The defendants George Nichols and Barry Lee Scott were convicted of possessing a motor vehicle knowing or having reason to believe that it had been stolen, MCLA § 257.254 (Stat Ann 1968 Rev § 9.1954).
When they were first seen by the police, one of the defendants was seated behind the wheel of the stolen automobile and the other was standing’ beside it. It was late at night and the automobile was parked on a deserted side street in a nonresidential area.
The disputed issue was whether the defendants knew or had reason to know that the automobile was stolen. At the trial the defendants claimed that an acquaintance named Cook had entrusted the automobile to them and that Cook then left to round up some girls who had promised to rendezvous with the defendants, Cook, and others at the place where the automobile was parked.
The principal assignment of error relates to the admission of evidence concerning a truck which was parked some 60 feet from the automobile. The arresting officer testified that his attention was called to the truck because one door was slightly open. On *67closer inspection he found that a window had been forced and the engine had been “hot wired”. Scraps of insulation similar to that covering the wire used to hot wire the truck were found on the floor of the stolen automobile.
While evidence of the commission of other crimes may not he introduced to show disposition toward criminal conduct (People v. Locke [1936], 275 Mich 333) such evidence is admissible to show knowledge or intent when they are elements of the offense charged, MCLA § 768.27 (Stat Ann 1954 Rev § 28.1050). People v. Clarkson (1885), 56 Mich 164; People v. Giddings (1910), 159 Mich 523, 525; People v. Di Pietro (1921), 214 Mich 507, 511; People v. McLean (1925), 230 Mich 423, 425, 426; People v. Matthews (1939), 289 Mich 440, 449, 450.
We have previously ruled that a jury may draw more than one inference from the same evidence. The question is whether the multiple inferences are reasonable, not whether arguably one inference is based on another. People v. Helcher (1968), 14 Mich App 386, 390; People v. Eaves (1966), 4 Mich App 457. Both the inference that defendants were attempting to steal the truck and the inference that they were in knowing possession of a stolen automobile were reasonable inferences from the evidence in this case. In addition to the evidence of the scraps of insulation and the defendants’ presence on a deserted nonresidential side street late at night, there was the testimony of a policeman which indicated that the defendants had been at the scene for a considerable period of time. Several flashlights with their ends taped to provide narrow beams were found on the front seat of the automobile and a similar flashlight was found on the ground near it. Each of the items of circumstantial evidence had only limited probative value. But in combination *68there was a sufficient basis for the inferences to which the defendants object.
In this case the people were required to show that the defendants knew or had reason to know that the automobile was stolen. The evidence of the attempted theft of the truck was admissible to show that the defendants’ possession of the stolen automobile was not innocent. There is unity of time, place, and nature between the charged offense and the evidence of additional criminal activity and, therefore, no troubling question arises concerning the relevance of the one to the other.
The second assignment of error concerns a credit card and a gas receipt found in the rear of the police cruiser in which the defendants were transported to the station house after their arrest. The evidence of the credit card and gas receipt was received without objection. Only when an officer testified that the name on the credit card was not that of either defendant did the defendant’s attorney object. The prosecutor then dropped this line of questioning. The defense was forewarned by evidence adduced at the preliminary examination of the direction of the prosecutor’s questions concerning the credit card and gas receipt; the defendants’ attorney could have made his objection before it was brought out that the credit card did not belong to either defendant. Additionally, we note that the defendants’ attorney did not ask that the evidence be stricken or request a cautionary instruction. In his summation the prosecutor stated without objection that the name on the credit card was “Isen-something.” (At the preliminary examination the name was given as “Eisenstedt”.) The issues are not of sufficient importance to warrant a new trial absent timely and proper preservation for appeal.
*69Nor do we find merit in the defendants’ remaining assignment of error. This case was tried before onr decision in People v. Brocato (1969), 17 Mich App 277, was announced. With that in mind and in the light of the people’s right in this case to prove other offenses involving like conduct to show guilty knowledge, we have concluded that neither defendant is entitled to a new trial because of the question put to one of the defendants inquiring whether he had been involved in the commsision of other stolen vehicle crimes.
There was a factual basis for the question. The prosecutor was not, in this pre-Broeato case, seeking by innuendo to place before the jury evidence that he knew was inadmissible or facts that he was not prepared to prove. When the defendants’ attorney objected to the prosecutor’s line of inquiry the judge directed the prosecutor to confine his questions to possible convictions.
Affirmed.
All concurred.