dissenting.
We respectfully dissent from the per curiam affirmance. We disagree with Judge Lowenstein’s opinion that the evidence was adequate to allow a jury to find Mr. Butler guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. While we agree that Mr. Butler failed to preserve his objection to the admission of the expert’s opinion that the hairs found on the victim matched Mr. Butler’s hair beyond a reasonable doubt, we find that, under Callahan v. Cardinal Glennon Hosp., 863 S.W.2d 852, 860 (Mo. banc 1993), the question remains whether that aspect of her opinion testimony was so deficient in weight and credibility as to be entitled to little or no weight. We would find that it was entitled to no weight, since the expert admitted elsewhere in her testimony that the state of microscopic hair comparison is such that neither she nor other experts can state with certainty the likelihood that a hair will show up in a particular population, and that hair comparison analysis cannot be used to identify *46a particular individual. As a result, her personal opinion whether the hair was Mr. Butler’s to a reasonable certainty was entitled to no weight. In this respect, we disagree with all the concurring opinions. In all other respects we agree with Judge Breckenridge’s opinion that the remaining evidence showed only that Mr. Butler lived in the same trailer park as the victims, was familiar with the trailer park, and had hair which was not inconsistent with hairs found on the victim, one of which had spots that looked like the spots found on one of the victim’s hairs. Contrary to Judge Lowenstein’s opinion, and like Judge Breekenridge, for the reasons detailed below we do not find that this provides a sufficient factual basis for the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Butler was the perpetrator of the crime.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Because the facts allegedly identifying Mr. Butler as the perpetrator are essential to the resolution of this appeal, we restate the factual back ground of this appeal in detail, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict. State v. Storey, 901 S.W.2d 886, 891 (Mo. banc 1995). So viewed, the evidence shows that, at approximately 9:30 p.m. on the evening of August 31, 1993, two boys, sixteen-year-old J.L. and thirteen-year-old N.E., were sitting by a lake and boat storage area at the Lakeview Terrace Mobile Home Court in Clay County where they lived. A man walked by a couple of times and asked them whether they had seen someone waiting around who was supposed to help him take his boat out of storage. When the boys told him they had not, the man left. The man later came back, and offered to pay them money to help him get his boat ready to take to the lake. J.L. and N.E. agreed, and the man left again after telling the boys he was going to his house to get the combination to unlock the boat storage area. He returned five to ten minutes later and told the boys he could not find the combination, but he knew where they could jump over the fence.
J.L. and N.E. began walking through a wooded area around the fence and the man followed behind. As they were walking, the boys heard the man ask, “Who is going to be the hero?” J.L. and N.E. turned around and saw that the man had a gun in his hand. He told the boys that, if they cooperated, they would be all right. The man ordered N.E. to lay on the ground, and ordered J.L. to lay on top of N.E. The man tied J.L.’s hands behind his back with a rope, moved him onto the ground next to N.E., and tied N.E.’s hands behind his back. The man had anal intercourse with J.L.
While the boys were on the ground, N.E. tried twice to look at the man’s face; however, the man told N.E. to turn his head and pushed N.E.’s head away. While the man was' still sodomizing J.L., N.E. jumped to his feet and ran. As N.E. was running away, the man told him to stop or he would shoot him, but N.E. escaped. After briefly chasing N.E., the assailant turned around and came back to J.L. He untied J.L., told him not to say anything, and ran away. N.E. went to the house of a friend whose father was a police officer. The friend’s father reported the incident to the police. J.L. ran to his own home. Ten minutes after he arrived home, the police came. A crime scene technician collected his clothing, which was new and had never been worn before that day. The police recovered an unidentified head hair from J.L.’s shirt and an unidentified pubic hair from J.L.’s underwear.
The following year, Mr. Butler, who lived in the same mobile home park, became a suspect. In April of 1995, 20 months after the crime occurred, the police collected hair and blood samples from Mr. Butler. Mr. Butler was subsequently indicted on one count of forcible sodomy, one count of felonious restraint, and two counts of armed criminal action.
*47Mr. Butler’s first trial on these charges ended in a mistrial. The second trial took place on July 22-24, 1996. Both N.E. and J.L. testified regarding the assailant’s appearance. N.E. testified that the assailant was a man about 30 years old, of average weight, roughly five feet ten inches tall, with a couple of days’ beard stubble on his face, wearing a ball cap with black letters on the front, and a Jack Daniels T-shirt.
In contrast, in his initial statement to police right after the incident, J.L. had described the assailant as being a stocky-built white male, twenty to thirty years old, five feet seven inches tall, weighing approximately 170 pounds, with brown curly hair which extended “a little bit” beyond the ball cap in front, with a couple of days’ beard stubble on his face, and wearing a Jack Daniels T-shirt and a silver wristwateh with a metal wristband. At trial, J.L. gave a more general description, stating that the assailant was five foot seven or eight, wearing dark clothing and a baseball hat.
At the time of the trial, Mr. Butler was 32 years old, five feet nine inches tall, 185 to 190 pounds in weight, with straight brown hair, a rather severe receding hairline, and a mustache. The State offered no evidence that he had ever had curly brown hair, that he recently gained weight, that he had clothing or a watch matching that worn by the perpetrator, or that he had a boat in the boat storage area or had a combination to the lock to the boat storage area. He said he did not. Neither N.E. nor J.L. could identify Mr. Butler by sight or voice as the assailant. On the other hand, Mr. Butler lived in the trailer park and was familiar with it, and he admitted that he was in the park - he said he supposed he was in his trailer - at the time of the crime. He had no witnesses to his whereabouts. And, like the perpetrator, he could be described as being of average height and weight and about 30 years old.
In addition to the boys’ testimony and the general testimony about Mr. Butler’s appearance and where he lived, the State offered the expert testimony of Darvine Duvenci. Ms. Duvenci was employed by the Regional Crime Lab in Kansas City, where she worked in the trace evidence and serology section of the chemistry department. Her work with trace evidence involves the analysis of microscopic items of evidence such as hair, fibers, paint chips, glass, and other materials, while serology involves the genetic analysis of body fluids. Ms. Duvenci had been a forensic chemist for twelve years, and estimated that she performed approximately 100 hair comparisons a year.
Ms. Duvenci testified as to the limitations of comparative microscopy of hair. She stated unequivocally that such use of such comparisons to positively identify individuals is not accepted by the scientific community as reliable. Ms. Duvenci testified that, while she is able to state that hair from an unidentified individual “matches” the hair of an identified individual, she is unable to determine what percentage of the population could have contributed the unidentified hair. Thus, according to Ms. Duvenci, the state of the science of microscopic hair comparison is such that experts cannot state that a person with a certain type of hair characteristics will show up a certain number of times in the population.
Ms. Duvenci was then asked to give her opinion about her microscopic comparison of the one unidentified head hair and the one unidentified pubic hair found on J.L.’s clothing with the samples of head, pubic and facial hairs from Mr. Butler. She said she was unable to find any significant differences between characteristics in the unidentified head and pubic hair found on J.L.’s clothing and the sample head and pubic hair collected from Mr. Butler that would cause her to exclude Mr. Butler as the source of the unidentified hair. She testified that, were she to interchange the unidentified head and pubic hair with those of Mr. Butler, she would not be able to distinguish them.
*48Ms. Duvenci also testified that Mr. Butler’s pubic hair sample and the unidentified pubic hair found in J.L.’s underwear had spots on the medulla, and that she could not remember previously finding such spots in her examination of over 1200 hair samples. She also testified that in her personal experience with hair comparisons, she could not recall finding two unidentified hairs from totally different body regions of a person that both matched hairs from those same parts of the body of another person. According to Ms. Duven-ci, this finding of a match of both a pubic hair and a head ham was “like double significance of evidence.” She did not suggest that scientific studies or the state of the scientific art supported giving such a “double significance” to this evidence, however. Rather, she acknowledged that neither she nor forensic scientists in general were able to positively identify individuals based on hair comparison. She thought two matches were twice as meaningful.
Despite testifying the scientific community does not accept use of hair comparison evidence to identify a particular person, Ms. Duvenci went on to state that she felt there was a “very strong probability” that the two unidentified hairs collected from J.L. came from Mr. Butler. And, when asked by the prosecutor whether she believed “within a reasonable degree of certainty” that the unidentified hairs were in fact from Mr. Butler, Ms. Duvenci answered in the affirmative.
In his defense, Mr. Butler testified that he did not commit the crimes, and he offered evidence that he did not fit the description of the assailant. When asked if the hairs were his, was there a way they could have gotten on J.L., he said that he would typically swim on Tuesdays, since that was the day he took classes, and so it was his only day off work. He recalled that on Tuesday, August 31, a boy had gotten a gash on his forehead while roughhousing, and had to have the cut treated. He said he recalled the incident because he had not seen someone get a cut on the head at the pool ever before, and that the boy who got the cut looked like J.L. He said he supposed it possible hair was transferred to the victim either while they were both swimming and the roughhousing was occurring in the pool, or that hair from his towel was transferred to the victim since people had put their towels in the same area of the pool. He had gone to class that night and assumed he had had returned home after class ended at 9:50 p.m. that night.
The trial court denied Mr. Butler’s motion for acquittal, and submitted the case to the jury. The jury convicted Mr. Butler on all counts and he was sentenced as a prior and persistent offender under §§ 558.016 and 557.036 RSMo 1994. Mr. Butler timely filed this appeal.
II. LEGAL INSUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT CONVICTION
On appeal, Mr. Butler raises errors in regard to the jury instructions and in regard to improper admission of evidence of uncharged misconduct, and further argues that the evidence was insufficient to submit the case to the jury. It is as to the concurring opinions’ resolution of the sufficiency of the evidence issue that we dissent.
A Standard of Review
In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a guilty verdict, it is not our function to reweigh the evidence, State v. Martin, 940 S.W.2d 6, 8 (Mo.App.1997), or to act as a “‘super juror’ with veto powers.” State v. Grim, 854 S.W.2d 403, 414 (Mo. banc 1993). This Court is, rather, charged with the responsibility of determining whether all of the evidence, direct and circumstantial, is sufficient to provide any rational juror with proof beyond a reasonable doubt of each of the elements of the crime charged. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); Grim, 854 S.W.2d at 405; State v. Kee, 956 *49S.W.2d 298, 300-01 (Mo.App.1997). Because the evidence is weighed by the jury, not the reviewing court, we examine the evidence and inferences in the light most favorable to the verdict. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319, 99 S.Ct. at 2789; State v. O’Brien, 857 S.W.2d 212, 215-16 (Mo. banc 1993). In doing so, we “disregard contrary inferences, unless they are such a natural and logical extension of the evidence that a reasonable juror would be unable to disregard them.” Grim, 854 S.W.2d at 411. Thus, our review of the submissibility of the State’s case “impinges upon ‘jury’ discretion only to the extent necessary to guarantee the fundamental protection of due process of law.” Jackson, Id. at 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781.
B. Evidence of Hair Comparison Analysis.
The State and Judge Lowenstein principally rely on the testimony of Ms. Duvenci regarding the results of her microscopic comparison of the two hairs recovered from J.L.’s clothing with Mr. Butler’s hair samples. We completely agree with Judge Lowenstein and Judge Breckenridge that competent hair comparison evidence is admissible in Missouri in a criminal trial, State v. Hoard, 715 S.W.2d 321, 325 (Mo.App.1986), and is probative of guilt. Its probative value has limitations, however, limitations even Ms. Duvenci recognized, but which Judge Lowenstein does not.
It was Ms. Duvenci herself who testified that microscopic hair comparison analysis cannot positively identify individuals, but can only reduce the possible group of suspects by eliminating an individual. To this extent, she testified, hair comparisons are not conclusive in the same way as are fingerprints or DNA comparisons, for which the probabilities of two person having the same characteristics are infinitesimal, because there are not enough individual features in human hair to provide conclusive identifications. In fact, as Judge Breckenridge notes in her opinion, Ms. Duvenci testified that there are only three possible conclusions she can draw from comparing a known hair sample, such as Mr. Butler’s, with an unknown hair sample: (1) that the hairs are not similar; (2) that no conclusion is possible; or (3) that the hairs match based on microscopic characteristics, and that they therefore either originated from the same person or from another person whose hairs exhibit the same microscopic characteristics.
Ms. Duvenci further testified, in fact, that while she is able to state whether hair from an unidentified individual “matches,” that is, is consistent with, the hair of an identified individual, she is unable to determine what percentage of the population could have contributed the unidentified hair. According to Ms. Duvenci, the state of the art in analysis of microscopic hair comparisons is such that experts cannot state that a person with certain types of hair characteristics will show up a certain number of times in the population. While attempts to quantify the probabilities in human head and pubic hair have been made, see, e.g., B.D. Gaudette, Some Further Thoughts on Probabilities and Human Hair Comparisons, 23 J. Forensic Sci. 758, 760 (1978), Ms. Duvenci herself testified, and the experts agree, that those statistics have not been accepted in the scientific community. See Clive Á. Stafford Smith & Patrick D. Goodman, Forensic Hair Comparison Analysis; Nineteenth Century Science or Twentieth Century Snake Oil?, 27 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 227 (1996); P.D. Barnett & R.R. Ogle, Probabilities and Human Hair Comparison, 27 J. Forensic Sci. 272, 278 (1982). Without the ability to quantify probabilities, the scientific community cannot determine the significance of the match of two hairs, See Barnett & Ogle, supra,1 and has not even established a uni*50form set of features or characteristics to examine when making hair comparisons. And, in making hair comparisons, the examiner forms a subjective, rather than objective opinion.
Much of Ms. Duvenci’s testimony as to the state of the science of hair comparison is consistent with the testimony of other experts in Missouri cases. Thus, in previous Missouri cases in which expert testimony was offered regarding microscopic hair comparison between the defendant’s hair and unknown hairs found at the crime scene, experts expressed the results of their comparisons in terms of the defendant’s hair and the unknown hair being “similar,” Hoard, 715 S.W.2d at 325; “indistinguishable,” State v. Bland, 757 S.W.2d 242, 244 (Mo.App.1988), or that they “matched,” State v. White, 621 S.W.2d 287, 292 (Mo.1981). Some experts attempt to focus their testimony further by stating, for instance, that defendant was part of a “very small part of the population” that could match the sample so that defendant was “a possible contributor [of] that hair,” State v. Marlow, 888 S.W.2d 417, 421 (Mo.App.1994), and one expert, unlike Ms. Du-venci, said that statistical comparisons could be made and that 1 in 850 persons would have had hair matching the sample in that case. State v. Andrews, 770 S.W.2d 424, 426 (Mo.App.1989).
And, as Judge Lowenstein notes, in State v. Jones, 777 S.W.2d 639, 641 (Mo.App.1989), the expert was permitted to testify that he (like Ms. Duvenci) saw spots on both the defendant’s hair and the comparison hair, and he (like Ms. Duvenci) said it was not common to find such spots, and that “in his experience he had found this condition in one or two percent of the hairs he had examined.” Id. Defense counsel argued it was error to admit this testimony, because the scientific community did not recognize such spots as a basis for identifying the source of the hair. Jones disagreed because the expert did not purport to claim that he could state the probability that the hair came from defendant. State v. Jones, 777 S.W.2d 639, 641 (Mo.App.1989). He just 'stated the percentage of black spots he had seen in his experience, a factual matter as to which he was competent to testify.
Here, as in Jones, Ms. Duvenci was permitted to testify that she saw spots on his pubic hair and that she, too, found them unusual in her experience - in fact, it was the first hair with spots she had seen. Under Jones, we agree, this testimony was admissible. What distinguishes the evidence in this case from that in Jones and the other cases cited above, however, is that Ms. Duvenci then went on to testify that the fact that both Mr. Butler’s head and pubic hairs matched the unidentified head and pubic hairs had “double significance, ” and that she went on to state that she thought there was a strong probability *51that the two hairs came from the defendant, and that within “a reasonable degree of certainty” she believed “the unknown hairs actually came from the defendant. ” These opinions were essentially a positive identification of Mr. Butler derived from the hair evidence. State v. Faircloth, 99 N.C.App. 685, 394 S.E.2d 198, 202-03 (1990).
Ms. Duvenci so testified despite her previous admission that the scientific community did not support such a conclusion based on hair comparisons, and despite the fact that it went beyond her personal factual experience and beyond the principles accepted in the scientific community. She did what the expert in Jones had avoided doing - she stated that based on her experience and contrary to the rest of the scientific community, she could say to a very strong probability and could say to a reasonable certainty that the hairs came from Defendant. The State repeatedly emphasized this testimony in closing argument. It was the key basis of its case, for, without it, the evidence simply showed an average sized man with curly hair who lived in or was familiar with the trailer park was the perpetrator, and that the perpetrator had hair which, under a microscope, matched that of Mr. Butler. This would not provide a basis to find Mr. Butler guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
Judge Lowenstein suggests that such testimony is proper under State v. White, 621 S.W.2d at 292-93. That case, however, simply stated that Missouri courts will permit introduction of evidence that two hair samples match, that is, that they are indistinguishable from each other, and we agree that Ms. Duvenci was properly permitted to testify as to whether the sample hairs taken from Mr. Butler matched those found on the victim. If the hairs did not match, then Mr. Butler would have been exculpated and we would not be considering this appeal.
The issue raised by the dissent is whether any weight should be given to Ms. Duvenci’s further conclusions that the fact that two hairs “matched” had “like double significance,” and that the matches caused her to conclude that Mr. Butler was very probably the source of the hairs and that the hairs were his to a reasonable degree of certainty. The latter is a very different issue, and White in no way permits admission of the latter statements.
Judge Lowenstein also cites State v. Kleypas, 602 S.W.2d 863, 870 (Mo.App.1980), as if it supported admission of Ms. Duvenci’s testimony that the hams very probably came from defendant and that they came from him beyond a reasonable doubt. Again, that case simply does not so hold. In Kleypas, defendant was accused of kidnapping and killing the victim. The evidence against him included evidence that footprints in fresh snow led from the back door of defendant’s home to the home of the victim, and back again, and that there were no other footprints in the snow there. 602 S.W.2d at 865. The evidence also showed that the tread on defendant’s boots matched the tread of the tracks in the snow between the houses. In addition, defendant admitted that a vodka bottle found along the route of the footprints was his. Id. Finally, there was evidence that a bite mark found on the victim matched the bite mark made by defendant’s teeth. There, as here, the expert then testified that it was his opinion to a reasonable certainty that defendant had made the bite marks.
Defendant objected to the bite mark evidence in Kleypas on a basis similar to that raised here - that the state of scientific knowledge in the area of bite mark comparison did not permit bite marks to be used to identify a particular individual. However, and as Judge Breckenridge notes in her opinion, Judge Lowenstein is incorrect that Kleypas approved of admission of this testimony or held that the evidence would not have been sufficient without it. To the contrary, the court noted that the “reasonable certainty” testimony was only elicited on cross-examination, and that even if objection to it should *52have been sustained, there was no error here since defendant had tried to exclude all of the expert’s bite mark testimony, not merely the part that purported to identify the bite mark as that of defendant. Kleypas, 602 S.W.2d. at 870. Moreover, the court noted that Kleypas (unlike Butler) was a court tried case, and specifically concluded:
In all events, in its careful and explicit findings of fact, the trial court clearly indicated that it considered only the testimony that the bite marks were consistent with and compatible with the defendant’s teeth. The defendant could not have been prejudiced by the testimony last referred to. Excluding the evidence of reasonable medical certainty, the evidence was clearly sufficient to support the conviction.
Id.
Finally, Judge Lowenstein cites State v. Maxie, 513 S.W.2d 338, 344 (Mo.1974), for the proposition that an expert can testify that he finds it “highly probable” that certain fibers he examined came from a particular shirt, without explaining the statistical basis for comparing the fibers. Judge Lowenstein apparently intends to subtly suggest by this reliance that Ms. Duvenci’s testimony that she thought there was a very strong probability that the hairs came from Mr. Butler and that the fact that hairs from two parts of the body matched had “like double significance” would also be admissible under Missouri law, even if objected to, without a showing that such evidence was accepted by the relevant scientific community, and thus, even if the objectionable opinion that the hairs were Mr. Butler’s to a “reasonable certainty” were ignored, there would be sufficient evidence to support the verdict.
Maxie does not support that proposition. First, Maxie involved shirt fibers, not hairs, and the expert testified as to -the individual effects caused by what bolt of cloth was used, the age of the fiber, how often it had been laundered, and so forth, which caused him to believe the fibers came from a particular shirt. The opinion does not address use of hair comparison testimony.
Second, and even more basically, the opinion in Maxie nowhere states whether or not the fiber expert had testified to the existence of supporting studies, or to whether his methods and the principles he applied were accepted in the relevant scientific field. It is silent on the issue and, so far as the opinion shows, the issue whether the expert’s principles and methodology were accepted in the field simply did not arise. The only issue addressed in Maxie as to the fiber expert’s opinion is whether it was admissible despite the fact the expert spoke in terms of probabilities rather than absolute certainties. The court just says that absolute certainty is not required, and of course we agree.
Finally, nothing in Maxie even hints that the court thereby intended to overrule Frye sub silencio and to hold for the first - and only - time that expert testimony is admissible in Missouri even if it is not generally accepted in the relevant scientific field. Yet, that is what Judge Low-enstein’s reliance on Maxie appears to suggest, for it is not relevant to the instant case unless Judge Lowenstein intends to indicate by citing Maxie that it is acceptable in Missouri for an expert to just testify to probabilities without regard to whether that testimony is supported by scientific studies or principles accepted in the expert’s field, even over objection. Such a principle, would, of course, be inconsistent with Missouri law.
In sum, like Judge Breckenridge and unlike Judge Lowenstein, we conclude that neither White, Kleypas, Maxie, nor any Missouri case suggests that a submissible case can be made based solely on hair comparison testimony, nor do they support admission of expert testimony which purports to state that a particular hair came from a particular person and identifies that person beyond a reasonable doubt. Nothing in Missouri law allows such “opin*53ions” to be given any weight in determining whether a submissible case was made, as discussed below. It is for this reason that the dissenting judges would find that the State failed to make a submissible case.
We do agree with Judge Lowenstein and Judge Breckenridge that Mr. Butler waived his right to raise the inadmissibility of this evidence because he did not object to the foundation for Ms. Duvenci’s opinion that, to a reasonable degree of scientific certainty, the unknown hairs found on J.L.’s clothing came from Mr. Butler. And, as they note, the general rule is that, when an expert’s opinion comes into evidence without objection and there is a factual basis for the opinion, then the weight of the opinion evidence is normally for the jury. See State v. Guyton, 635 S.W.2d 353, 360 (Mo.App.1982). We agree with this rule.
We further agree with the application of this rule in Callahan v. Cardinal Glennon Hosp., 863 S.W.2d 852, 860 (Mo. banc 1993), which held that attacks on the foundation for an expert’s testimony under the test set out in Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir.1923), must be made at the time the expert’s testimony is sought to be admitted, because Frye sets the standard for admissibility, not submissibility, of expert testimony. Callahan thus held that, by failing to object to the admission of an expert’s testimony, the defendant in Callahan had waived any objection to the foundation for that testimony under Frye.
We disagree, however, with their further conclusion that Mr. Butler’s failure to challenge the lack of foundation for admission of Ms. Duvenci’s testimony under the Frye test automatically precluded Mr. Butler from attacking the weight and reliability of that testimony in arguing that a submissi-ble case was not made. In fact, as Judge Breckenridge recognizes in her opinion, Callahan specifically held that, even though the defendant in that case had waived Frye foundational objections by failing to object to admissibility of the expert’s opinions, and even though this meant that her testimony could properly be considered in determining the sufficiency of the evidence, defendant could still argue that the testimony was “so deficient in weight and credibility that it has little or no value on the issue of causation.” Callahan, 863 S.W.2d at 863 (emphasis added).
This distinction between foundational objections and objections based on a fundamental lack of weight or credibility makes sense. As prior cases have noted, “foundational deficiencies can frequently be remedied” in response to an objection at trial. State v. Blue, 875 S.W.2d 632, 633 (Mo.App.1994). Because this is the ease, it would be unfair to allow a party to “sandbag” a witness by failing to object to correctable foundational errors in the witness’ testimony at the time of admission, and to permit the party to delay objection until submission, when it may be too late to correct the foundational errors. In fact, Washington by Washington v. Barnes Hosp., 897 S.W.2d 611, 616 (Mo. banc 1995), cites Callahan and applies this rationale in support of its ruling.
This rationale for the requirement of an objection contemporaneous with admission of the expert’s testimony does not apply where the error is not a foundational one which is subject to correction, however, but rather is one which goes to a fundamental inconsistency in the testimony itself, a flaw which could not be rectified whenever an objection was made, and which makes the opinion inherently unreliable and consequently entitled to little or no weight.
Thus, for instance, the mere fact that an expert testified, without objection, that there was no gravity, so people could fly, would not require the court to submit a case to the jury which required a finding that people could fly. In such a case, the court could hold that the testimony was so deficient in weight, reliability and probative value as to be entitled to no weight in *54determining submissibility, even though it had been admitted "without objection and even though the weight to be given expert testimony is usually for the jury. This is the distinction Callahan calls on us. to make.
Callahan, of course, was a civil case, in which the standard of proof was the preponderance of the evidence. Here, we are dealing with a criminal case, in which the standard is proof beyond a reasonable doubt. While it is normally up to the jury to determine whether the admitted evidence meets this standard, where the evidence to be considered is so lacking in weight and probity that no reasonable juror could find that it meets the reasonable doubt standard, then a submissible case has not been made and the case should not be submitted. See, e.g., State v. Johnson, 504 S.W.2d 334, 335 (Mo.App.1973) (doctor’s testimony as to autopsy, admitted without objection, was entitled to no probative value where doctor admitted he had never conducted autopsy). Cf. State v. Smith, 944 S.W.2d 901 (Mo. banc 1997); State v. Biddle, 599 S.W.2d 182, 188 (Mo. banc 1980) (both considering reliability of expert opinion as plain error, even though not objected to or admission stipulated to, since stipulations as to law are not binding on court).
In applying these principles to the facts of this case, we would find that the objection to Ms. Duvenci’s expert opinion that Mr. Butler is very probably the source of the unknown head and pubic hairs found on J.L.’s clothing, and that he is the source to a reasonable degree of scientific certainty, and that the match of two hairs was “like double significance,” is not merely one of foundation. It is apparent from her testimony that she simply gave her own personal opinion of the identity of the perpetrator based on the frequency of her observation of these characteristics in her own previous hair comparisons, not upon any accepted standard in the scientific community, and in the face of her explicit recognition that the scientific community believes that hair comparison evidence cannot in fact be used to identify a particular person with certainty.
Contrary to the concurring opinions’ characterization of this issue, it is not simply an issue of lack of adequate statistical foundation for Ms. Duvenci’s opinion, nor is it a situation in which she used a proper technique and we merely believe she reached the wrong result in interpreting it. Rather, she admitted that her conclusions that the hair was very probably Mr. Butler’s hair and that it was his beyond a reasonable doubt were conclusions which she could not reach based on the state of scientific knowledge in her field of expertise. The scientific community says that identifications cannot be made based on hair comparison, she herself so testified and agreed that this was the view of those in her field, and her own view. The technique she used, while sufficient to allow her to determine whether hairs are similar, was admittedly not a technique which the scientific community believed could be used to identify a particular individual.
Yet, Ms. Duvenci used this technique for this purpose, without ever suggesting that she believed that those in her field were wrong, or offering some other scientific or medical basis for her views as to Mr. Butler’s guilt. She simply offered her personal, not her expert," opinion that the hair comparison identified Mr. Butler based on her own anecdotal observations that some characteristics of hairs are more unusual than others, and that matching spots are so unusual that she had not seen them before. Even though admitted and available for the jury’s consideration, her identification opinions, not being based on her expertise or on accepted scientific techniques for identification, are entitled to little or no weight on the issue of whether the hairs found on the victim actually were the Defendant’s hair. Otherwise, there is a danger that “[t]he uncritical use of [flawed] probability estimates can easily distort the value of hair evidence, particularly when presented to a lay jury hearing *55evidence that involves hair identification and could lead to a miscarriage of justice when hair evidence plays a prominent role in a case.” Barnett & Ogle, supra, at 277.
Because, while relevant, hair comparison evidence cannot be used to identify a particular individual, courts in other jurisdictions have found that such evidence, by itself, is insufficient to provide proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. State, 511 So.2d 1047, 1050 (Fla.App.1987), reversed defendant’s convictions of first-degree murder and armed criminal action on the basis that there was insufficient evidence to support the convictions. In Jackson, the state presented evidence concerning head hairs taken from the victim’s pajama top. Id. at 1048. The state’s expert in hair and fiber analysis testified that two of the head hairs taken from the victim were indistinguishable from defendant’s head hair sample. Id. The state’s expert indicated, however, that “hair will never get unique enough to be like a fingerprint” and admitted that “hair comparisons do not constitute a basis for positive personal identification.” Id. at 1049. In reversing defendant’s conviction, Jackson held that, although hair comparison testimony is admissible, it cannot provide an identification with absolute certainty by itself. Id.
The Court of Appeals of North Carolina has also addressed this issue on more than one occasion. In State v. Stallings, 77 N.C.App. 189, 334 S.E.2d 485, 486 (1985), defendant was convicted of armed robbery solely on the basis of hair comparison evidence which indicated that his hair was microscopically consistent with the hair found in the mask used during the robbery. The court held that “[ujnlike fingerprint evidence ... comparative microscopy of hair is not accepted as reliable for positively identifying individuals. Rather it serves to exclude classes of individuals from consideration and is conclusive, if at all, only to negative identity.” Id. Therefore, Stallings reversed defendant’s eon-viction. Id. at 487. This position was reaffirmed in State v. Johnson, 78 N.C.App. 729, 338 S.E.2d 584, 587 (1986).
People v. Gomez, 215 Ill.App.3d 208, 158 Ill.Dec. 709, 574 N.E.2d 822, 823 (1991), also reversed a first-degree murder conviction because there was insufficient circumstantial evidence to establish the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. There was evidence of defendant’s fingerprint at the murder scene, a place where he paid his monthly rent, as well as samples of blood and paint taken from the murder scene and the defendant’s residence. The state also introduced, as part of its case in chief, hairs found on the victim’s body which shared some similarity with the defendant’s hair. Id. at 826. The court held that hair samples “do not possess the necessary unique qualities of fingerprints to allow positive identification.” Id. at 828. “The mere physical probabilities inferred from ... hair ... samples alone are insufficient to sustain a conviction beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. See People v. Brown, 122 Ill.App.3d 452, 77 Ill.Dec. 684, 461 N.E.2d 71, 74 (1984). Because the court found that the circumstantial evidence was insufficient to prove guilt, the court reversed defendant’s conviction.
In dismissing the persuasive cases from other jurisdictions which have addressed this issue, Judge Lowenstein claims that, while in many cases hair comparison evidence, standing alone, will not make a submissible case, the hair evidence in this case is sufficient to make a submissible case because the expert here has twelve years of experience in the field of hair comparisons, and her opinion that certain characteristics were “very unusual” or “very rare” in her experience makes the evidence more compelling. Judge Lowen-stein argues that, once evidence of guilt is admitted, the jury’s finding that the evidence constituted proof beyond a reasonable doubt in effect answers the question of submissibility for this Court.2
*56This argument ignores the fact that no amount of experience in hair comparisons by Ms. Duvenci could overcome the rest of her testimony, in which she herself recognizes the objective fact that hair comparisons cannot positively identify individuals, but can only reduce the possible group of suspects by eliminating an individual. This Court has a duty to ensure the protection of a defendant’s due process rights by determining whether the evidence of guilt is sufficient so that any reasonable juror could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319, 99 S.Ct. at 2789; Grim, 854 S.W.2d at 405. To do otherwise would be, essentially, to affirm automatically a finding of submissibility, regardless of how uncertain and speculative the evidence might be, simply because a jury returned a guilty verdict. The Missouri Supreme Court has stated, however, that “any guilty verdict subsequently rendered by the jury is wholly irrelevant to the question of whether the case was sufficient to go to the jury at all.” O’Brien, 857 S.W.2d at 215.
In contrast to Judge Lowenstein, Judge Breckenridge agrees that, if Callahan’s distinction between the foundation of an expert’s opinion, and its reliability and weight, were still good law, then Mr. Butler’s appeal should be successful because Ms. Duvenci’s testimony that the hair was Mr. Butler’s to a reasonable degree of certainty is entitled to no weight and is not reliable. She concludes, however, that Callahan’s distinction between an attack on the foundation for expert testimony and an attack on its weight and reliability must have been overruled sub silencio in the Missouri Supreme Court’s later decision in Washington, 897 S.W.2d at 616.
As Judge Breckenridge’s opinion discusses at greater length, Washington reaffirmed the holding in Callahan that the issue whether “proffered opinion testimony of an expert is supported by a sufficient factual or scientific foundation” is one of admissibility, not submissibility. Washington, 897 S.W.2d at 616. Thus, where, as in Washington, and as in the instant case, an expert’s opinion has been admitted without objection, it can be considered by the jury in determining submissibility, even if the foundation for the opinion would have been subject to attack if properly objected to at the time of admission. Id.
We further agree with Judge Breckenridge that Washington recognized that its holding was contrary to the holdings in two previous Missouri Court of Appeals cases, Adams v. Children’s Mercy Hosp., 848 S.W.2d 535, 548 (Mo.App.1993), and Pippin v. St. Joe Minerals Corp., 799 S.W.2d 898, 904 (Mo.App.1990), and that Washington specifically disapproved of the way in which those cases considered admissibility “under the guise of submissibility,” and held that, to the extent they did so, Adams and Pippin were no longer to be followed. Washington, Id. at 616.
Judge Breckenridge then concludes that Washington must also have impliedly overruled Callahan to the extent it said that reliability and weight can be argued even when admissibility is not objected to, for Washington further noted that weight and submissibility are generally for the jury. Washington, 897 S.W.2d at 616. It is here that the dissenting judges and Judge Breckenridge disagree.
As is clear from Washington’s disapproval of Adams and Pippin, two previously leading cases, our Supreme Court does not mince words when it wishes to overrule prior decisions with which it disagrees. Yet, rather than stating it disapproved of Callahan’s distinction between attacks on foundation and attacks on reliability, it specifically cited Callahan with *57approval for its recognition of the distinction between attacks on admissibility and submissibility. This indicated the Court was well aware of its prior decision in Callahan. If Washington had wanted to disapprove of Callahan’s statement that courts can consider whether an expert’s opinion “is so deficient in weight and credibility that it has little or no value on the issue of causation,” Callahan, 863 S.W.2d at 863, even if no objections were made to the admissibility of the testimony, it could and would have done so, in the same way that it disapproved of Adams and Pippin. By failing to do so, Washington instead appears to reaffirm Callahan’s distinction between objections to the foundation for an expert’s opinion, which is an issue relevant only to admissibility, and objections to the weight and reliability of that testimony, which is relevant to submissibility.
For these reasons, we would find that the reliable opinion evidence from Ms. Du-venci, which is entitled to weight in determining the sufficiency of the evidence, is that the head and pubic hairs found on J.L.’s clothing match the sample of Mr. Butler’s head and pubic hairs, and the unknown hairs originated from Mr. Butler or another person whose hairs exhibit the same microscopic characteristics and that in her personal experience it is unusual to find spots on the hairs as she found here. We would not find this to be sufficient in itself, or when considered in combination with the other circumstantial evidence, to support his conviction.
C. Sufficiency of Evidence of General Description and Familiarity with Location of Crime
In order to determine whether a submis-sible case was made, we review all of the evidence connecting Mr. Butler with these crimes, and consider whether it, when added to the valid expert testimony that the hairs matched and that Ms. Duvenci had not seen spots on the medulla in her prior extensive experience examining hams, made a submissible case.
We note, first, that the State and Judge Lowenstein rely on evidence which they say shows that Mr. Butler’s general description “fit the defendant.” While we agree that the boys’ varying descriptions of their assailant do not exclude Mr. Butler, and that the jury was free to find that Mr. Butler matched these descriptions, we disagree with the implication of Judge Lowenstein’s opinion that this description evidence specifically described Mr. Butler in particular, or that it went a long way toward convicting him. The boys’ description basically described every average white male who lived in or near the trailer park: a white male between 20 and 30 years old, described as being of average weight and between five feet seven and five feet ten inches tall. Moreover, J.L. had described their assailant as having brown curly hair that extended past a baseball cap in the front, whereas it is undisputed that Mr. Butler did not have curly brown hair, but rather straight brown hair, with a severely receding hairline. His hair simply did not match the description given of the perpetrator’s hair. Similarly, there was no evidence that Mr. Butler had a boat in the boat storage area or a combination to it. Thus, the reason for the significance to Judge Lowenstein of the fact that the perpetrator apparently had a boat and the combination to the boat storage area is, at best, elusive.
However, assuming that the jury resolved all inferences against Mr. Butler, and assuming that the jury ignored the ham description evidence and determined that the boys’ description of the perpetrator was sufficiently similar to that of Mr. Butler so as not to exclude him as the perpetrator, this type of general description evidence is, of course, not sufficient to sustain the conviction, particularly where, as here, when confronted with Mr. Butler, neither boy could identify either him or his voice. See Velarde v. People, 179 Colo. 207, 500 P.2d 125, 126 (1972) (evidenced that defendant had physical makeup similar to witness’ general description of perpetrator, without more, was insufficient *58to link defendant to the crime and sustain the conviction).
Judge Lowenstein also relies on the evidence that Mr. Butler lived in the mobile home park where the boys lived and in which the crime was committed, and so, according to his own testimony, was familiar with the general area where the crime was committed, and in fact had been swimming at the pool near the boat storage area six hours before the crime occurred.3 Judge Lowenstein then suggests that the fact that Mr. Butler offered a hypothesis of his innocence and recalled details of his activities the day of the crime shows his “overall plan to lie to conceal his guilt” and “gives rise to an inference of guilty knowledge.” Specifically, Mr. Butler testified that he swam in the mobile home park’s pool on the day of the incident. Mr. Butler remembered seeing someone who looked like J.L. get a cut on his forehead after roughhousing at the pool that day. According to Mr. Butler, everyone who used the pool put their towels in a common area by the pool, and his towel may have been in the same area as the towel of the boy who resembled J.L. On cross-examination, Mr. Butler testified that he was offering this evidence as a possible explanation for how the two hairs, which were microscopically indistinguishable from his, were found on J.L.’s clothing, since he could think of no other explanation for their presence.
In support of the contention that Mr. Butler’s testimony was a lie to conceal his guilt, which created a reasonable inference of guilt, Judge Lowenstein cites State v. Chaney, 967 S.W.2d 47, 53 (Mo. banc 1998). The defendant in Chaney was charged with first degree murder. He testified regarding his whereabouts on the evening of the victim’s disappearance. His testimony was inconsistent with statements he had made before trial to police, neighbors, and his wife. When confronted with the inconsistencies, the defendant denied making inconsistent statements and explained that all of the other witnesses were mistaken. The Court stated that “[a]s the trier of fact, the jury was entitled to believe that his shifting explanations, coupled with his inability to corroborate his whereabouts during the critical time period, were part of an overall plan to he to conceal his guilt.” Id.
Chaney is easily distinguishable from this case. First, the fact that Mr. Butler had knowledge of the mobile home park in which he lived, and used the swimming pool in his own mobile home park on the day of the incident, six hours prior to the incident, can hardly be said to carry the same significance as a defendant’s being present at the scene of a burglary and stealing, at the time the crime was committed, and in possession, of the stolen property. Similarly, Mr. Butler’s testimony regarding his memory of being at the mobile home park pool, where everyone throws their towels in a pile at one end of the pool, on the day of the incident, and of seeing someone there who looked like J.L., hardly evidences “an overall plan to lie to conceal his guilt.” Mr. Butler offered his testimony as a possible explanation for the presence of the two hairs on J.L.’s clothing which were microscopically indistinguishable from his hair, should it be that the hairs were in fact his. Judge Lowenstein’s theory that an innocent person would not try to explain away incriminating evidence ignores the fact that the State would have been entitled to comment on Mr. Butler’s failure to offer an explanation had he not done so. State v. Simmons, 955 S.W.2d 752, 764 (Mo. banc 1997). We also simply disagree that an innocent person would not try to think of some way his hair could have been found on the victim. To the contrary, the very fact that the innocent person knows that he is not the culprit *59would cause that person to presume that if that hair is his, it must have gotten on the victim some other way. He thus thinks of the only ways this could have occurred. It is not clear what about this thought process is supposed to be incriminatory. In any event, while we agree that this evidence was relevant and admissible, and that it’s credibility was for the jury to determine, none of the evidence was inconsistent with his innocence.4
We further note that, while Judge Low-enstein argues that Mr. Butler’s testimony that his hairs could have been transferred to J.L.’s clothing because all the towels of people using the pool were thrown together was a lie to conceal his guilt, it accepts as true Mr. Butler’s testimony that he and J.L. were both at the pool earlier in the day the crime was committed and argues that this fact can be used to infer Mr. Butler’s guilt. “While we are to accept as true all inferences favorable to the State, they must be logical inferences that may be reasonably drawn from the evidence.” State v. Friend, 936 S.W.2d 824, 828 (Mo.App.1996).
But, assuming that the jury could have found the variances in Mr. Butler’s hypotheses as to how the hairs could have been transferred to J.L. to be evidence of his guilt, it is not sufficient, when added to the other competent evidence, to support a finding that he was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The only evidence implicating Mr. Butler in the crimes charged is circumstantial evidence that Mr. Butler’s head and public hairs match those found on J.L.’s clothing, that Mr. Butler was a resident of the mobile home park and used its pool, that his trailer was within walking distance of the crime scene, and that he was a white man of arguably average height and weight. Against his identification is the fact, testified to by Ms. Duvenci, that such hair comparison evidence may not be used to identify a particular individual, that there may be many white men of average height at the trailer park, that his hair style was not like that of the assailant in that it was straight and severely receding, not curly and extending over his forehead, and he had a mustache, and there was no evidence he had a boat or a combination to the lock to the boat storage area. While the evidence, considered as a whole, could raise a suspicion or conjecture that Mr. Butler was the perpetrator of the crimes against J.L. and N.E., it does not provide a reasonable juror with a basis to find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. See Stallings, 334 S.E.2d at 486-87.5
Here, unlike the cases cited by Judge Lowenstein, the other evidence was simply *60insufficient to allow the jury to identify Defendant. For these reasons, the dissenting judges would hold that the State failed to make a submissible case, in that the evidence was insufficient to support a finding by a reasonable juror that Mr. Butler was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and would reverse his conviction.
. Thus, as Barnett and Ogle stated in discussing the difficulty of determining the weight to attribute to evidence of hair comparison:
If the evidence and the standard [to which it is compared] share common attributes suggesting they have a common source, *50they are said to match. Once the evidence and standard are determined to match, a decision must be made as to the significance of this finding.
The significance of the match between two objects requires knowledge about the frequency of occurrence of the measured attributes in the population. If the set of measured attributes occurs only in a single individual in the population, then the match results in individualization (the conclusion that the evidence could have originated only from the same source as the standard.) On the other hand, if the set of measured attributes occurs in a large portion of the population, the fact that the evidence and standard match is of little significance.
A primary task facing criminologists in the evaluation of associative evidence is the determination of those attributes of the physical evidence useful to the task of individualization. In order to be useful the attributes must be capable of measurement and not shared by the entire population. If these attributes can be identified (that is described and measured), and if the frequency of occurrence of the attributes in the population can be determined, then, in principle, probability estimates can be made to assist in evaluating the significance of the evidence. These probability estimates are used to determine the degree of certainty that the evidence originated from the same source as the standard.
Barnett & Ogle, supra, at 272-73.
. Judge Lowenstein also cites cases from other jurisdictions which apparently have per*56mitted testimony, even over objection, that a hair match identifies a defendant to a reasonable certainty. As Judge Breckenridge’s opinion notes, Missouri follows the Frye test and does not permit such testimony to be admitted if properly objected to. Thus, Judge Low-enstein's reliance on these cases is not persuasive.
. Mr. Butler testified that he was swimming until 3:00 p.m. that day. A police officer arrived at J.L.’s residence at 10:24 p.m., which was about ten minutes after J.L. arrived home. J.L. ran directly home after the assailant untied him, so it was between 9:30 to 10:15 p.m., approximately, when the boys had contact with the assailant.
. This thus distinguishes this case from cases such as State v. Benfield, 522 S.W.2d 830, 833 (Mo.App.1975). Benfield held that defendant’s "unexplained possession of property recently stolen in a burglary,” along with his presence at the scene when the burglary and stealing occurred, his opportunity to commit the crimes, as well as the fact that he was seen leaving the crime scene with the stolen property, constituted "facts and circumstances which not only prove appellant’s guilt but are also inconsistent with his innocence.” Id. Here, Mr. Butler’s knowledge about his own mobile home park and his own activities is not inconsistent with his innocence.
. By finding that the circumstantial evidence in this case does not prove Mr. Butler’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, this Court would not run afoul of State v. Grim, 854 S.W.2d 403 (Mo. banc 1993). In Grim, the Supreme Court held that circumstantial evidence is sufficient to sustain a guilty verdict and that no greater quantum of proof is required to support a conviction based on such circumstantial evidence. Id. at 406. The difference between Grim and this case, however, is that in Grim, the circumstantial evidence of defendant’s guilt was a bloody fingerprint which was made in the victim’s blood. Id. at 412. Because of the reliable and unique quality of an individual’s fingerprint, fingerprint evidence, alone, is sufficient to support a criminal conviction. Bland, 757 S.W.2d at 245-46; State v. Anderson, 671 S.W.2d 383, 385 (Mo.App.1984). But, as has already been noted, hair comparison evidence is not nearly as reliable as fingerprint evidence. Affirming a criminal conviction on unreliable and inconclusive circumstantial evidence would be affirming a conviction supported by less than proof beyond reasonable doubt, which Grim clearly prohibits as well. 854 S.W.2d at 408.