Bugg before the Workmen’s Compensation Department, and of her having taken unto herself the statutory redemption as ordered on her bid in the sum of $15,000, speaks both the controlling facts and the legal result that is due here. Such demonstrative evidence appears in the form of an appendix, post at p 361, consisting of a copy of the statutory agreement for redemption of liability signed by Mrs. Bugg and by her husband’s employer, Fairview Farms, Inc. (Appendix “A”), and of a copy of the department’s order for redemption, issued under said § 412.22 (Appendix “B”).
Out of the foregoing the conclusions proposed at the outset of this opinion have been drawn. Under the cited statutes it is patently fatuous to suggest that one individually concerned in or with a duly pending suit for wrongful death may, by action taken other than in strict accord with compiler’s sections 600.2922 and 702.115, defeat the suit or destroy the statutory rights of others in and to the potential proceeds thereof. It is equally absurd to draw from these statutes intent of the legislature that one thus concerned may not, by voluntary action on his part resulting. either in a release or an adjudication binding upon him and the alleged wrongdoer, bar his original right as an eligible distributee of whatever but. for such action might have been recovered by him as and for pecuniary injury. As to this last, consider quoted § 416.1. It is 59 years old and seems never as having endured any misunderstanding of its “such action shall” declaration of purpose.
Three years have passed since the Court faced the problem of Jordan. To this day I cannot fathom the reasoning of our majority in that case. No trustee, whether or no he is a fellow beneficiary, may by his own separate venture for personal con*357sideration defeat or bar the rights of other eligible beneficiaries or, as also here, the rights of eligible creditors of the trust, from any of their rights under the wrongful death statute.2 No judgment of a court or other tribunal sought and obtained thus by him could possibly affect their said rights, they being neither party nor privy thereto and not being represented actually or legally in the proceeding creative of such judgment. And nothing whatever in the workmen’s compensation law discloses or even hints at departmental authority to adjudicate the rights of unrepresented others; rights arising by virtue of a wholly separate statute such as our wrongful death act.
Did we not properly hold, in MacDonald v. Quimby (1957), 350 Mich 21, that the surviving widow’s effort as plaintiff-trustee to bar the decedent’s dependent mother as a beneficiary of the pending cause must come to naught? Would Jordan’s majority have held as it did had Mr. Jordan left say four or five small dependent children, either of his last or an earlier marriage, all having been ignored by his widow as she proceeded to statutory redemption and personal appropriation of the proceeds? What about the rights of the statutorily designated creditors of the estate, unto even the lowly undertaker for whom the legislature attempted expressly to provide?
In connection with this last, read §§ 600.2922 and 702.115(6) again and reflect upon the repetitious effect of §§ 2921 and 2922 of the RJA (CLS 1961, §§ 600.2921, 600.2922 [Stat Ann 1962 Rev §§ 27A-.2921, 27A.2922]). Section 2921 provides: “Actions on claims for injuries which result in death shall *358not be prosecuted after the death of the injured person except pursuant to the next section.” Section 2922 provides: “All actions for such death, or injuries resulting in death, shall be brought only under this act.”
The point just made is not one of presently due interpretation and application of §§ 600.2921, 600-.2922 and 702.115. That will arise when a substantial sum, over and above the amount recovered for pecuniary injury, has been realized for conscious pain and suffering, and for extensive-expensive medical care and hospitalization; the fatally injured decedent having lingered painfully and consciously for days, weeks, or months prior to demise. The specific point made is that, under the successive majority opinions of Jordan, all damages recoverable under the wrongful death statute — regardless of the remaining rightful distributees thereof — are lost once the decedent’s widow decides to seek and does obtain an award of workmen’s compensation in her own exclusive right.
The following conclusions of law, each based steadfastly on the proposition that this Court should look to the intent of the legislature when called upon to apply a statutory provision or provisions, are submitted for professional consideration.
A. The powers and authority of the Workmen’s Compensation Department must be found within the four corners of its mother statute. Nowhere in that entire statute is there any provision which authorizes the department to issue an order of redemption which, by proviso or “no prejudice” language, saves for determination by another forum issue whether the injured employee was engaged in the course of his employment at the time of injury, or issue whether that injury arose out of such employment. This is not to suggest, of course, that *359the department attempted any such super-jurisdictional judgment. It did not, as its § 412.22 order of redemption plainly discloses. That order speaks the adjudication of the department; not the ambages of counsel before the referee. See Appendix “B,” post at p 362.
B. Our hornbooks tell us that no one may lawfully mulct another twice for the same injury. Here the dependent widow of a fatally injured workman has sought and received in her own right, with departmental approval entered strictly in accordance with § 412.22 aforesaid, a compensatory award that was redeemed and fully paid. As between the widow and the defendant employer that settled her status. She legally became a statutory dependent of the decedent, entitled as such to the dependency benefits received by her under § 412.22. She is as much ineligible now, as an alleged pecuniarily injured survivor of her husband, as if she had been judged contributorily negligent in bringing about the traffic accident which caused his fatal injuries3 or, indeed, as if she had voluntarily settled with the employer and had given to it her own outright release of liability. By the impact not only of § 412.22 but of § 416.1, Mrs. Bugg has received satisfaction in full from her husband’s employer, defendant Fairview Farms, Inc., for the fatal injuries suffered by him.
C. Holcomb v. Bullock (1958), 353 Mich 514, cited by the majority as supporting its holding that the sum paid Mrs. Bugg was merely “tantamount to a voluntary payment,” is hardly in point. After defendant Bullock’s insurance carrier had paid, pendente, compensation benefits in the total sum of $735.75 (of which $415.75 was represented by accrued hospital and medical bills), the issue of com*360pensable injury went to full hearing and determination before a departmental referee. He denied compensation. The appeal board affirmed on ground that “plaintiff was an independent contractor rather than an employee of defendant at the time of the accident.”
In Bugg the administrative decision was just the other way around, to the tune of $15,000 as and for adjudicated and accepted redemption of Mrs. Bugg’s claimed right to compensable benefits. Did not Division 2 rule correctly, in Johnston’s Administrator v. United Airlines (1970), 23 Mich App 279, 285, that “A redemption order is a final determination and an award made and accepted cannot be disturbed except upon a showing that it was procured by fraud.” (Citing Panozzo [v. Ford Motor Co. (1931)], 255 Mich 149 and Catina [v. Hudson Motor Car Co. (1935)], 272 Mich 377)? Under today’s majority view, what happens as regards the paid $15,000? Was all this for free? Did not the employer thereby receive from Mrs. Bugg a § 416.1 release ?
The trial court’s order for accelerated judgment should be reversed and the cause remanded for trial with the decedent’s widow eliminated, by jury instruction, as a claimed pecuniary beneficiary. The plaintiff-fiduciary should have costs suffered thus far.
Nothing set forth in the foregoing opinion should be construed as impairing the pleaded rights of Mrs. Bugg, individually or as personal representative of the decedent, as against any defendant other than the decedent’s said employer.
*361 APPENDIX “A”
(Agreement for Redemption of Liability)
STATE OP MICHIGAN
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
workmen’s compensation DEPARTMENT
AGREEMENT TO REDEEM LIABILITY
BETWEEN
Orville Bngg (Deceased)
Olive Bugg (Widow)
Reed Ranch
Employee or Dependent (s)
Fairview, Michigan
Address
and
Fairview Farms, Inc.
Employer
Consolidated Underwriters
Insurance Carrier
The above parties represent as follows:
Orville Bugg (Deceased) was an employee of Fair-view Farms, Inc, and on or about 3-16-67 he received an injury arising out of and in the course of his employment and that as a result of such injury weekly payments have been made to Olive Bugg (Widow) by the employer for not less than six (6) months, and that:
It is the mutual desire of the parties that their differences be permanently compromised, settled and adjudged, and that the plaintiff’s claim for compensation and medical benefits be released, discharged, redeemed and ended by the payment of $15,000.00 in a lump sum, by way of redemption of liability.
*362It is expressly understood and stipulated in the event this redemption of liability is not approved by the Workmen’s Compensation Department, nothing contained herein shall be used before the Workmen’s Compensation Department at any subsequent proceeding.
I hereby approve of the medical report submitted herewith.
(In the above space state fully the following facts: total amount of compensation paid to date, the present disability of the employee, the reasons for desiring a redemption of liability, and the amount agreed to be paid upon approval of this agreement by the Department.)
WHEREFORE, it is agreed between the parties that the Department may enter an order in this cause providing that the sum of Fifteen Thousand and 00/100 ($15,000.00) Dollars shall be forthwith paid by the employer to Olive Bugg (Widow) and that upon such payment the liability of the employer for the payment of compensation for said injury shall be redeemed in accordance with the first part of Section 22 of Part II of the Workmen’s Compensation Act.
Dated 4 Mar 68
(Signed by Mrs. Bugg, her attorney, and by the attorneys for the employer’s compensation carrier)
APPENDIX “B”
(Order of Redemption)
REDEMPTION ORDER
(Mailed March 4, 1968)
The agreement to redeem the employer’s entire liability for an injury sustained by the plaintiff on 3-16-67 by a single payment in lieu of weekly payments having been considered by a Hearing Referee *363of the Workmen’s Compensation Department and it appearing that said agreement should he: (APPROVED)
THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that said agreement to redeem the employer’s entire liability for weekly payments and medical benefits herein by the payment of $15,000.00 is approved.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that said sum be paid as follows:
$2,250.00 directly to Bruce O. Wilson, attorney(s) for plaintiff for all legal services rendered, including all expenses in connection therewith;
$.....directly to (specify type or none) .... for medical expenses $12,750.00 directly to the plaintiff, being the balance;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendant(s) shall also complete the payment of weekly compensation of $.....per week until..........,19 . . ;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, that Defendants shall pay the cost of the transcript of the hearing herein.
/s/ Russell E. Bine
Hearing Referee
Signed this 4th day of March, 1968. County of Oakland.
THE ABOVE ORDER IS ENTERED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF ACT No. 10, PUBLIC ACTS, FIRST EXTRA SESSION OF 1912, AS AMENDED. IF A REQUEST BY ANY OF THE PARTIES FOR REVIEW BY THE DIRECTOR, OR NOTICE OF REVIEW BY THE DIRECTOR ON HIS OWN MOTION, IS NOT FILED WITHIN 15 DAYS FROM THE MAILING DATE OF THIS ORDER, IT SHALL STAND AS THE FINAL DECISION OF THE WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION DEPARTMENT.
Jordan v. C. A. Roberts Company (1967), 379 Mich 235 (same on 1968 rehearing, 381 Mich 91), holding that a widow’s action in seeking and obtaining for herself an adjudication by the appeal board that her husband had been compensably as well as fatally injured, and then of pocketing the proceeds of a statutory redemption of the employer’s liability to her under the WCL, barred outright a timely suit for wrongful death of her decedent husband.
For beginning reading on this, the subject being a Missouri statute couched pertinently the same as § 600.2922, consider Southern Pacific Company v. Tomlinson (1896), 163 US 369, 374 (16 S Ct 1171, 41 L Ed 193).
See Restatement of Torts Second, chapter 17 Contributory Negligence, § 493, pp 553, 554, “Beneficiary Under a Death Statute,” and comment thereunder.