(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion and would affirm the trial court denial of summary judgment.
The fighting issue in this case is whether the plaintiff, David Bryan, “was so connected in interest with one of the parties in the former action as to have had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the relevant claim or issue, and be properly bound by its resolution.” Hunter v. City of Des Moines, 300 N.W.2d 121, 123 (Iowa 1981) (citing Bertran v. Glens Falls Insurance Co., 232 N.W.2d 527, 533 (Iowa 1975), Larsen v. McDonald, 212 N.W.2d 505, 507 (Iowa 1973)).
In order to answer this question we must first determine whether Bryan’s claim was his own independent claim, or his parents’. We have a classic law school exam situation. The state of the law fluctuated during the brief span of time so that the answer depends on whether the current law, or previous law, applies.
In Weitl v. Moes, 311 N.W.2d 259 (Iowa 1981), the supreme court said such actions belonged to the child. In Audubon-Exira v. Illinois Central Gulf Rail. Co., 335 N.W.2d 148 (Iowa 1983), the court stated the question of who should sue on behalf of a child’s claim for loss of consortium had been in flux for some time, and reversed Weitl, holding that the claim must be brought by the parent. The accident occurred prior to the Weitl case. The Audubon decision was not handed down until June of 1983, two months after the verdict in the mother’s case and one month after Bryan had filed his claim.
As the majority points out, the question of whether a decision should apply retroactively and prospectively, and specifically whether the Weitl decision should apply retroactively, has been addressed by the *256supreme court this last month. In Beeck v. S.R. Smith Co., 359 N.W.2d 482 (Iowa 1984) the court answered the certified question whether Weitl should apply retroactively.
The court answered the question in the affirmative stating that the case applied both retrospectively and prospectively. Id. at 485. Therefore, Weitl applies retrospectively to include Bryan’s claim.
The only remaining question is whether the Audubon case, which overruled Weitl, has any effect here. The supreme court noted in Beeck that most opinions, including overruling decisions, operate both retrospectively and prospectively. Beeck at 484 (citing Farm Bureau Service Co. v. Kohls, 203 N.W.2d 209, 211 (Iowa 1972); Note, 46 Iowa L.Rev. 600, 617 (1961); 20 Am.Jur.2d Courts § 233 (1965); 21 C.J.S. Courts § 194 (1940)).
It would seem that the Audubon case, like the Weitl case, would operate retrospectively and might apply to prevent Bryan’s claim. However, courts may hold that a certain overruling decision should only have prospective application, and the supreme court in Beeck referred to the test of Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 106-07, 92 S.Ct. 349, 355, 30 L.Ed.2d 296, 306 (1971). Beeck at 484. The test requires the court to consider whether the overruling opinion changes a principle of law on which the litigants may have relied, to weigh the merits of the case by looking to prior history of the rule, and to survey the potential inequitable results if the decision is applied retroactively. Id. The court in Beeck determined this test had not been met, and applied Weitl both retroactively and prospectively, but limited its decision by saying “the federal court’s question does not include an additional factor that the parent’s claim for injuries or a claim for the parent’s wrongful death went to judgment or was settled before the instant litigation was commenced, and we do not consider such a factor.” Id. at 485.
That additional factor is present in this case. The claim of Bryan’s mother was decided before the change in law by the Audubon decision. I disagree with the majority that this is unimportant; the court in Beeck indicated it was a distinguishing factor. I believe the test of Chevron has been met as regards application of Audubon to this situation. As pointed out by the court in Audubon, this area of law had been in flux for some time and the turnaround in the court’s thinking could not have been anticipated. Rather, the child’s parents and attorney relied on the law continuing as that expressed in Weitl. Therefore, I would limit the effect of the Audubon case, and find that Weitl applies here, allowing Bryan an independent cause of action.
The majority also says that even if Weitl applies, it was limited to include only those claims of the child which could not feasibly have been joined with the parent’s claims.
I believe this decision must be made in light of holdings stating that summary judgment cannot ordinarily dispose of issues of negligence. Daboll v. Hoden, 222 N.W.2d 727, 734 (Iowa 1974). As the court in Audubon noted, “Our interpretations of section 613.15 have been inconsistent.” Audubon at 150. I believe plaintiff here was justified in relying on the Weitl holding that David had an independent cause of action.
The majority notes the record reflects no justification for not joining David’s claim with his mother’s. In fact, the record is devoid of comment on this issue. I do not believe we can presume there is no justification which would fall into the comment in Weitl when the issue was never addressed by the court or counsel. In determining if summary judgment is appropriate, we are to view the pleadings in the light most favorable to the party against whom the motion is made. Barnhill v. Davis, 300 N.W.2d 104, 105 (Iowa 1981). I do not believe this is a proper basis for granting summary judgment.
Having determined Bryan has an independent claim, the issue is whether he is so closely connected in interest with his mother that the claim should be precluded. The cases discussing the question of connection *257of parties’ interests have not indicated a family relationship meets this test. See e.g., Bertran 232 N.W.2d at 534 (no such connected interest precluding litigation when employee sued employer in first claim and sued insurer in second claim); Larsen 212 N.W.2d at 507 (parties not so closely connected in interest when plaintiff in first suit was the city, and in second suit plaintiffs were neighbors of defendant); State v. Young, 211 N.W.2d 352 (Iowa 1973) (defendant not allowed to use acquittal of coparticipant in robbery as issue preclusion); Jordan v. Stuart Creamery, Incorporated, 258 Iowa 1, 4, 10, 137 N.W.2d 259, 260, 264 (1965) (issue preclusion allowed when the same parties were involved in both suits); Henry v. Henry, 192 Iowa 1346, 186 N.W. 639 (1922) (no issue preclusion when wife sued several people for alienation of affections).
I do not believe that Bryan was so closely connected in interest to the plaintiff in the prior action that the issue of negligence binds the son. I believe this case should continue to trial and would deny summary judgment.