dissenting.
I dissent. I do not believe the Roberts-es, Grohman, or Hogg (the defendants) established they were entitled to a summary judgment on the defamation claims. I believe Colson should be given the opportunity to present her defamation claims against them to a jury. I would reverse and remand.
The panel finds that the activities of the defendants was no more than the “steady stream of accusations of vehement criticism that any politician must be expected to endure,” quoting the Fifth Circuit opinion in this case, Colson v. Grohman, 174 F.3d 498, 514 (5th Cir.1999). The panel takes this quote out of context. The issue before the Fifth Circuit was whether the *423defendants violated Colson’s First Amendment rights by misusing the criminal justice and recall processes to retaliate against her. Under that claim, Colson was required to show more than mere injury to reputation. As the Fifth Circuit said, the making of false accusations is not actionable under the First Amendment retaliation jurisprudence. Colson, 174 F.3d at 512. The Fifth Circuit held that Colson would have had a retaliation claim if she had ever been subjected to a recall petition. Id. at 513. As it was, she was voted out of office, which is not actionable as a retaliation claim.
The panel ignores statements from the Fifth Circuit opinion that do not favor its holding. For example, the Fifth Circuit found that the summary judgment evidence showed “the defendants not only criticized Colson but defamed and libeled her, presenting criminal allegations to the District Attorney’s Office and the public with knowledge they were false or with reckless disregard of whether they were false or not.”
Wrong Standard of Review
The panel forgets that this is an appeal from a summary judgment. When reviewing a summary judgment, we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant, in this case Colson. Instead, the panel ignores all evidence that favors Colson and focuses only on the evidence and inferences that favor the defendants. For example, the panel finds that the grand jury’s letters to the Council that allegations were made and warning them to act in compliance with the Texas Open Meetings Act is somehow evidence that justified the defendants’ belief that Colson had violated the law.
The panel ignores all of the evidence that shows the defendants knowingly made false statements about Colson. Consider, example, the following evidence disregarded by the majority: Selleck stated in his affidavit he told Mapel as early as June 1993 there was no basis for bringing criminal charges against the council members. Mapel then told Hogg his office would take no action. Selleck testified that Hogg and Grohman accused Councilman Miller of illegally receiving a salary from two governmental entities at the same time, without revealing it was Grohman who had suggested that Miller do so. County Investigator Blankenship stated in his affidavit Hogg offered Selleck 1,800 votes from the members of Pearland’s First Baptist Church if Selleck ran for District Attorney if Selleck convinced the grand jury to indict Colson, Miller, and Frank. Hogg himself admitted in deposition testimony he prepared recall petitions even though he knew it was improper for him to do so and it was unusual for him to become personally involved in criminal investigations.
Conclusion
Clearly Colson was defamed. No elected official should have to endure the kinds of attacks to which she was subjected.