DISSENT ON APPELLANT’S MOTION FOR REHEARING
DUGGAN, Justice,dissenting.
We previously granted appellee Siurek’s motion for rehearing, withdrew the original opinion, and substituted our opinion on rehearing issued April 30, 1987. Appellant Sentry filed its motion for rehearing, which the majority now overrules without opinion. I respectfully dissent. I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that Siurek’s special issues were sufficient to support a judgment based on Sentry’s alleged breach of its duty of good faith and fair dealing.
I believe the trial court reversibly erred when it overruled Sentry’s objections that the charge issues did not limit the jury to a consideration of Sentry’s conduct within a specified time period. Sentry appropriately sought to restrict the relevant period to the time between September 30, 1983, when Siurek first reported the collision to Sentry, and April 16, 1984, when Siurek filed suit.
The harm to Sentry is apparent. The record is undisputed that Siurek’s attorney first demanded “immediate payment” of Siurek’s collision loss on December 2, 1983, only after Sentry both suggested to him that he file a PIP claim for his client and forwarded the appropriate forms. Accordingly, the jury must have given great weight to later events. By refusing to confine the jury’s attention to the period before suit was filed, and by leaving the time for consideration of Sentry’s bad faith action open-ended, the court allowed the jury to believe that Sentry’s pleading of and reliance upon its defense of settlement was per se demonstrative of bad conduct that persisted right through trial. Indeed, as Siurek’s counsel stated in closing argument, “where’s the money? I told you on voir dire we’re still waiting for the postman. I mean he hasn’t shown up yet.”
Such an adverse use of Sentry’s pleading and proof of settlement is totally inconsistent with the majority’s holding on the ap-pellee’s (Siurek’s) motion for rehearing, as in our original opinion, that Sentry’s contractual duty to its insured was discharged by Siurek’s settlement with the third par*108ty’s insurer, Trinity. Where an insured’s (or his attorney’s) actions have — to say the least — complicated resolution of a claim by destruction of the insurer’s subrogation right, the trial court must carefully confine the time periods to be considered in determining the insurer’s breach of duty. I conclude that Sentry was irreparably harmed by the trial court’s refusal, over timely and specific objection, to confine the issue.
I would grant appellant Sentry’s motion for rehearing, and reverse and remand. Therefore, I dissent.