DeVries v. DeVries

HENDERSON, Justice

(concurring in part, dissenting in part).

I concur with that aspect of the decision to which I do not dissent.

Inasmuch as this Court has determined that we cannot have a meaningful review of the trial court’s division of property, and, therefore, this case is being remanded for a valuation of assets, the award of alimony should not be considered and affirmed at this juncture. As I wrote some 10 years ago in Martin v. Martin, 358 N.W.2d 793, 802-803 (S.D.1984) (Henderson, J., dissenting):

An inherent fault lies in the reasoning of the majority opinion by isolating the subject of alimony. For, as we expressed in Goehry v. Goehry, 354 N.W.2d 192, 194 (S.D.1984), “[t]he trial court’s award of alimony and the division of property are considered together on appeal to determine whether the trial court abused its discretion. Krage v. Krage, 329 N.W.2d 878, 879 (S.D.1983) (emphasis supplied) ...”

This Court has long held that the property division and alimony must be considered together. Kappenmann v. Kappenmann, 479 N.W.2d 520, 523 (S.D.1992); Strickland v. Strickland, 470 N.W.2d 832, 838 (S.D.1991); Parsons v. Parsons, 469 N.W.2d 581, 583 (S.D.1991); Ryken v. Ryken, 461 N.W.2d 122, 127 (S.D.1990) (Ryken II); Studt v. Studt, 443 N.W.2d 639, 643 (S.D.1989); Ryken v. Ryken, 440 N.W.2d 300, 303 (S.D.1989) (Ryken I); Henrichs v. Henrichs, 426 N.W.2d 569, 573 (S.D.1988); Baltzer v. Baltzer, 422 N.W.2d 584, 587 (S.D.1988); Stemper v. Stemper, 403 N.W.2d 405, 407 (S.D. 1987); Temple v. Temple, 365 N.W.2d 561, 568 (S.D.1985); Booth v. Booth, 354 N.W.2d 924, 927 (S.D.1984); Palmer v. Palmer, 316 N.W.2d 631, 633 (S.D.1982); Wallahan v. Wallahan, 284 N.W.2d 21, 26 (S.D.1979); Lien v. Lien, 278 N.W.2d 436, 442 (S.D.1979); *79Stenberg v. Stenberg, 90 S.D. 229, 240 N.W.2d 100, 102 (1976).