concurring.
I concur in the result reached by the majority opinion, but write separately to express my concern about the issue. Section 523.010.4 provides that “nothing in this chapter shall be construed to give a public utility, as defined in section 386.020, RSMO, ..., the power to condemn property which is currently used by another provider of public utility service ...” (emphasis added). As I interpret the majority opinion, it proceeds, in part, on the theory that the phrase “another provider of public utility service” actually means another public utility. I am not satisfied that this is a correct interpretation of § 523.010.4. I do not believe that section is ambiguous. Rather, I believe that it clearly expresses an intention by the legislature that the power of condemnation shall not be exercised against another “provider” of public utility service whether or not that provider would otherwise qualify as a public utility pursuant to § 386.020(32)(amended and renumbered as § 386.020(42), RSMo Cum. Supp. 1996). I would, however, reach the same result as the majority by holding that Defendant is a “provider of public utility service.”