concurring specially.
The trial court’s memorandum opinion stated it “does not find that there has been a sufficient change of circumstances to warrant a change in custody in Joel’s best interest. The Court finds it would be in the child’s best interest to allow the change of residence.” But “changed circumstances” have been defined by this court as “new facts which were unknown to the moving party at the time the decree was entered.” Wright v. Wright, 431 N.W.2d 301, 303 (N.D.1988). Jacque's subsequent remarriage and her decision to move to Colorado are obviously material facts which were unknown to Richard, and most probably to Jacque herself, at the time of the original default divorce. There can be no doubt that a material change of circumstances occurred. Had Richard been aware at the time of the original divorce decree that Jacque would attempt to remove Joel from the State it seems probable that custody would have been contested and that Richard would not have stipulated that physical custody of Joel would be with Jacque. It appears to me that a conclusion that there has not been “sufficient change *659of circumstances to warrant a change in custody in Joel’s best interest” blurs the two questions to be answered in disposing of motions to change custody, i.e., (1) has there been a substantial change in circumstances and (2) is it in the best interests of the child that custody be changed? Miller v. Miller, 305 N.W.2d 656 (N.D.1981). In Mertz v. Mertz, 439 N.W.2d 94 (N.D.1989), we recognized that the preference of the child is more relevant in determining the best interests of the child than it is in determining whether there has been a significant change in circumstances.
My reluctance to affirm the trial court’s order denying a change of custody stems from the fact that I believe the trial court, perhaps inadvertently, appears in its memorandum opinion to trivialize the preference of a 13-year-old child to remain in Grand Forks where he has lived all of his natural life, and where he is close to his extended family, including a brother whom he visits regularly at the Grafton State School. The trial court concluded that “It seems natural that Joel would like to live with his father for several reasons. First, the father has provided many things for Joel. Joel enjoys being with his father where it appears that he is eager to please his father and really does not need much by way of discipline. Secondly, the Court believes that Joel feels his father needs him. Thirdly, this will allow him to stay in Grand Forks.” The same conclusions could be made regardless of Joel’s age, assuming he was of the age of reason.
We noted, at footnote 2 of Mertz, supra, that presumably the trial court gives more weight to the child’s preference as the child matures. I am not convinced that happened in this case. We also observed in that footnote that we assume the trial court recognizes that a child’s preference to live with the noncustodial parent may, in some instances, be motivated by goals and ambitions which undermine the significance of that preference and might be detrimental to the child’s best interests. Despite the offhand comments about discipline those ulterior goals and ambitions do not appear on this record. Rather, the sincerity of Joel’s preference is reflected in his desire to be among his extended family, most importantly his brother. Moreover, it would appear that the same general observations could be made about the relationship between most children and the noncustodial parent because the custodial parent is the person in whose home the child lives and who is in direct contact with the child day to day, through good times and bad. The custodial parent will be the disciplinarian and the noncustodial parent, even under generous visitation provisions, will be an outsider. So, too, the noncustodial parent will be suspect for having “bought” the child’s affection because they go to special places or special events are planned during the time of visitation. But it is because visitation is limited that it is natural for the noncustodial parent to plan something special during the visitation in order to best use the limited time together, whereas such planning is not necessary for the custodial parent who sees the child day to day.
Although I believe the child’s preference should be given consideration as the child matures, at least where it is not based on frivolous reasons, I recognize that the preference is not controlling. If it were, I would reverse the order of the trial court denying the change in custody. What is written above reflects my concern that insufficient consideration was given to the child’s preference under the facts of this case. I am not convinced that more serious consideration of Joel’s preference to live with Richard would cause the trial court to change its result. I cannot, therefore, conclude that under our standard of review the decision of the court is clearly erroneous and I therefore reluctantly concur in the result.
GIERKE, J., concurs.