concurring in result.
Ordinarily I do not believe correspondence from an agency to a client constitutes a final order as required for an effective appeal by section 28-32-15, NDCC. However, if the Department of Human Services conducted a formal review subsequent to receiving Ba-shus’s letter which led to the executive director’s April 21, 1993, letter, it is possible the April 21, 1993, letter might be an appeal-able final order. Insofar as Bashus’s letter is not in the record and we are without knowledge as to what “review” if any was conducted, I agree we should remand to the district court for the purposes of making Bashus’s letter a part of the record and to determine whether the department reopened the proceeding pursuant to section 28-32-14(5), NDCC.
The other items which are not in the record become relevant only if the April 21, 1993, letter is an appealable order. I do not agree with the majority’s attempt to “bootstrap” these items into the determination of whether or not the April 21st letter is a final order.