(dissenting).
.1 cannot agree that this is an appropriate case to depart from precedent and for the first time reverse a municipality’s exercise of its discretionary function of denying a license to operate a beer tavern.
After a full hearing before the city council’s Consumer Services Committee, at which 15 persons made appearances to object to the license, the committee made the following findings and conclusions, among others:
“Since 1970, several criminal and neighbor complaints were received and investigated. These incidents are more fully explained in the report of the License Inspector to this Committee *347and are incorporated by reference. That the applicant knew of these problems and was unable to abate them. As a result of .these continued complaints and violations, the business was voluntarily closed and the license turned in on October 18, 1974. ,
“The applicant states that her son Anthony may be an employee in the business; that the manager will be Chester Wojto-wicz, a brother-in-law.
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“* * * That numerous neighbors testified that an on-sale beer establishment is not compatible with the neighborhood; that the past operation was a serious nuisance, upsetting the peace and tranquility of the entire neighborhood; and that since the closing of the business the area has been quiet and there has been no reoccurrence of the past problems.
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“* * * That if the applicant is granted this license, it appears reasonably likely that the problems that existed in the past will again occur.”
Thereafter the city council adopted the committee report, with only one councilman abstaining.
In affirming the action of the city council, the district court made the following findings:
“The court has reviewed the actions taken by the licensing authority and finds that the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law of the Consumer Services Committee of the City Council are supported by the evidence and not arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable under all of the facts and circumstances of this particular case. The licensing authority conducted hearings giving the plaintiff adequate opportunity to be heard. The record discloses complaints involving this beer license going back over several years. Granted the plaintiff was not always the , licensee blit at all times material did have an interest in the premises,and should, at least to some degree, be held accountable,for .the activities that take place at the establishment.” . .
*348The basis for the majority’s opinion is, first, that the appellant had no knowledge of her tenants’ misconduct; second, that she had no control over their actions; and third, that she had an unblemished record when she herself operated the tavern. The majority holds that it is patently contrary to the evidence to argue that Mrs. Wajda must have been aware of the numerous ordinance violations of which her tenant, Patterson, and her son Lawrence were guilty. In my opinion the inference that she had knowledge of these offenses is overwhelming. Thirty-two neighbors joined in a petition to the city complaining of music blaring through open doors and windows, customers urinating in the street, automobiles and motorcycles racing their engines, and beer cans and papers littering the surrounding area. According to the minutes of the February 12,1975, meeting of the Consumer Services Committee, one neighbor testified that “[h]e felt sure that Mrs. Wajda knew of everything that was going on then and was a part of it,” because she was present with her sons when a complaint was made, and the committee threatened to close the tavern permanently if there were further violations. During the time her son Anthony was operating the tavern on her property, another son, Lawrence, who worked at the tavern with Anthony, was charged with the following offenses:
Violation of Ordinance § 854.190, permitting liquor on the premises,
Violation of Ordinance § 853.090, operating after hours,
Violation of Ordinance § 874.040, permitting gambling equipment on the premises.1
Under a plea agreement with the city attorney, Lawrence was convicted of the second and third charges and the first charge was dismissed. I find it hard to believe that the mother, who *349owned the premises, was totally unaware of the violations and convictions, of Lawrence.
After John Patterson became the licensee he was convicted of the following ordinance violations:
Violation of Ordinance § 856.030, permitting liquor on unlicensed premises,
Violation of Ordinance § 854.190, permitting liquor on premises licensed for beer,
Violation of Ordinance § 854.090, remaining open after hours,
Violation of Ordinance § 870.140, operating a disorderly house,
Violation of Ordinance § 874.040, possession of gaming equipment,
Violation of Ordinance § 874.010, allowing gambling on the premises.
The city council specifically found that Mrs. Wajda “knew of these problems and was unable to abate them.” I submit that there is compelling evidence to support these findings concurred in by the district court and that there is no basis whatever for charging that the council acted arbitrarily and capriciously in reaching their conclusions. In my opinion this court is simply substituting its findings for those of the council and the district court.
The majority argues that for Mrs. Wajda to attempt to assert any power or control over her tenants would be an impermissible delegation of responsibility. With respect to the sale of intoxicating liquor, the policy of the state is quite to the contrary. In that analogous situation, Minn. St. 340.19(2), imposes penalties on the owner of the premises for a tenant’s violations by limiting the further issuance of any license on the premises. Apart from statute, however, it is simply not true that Mrs. Wajda was powerless to control her tenants. Clearly under the law she had a right to cancel her lease where her property was being used *350unlawfully. It is inconceivable that such a right would be denied her.
With respect to the claim that she has demonstrated her ability to operate the tavern herself in compliance with the law, it should be noted that she actually did so for only 3 1/2 years, that she is now a 58-year-old widow, and that by her counsel’s own admission “because of the close connection ties of having sons, [counsel] felt sure that she will have her sons or daughters to help.” The council found that the problems which existed in the past would likely occur again and in my opinion the evidence fully supports that conclusion. It is obvious that a widow of Mrs. Wajda’s age will have to depend to an increasing degree on sons who have demonstrated their indifference or inability to observe the law and that she cannot be expected to maintain a constant vigil to prevent the kind of violations her son and Patterson committed. The likelihood of reoccurrences noted by the city council and also by the district court is manifest.
Finally, at oral argument it has been suggested that to deny Mrs. Wajda a license somehow deprives her of property without due process of law. This argument, I submit, is without merit for several reasons. As the majority concedes, no property owner has a constitutional right to operate a beer tavern. If such a license is denied, the property continues to be zoned for nonconforming commercial purposes and is available for lease to other tenants for other commercial uses. The market value of the property remains unaffected.
In the face of the numerous ordinance violations committed by plaintiff’s tenant and her son, her demonstrated unwillingness or inability to control the operation of the tavern on her premises, and the gross nature of the disturbances it has inflicted on her neighbors, in my opinion the majority’s conclusion that the city council acted arbitrarily and capriciously is wholly without foundation. Accordingly, I would affirm the decision of the district court.
*351Peterson, Justice (dissenting).I join in the dissent of Mr. Justice Otis.
MacLaughlin, Justice (dissenting).I concur in the dissent of Mr. Justice Otis.
The Minneapolis Code of Ordinances has been completely recodified. The ordinances under which Lawrence Wajda and John Patterson were charged now are found in Minneapolis Code of Ordinances, cc. 362, 368, 385, and-387.