OPINION ON STATE’S MOTION FOR REHEARING
MILLER, Judge.It was decided in this Court’s original opinion that the applicant was entitled to *647relief because one of applicant’s prior convictions introduced at the punishment phase had a fundamentally defective indictment, even though applicant had not objected at trial. The authorities relied on by the majority in the original opinion, Ex parte White, 659 S.W.2d 434 (Tex.Cr.App.1983) and Ex parte Todd, 669 S.W.2d 738 (Tex.Cr.App.1984), both stand for the proposition that a void prior conviction cannot be used to enhance punishment under Penal Code, § 12.42, and that no objection is required to preserve this error. In the instant case the void prior conviction was introduced only as evidence for the jury’s consideration and not for the purpose of statutorily raising the range of punishment for the offense. For this reason Ex parte White, and Ex parte Todd, supra, do not automatically provide an answer in this case.
As stated in the original opinion, five prior convictions were admitted during the punishment phase. One of these was a robbery conviction that was later declared void because of a fundamental defect in the indictment. Ex parte Russell, 685 S.W.2d 679 (Tex.Cr.App.1985). Applicant did not raise this error when the conviction was offered at trial. No objection was raised to its admission until this application for writ of habeas corpus was filed.
There are a limited number of issues that may be raised in an application for writ of habeas corpus. Habeas corpus is available only to review jurisdictional defects, Ex parte Watson, 601 S.W.2d 350 (Tex.Cr.App.1980), or denial of fundamental or constitutional rights, Ex parte Clark, 597 S.W.2d 760 (Tex.Cr.App.1979). There is no allegation that the trial court lacked jurisdiction in this case. Even if this error is one of constitutional dimensions, a timely objection may be required to preserve it. Rogers v. State, 640 S.W.2d 248 (Tex.Cr.App.1981), and Gibson v. State, 516 S.W.2d 406 (Tex.Cr.App.1974).
As stated above when a prior conviction is alleged in the indictment pursuant to V.T.C.A. Penal Code, § 12.42 and used to statutorily raise the range of punishment and that conviction is based on a fundamentally defective indictment, no objection is required to preserve error on appeal. It may be raised for the first time in an application for writ of habeas corpus. Ex parte Nivens, 619 S.W.2d 184 (Tex.Cr.App.1981) and Ex parte Howeth, 609 S.W.2d 540 (Tex.Cr.App.1980). It does not necessarily follow that a prior conviction based on a void indictment that is used only as evidence in the punishment phase will be treated the same way. The precise issue raised by the instant case has not previously been addressed by this Court.
A prior conviction offered as evidence in the punishment phase is governed by Art. 37.07(3)(a), V.A.C.C.P.:
“Regardless of the plea and whether the punishment be assessed by the judge or the jury, evidence may, as permitted by the Rules of Evidence, be offered by the State and the defendant as to the prior criminal record of the defendant, his general reputation and his character. The term prior criminal record means a final conviction in a court of record, or a probated or suspended sentence that has occurred prior to trial or any final conviction material to the offense charged.”
If a defendant wishes to complain on appeal about prior convictions admitted as evidence during the punishment phase, he must make a timely objection to the evidence or waive it. Ex parte Ramirez, 577 S.W.2d 261 (Tex.Cr.App.1979); Von Byrd v. State, 569 S.W.2d 883 (Tex.Cr.App.1978); Logan v. State, 482 S.W.2d 229 (Tex.Cr.App.1972); and Davis v. State, 463 S.W.2d 434 (Tex.Cr.App.1971). Even when the pri- or conviction was uncounselled, a timely objection is necessary to preserve error. Aldrighetti v. State, 507 S.W.2d 770 (Tex.Cr.App.1974); Boss v. State, 489 S.W.2d 580 (Tex.Cr.App.1972).
In the instant case appellant did not object to the robbery conviction when it was offered into evidence by the State. There is no compelling reason to treat the instant case differently than every other case in which a defendant is complaining of the introduction of his prior convictions. The instant case differs from Nivens, and Howeth, supra in that the robbery conviction *648was not alleged in the indictment for enhancement purposes and did not have the effect of statutorily raising the range of punishment that the jury may consider.
For these reasons we hold that appellant waived his right to complain about the introduction of the void burglary conviction because he did not make a timely objection when the evidence was offered by the State.
The State’s Motion for Rehearing is granted. The relief requested is denied.
ONION, P.J., and CLINTON, TEAGUE and DUNCAN, JJ., dissent.