(dissenting).
Considering that mineral rights are-' deemed in our jurisprudence to be prescriptible servitudes I do not agree with the majority that the provisions of LSA— Civil Code Article 3460, which relate to-the renunciation of prescription generally,, are inapplicable to them. My views on the subject are given in some detail in the-majority opinion on the original hearing,, as well as in -a dissenting opinion on re-*505hearing, of Haynes v. King, 219 La. 160, 52 So.2d 531. See also Nabors Oil & Gas Company v. Louisiana Oil Refining Company, 151 La. 361, 394, 91 So. 765, Bodcaw Lumber Co. of Louisiana v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 167 La. 847, 120 So; 389, and McDonald v. Richard, 203 La. 155, 13 So.2d 712.
But assuming for the sake of argument that the mineral servitudes involved herein could not have been re-created or re-established except by title (as the majority holds), it is my belief that such a re-creation and re-establishment of them resulted from Wise’s execution of the lease dated July 6, 1943 in which he recognized or acknowledged the mineral ownership of William T. Gleason and R. D. Watkins and expressed an intention to “extend the duration thereof.” The basis for the majority holding is LSA-Civil Code Article 766 which states that discontinuous servitudes (to which class a mineral servitude belongs, since it needs the act of man to. be exercised — LSA-Civil Code Article 727) can be established only by title. A title is nothing more than written evidence of ownership, ordinarily but not necessarily a deed. It can be a judgment of court, a legislative act, a 'probated will, or some other writing sanctioned by law. And this suggests the question: Does our Civil Code permit the establishment of a discontinuous servitude by some title other than a deed? In my opinion it does. Following, and in the same section containing, the mentioned Article 766 is Article 770 which' .reads:
“The title by which such servitudes are established as can not be acquired by prescription, can be replaced only by a title by which such servitude is acknowledged by the owner of the estate which owes the servitude, or by a final judgment condemning him to permit the exercise of the servitude.”
Which is to say, as I interpret the article, that for the establishment of the servitude by title it is sufficient, as a substitute for a deed, that there be a written acknowledgment of its existence by the owner of the servient estate or a final judgment condemning him to permit the exercise thereof. The servitudes involved in the instant case were so acknowledged by the landowner when executing the lease of July 6, 1943, and his written acknowledgment sufficed as title thereto.
It may be said, additionally, that the lease provision in question was effective and binding on the grantor Wise as being a stipulation pour autrui which provided advantages for Gleason and Watkins. As said in LSA-Civil Code Article 1890:
“A person may also, in his own name, make some advantage for a third person the condition or consideration of a commutative contract, or onerous donation; and if such third *507person consents to avail himself of • the advantage stipulated in his favor, the contract can not be revoked.”
I respectfully dissent.