concurring and dissenting.
I find myself in strong disagreement with the members of the majority panel and record my respectful dissent. The majority and separate concurring opinions have this day effectively sanctioned as legitimate judicial conduct, a political campaign strategy by which a jurist can personally put the financial “pinch” on an attorney or party involved in pending litigation in order to fund his re-election campaign so long as it is a pinch and not a “squeeze.”
In Appellants’ fifth point of error, it is asserted that the presiding judge at the hearing on his Motion To Recuse abused his discretion in refusing to recuse the trial judge because the acts of the trial judge were contrary to the standards of conduct promulgated by the Texas legislature, the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure and the Code of Judicial Conduct. Specifically, Appellants have questioned the trial judge’s impartiality. Appellants’ concern is based on the fact that the trial judge, during the pendency of a contested case, and knowing that a motion for summary judgment filed by Appellees was pending and would be heard by him two weeks later, personally telephoned an attorney who had made an appearance on behalf of Appellees and whose supporting affidavit was affixed to their motion for summary judgment as summary judgment proof, for the purpose of soliciting and accepting a re-election campaign contribution from that attorney and his law firm.9 Under the unique circumstances of the instant case, I would find that the trial judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned and would sustain Appellants’ fifth point of error.
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The majority opinion is based at least in part on a deficient and inaccurate chronology of events. More precisely, the record shows that Appellants filed their usury action against Appellees on June 10, 1988. Appellees’ answered by entering their general denial on August 2, 1988. The appellate record, consisting of over 2,000 pages of documents, exclusive of any statement of facts, establishes that a plethora of affidavits, amendments, answers, attachments, briefs, cases, certificates, counterclaims, depositions, exceptions, exhibits, interrogatories, letters, memoranda, motions, notices, objections, orders, petitions, pleas, requests, responses, sets and various supplements were filed from the date of the Original Petition to the date Appellants’ Motion to Recuse was filed.10 Included among the *808above documents were Appellants’ and Ap-pellees’ respective motions for summary judgment, both amended and supplemental. Appellants’ initial Motion for Summary Judgment was filed December 12, 1988. Appellees’ initial Motion for Summary Judgment, filed February 2, 1989, was based, at least partially, on the affirmative defense of limitations. Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat. Ann. art. 5069-1.06(3) (Vernon 1987) and Tex.Civ.Prac. & Rem.Code § 16.004 (Vernon 1986). On March 30, 1989, the trial court denied both parties’ motions for summary judgment. On August 9, 1989, Appellees filed their First Amended Motion for Summary Judgment. On October 3, 1989, the trial judge entered his order resetting a hearing on Appellees’ First Amended Motion for Summary Judgment. The hearing was set for December 22, 1989. Appellees’ First Amended Motion for Summary Judgment was likewise based on the affirmative defense of limitations. Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat. Ann. art. 5069-1.06(3) (Vernon 1987) and Tex.Civ.Prac. & Rem.Code § 16.004 (Vernon 1986). The First Amended Motion for Summary Judgment relies largely on the Appellants’ responses to Appellees’ Requests for Admission, filed November 2, 1988, approximately three months prior to the filing of Appellees’ original Motion for Summary Judgment. The record shows that in early December 1989, prior to the date of the scheduled hearing, the trial judge filed his application for designation of his own campaign treasurer. The record additionally shows that during that time in early December 1989, and while Appellees’ First Amended Motion for Summary Judgment was pending, the trial judge personally telephoned an attorney who had made an appearance on behalf of Appellees, and whose supporting affidavit was affixed to Appellees’ then-pending motion for summary judgment as summary judgment proof, and solicited a financial contribution for his re-election campaign.11 On December 6, 1989, that attorney delivered check number 14242 in the amount of $300 to the trial judge.12
On December 22, 1989, the trial judge held the scheduled hearing on Appellees’ First Amended Motion for Summary Judgment. Subsequent to the hearing, but before the trial judge decided the pending motion, Appellees filed their Supplemental Motion for Summary Judgment, accompanied by the supporting affidavit of the attorney who had given the trial judge a financial contribution. On January 16, 1990, a meeting was held in the trial judge’s chambers at which time the judge told the parties that the case was to be settled or the case would be settled by the court. On February 8, 1990, the trial judge granted Appellees’ First Amended Motion for Summary Judgment.13
*809On June 20, 1990, Appellant Tony C. Aguilar filed his Motion to Recuse the trial judge. Appellants’ Motion to Recuse was filed pursuant to Tex.R.Civ.P. 18b(2) (Vernon Supp.1988), and further predicated on Canons 1 and 2 B of the Texas Code of Judicial Conduct (Vernon 1988). On August 24, 1990, a hearing was conducted on Appellants’ Motion to Recuse. After considering the pleadings and attached affidavits as well as the argument of counsel, the judge assigned to hear the Motion to Re-cuse found that the trial judge possessed no personal bias or prejudice against Appellants which would have precluded Appellants from obtaining a fair and impartial trial. The recusal judge further found that the alleged prejudice upon which Appellants’ Motion to Recuse was based did not stem from any extrajudicial source, but was based upon the trial judge’s in-court rulings in the course of the trial.14
The record’ further shows that sixty seconds after the Order Denying Recusal was filed, Appellees filed their Second Supplemental Motion for Summary Judgment which was later complemented by their Third Supplemental Motion for Summary Judgment. On June 27, 1991, the trial judge denied Appellants’ Second Motion for Summary Judgment and granted all of Ap-pellees then-pending supplemental motions for summary judgment.15
II. DISCUSSION
The majority opinion correctly sets out the very stringent standard of review for denial of motions to recuse, i.e., whether or not the trial court abused its discretion. Petitt v. Laware, 715 S.W.2d 688, 692 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Tex.R.Civ.P. 18a(f) (Vernon Supp. 1988). The test for abuse of discretion is not whether, in the opinion of this Court, the facts present an appropriate case for the trial court’s actions. Rather, it is a question of whether the court acted without reference to any guiding rules and principles. Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc., 701 S.W.2d 238, 241-42 (Tex.1985), citing Craddock v. Sunshine Bus Lines, 134 Tex. 388, 133 S.W.2d 124, 126 (Tex.Comm.App.-1939, opinion adopted). Another way of stating the test is whether the act was arbitrary or unreasonable. Id. 701 S.W.2d at 242, citing Smithson v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 665 S.W.2d 439, 443 (Tex.1984); Landry v. Travelers Insurance Co., 458 S.W.2d 649, 651 (Tex.1970). This writer fully recognizes that the mere fact that a trial court may decide a matter within its discretionary authority in a different manner than an appellate judge in a similar circumstance does not demonstrate that an abuse of discretion has occurred. Downer, 701 S.W.2d at 242, citing Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Johnson, 389 S.W.2d 645, 648 (Tex.1965) and Jones v. Strayhorn, 159 Tex. 421, 321 S.W.2d 290, 295 (1959). A mere error of judgment is not an abuse of discretion. Loftin v. Martin, 776 S.W.2d 145, 146 (Tex.1989).
Insofar as there appears to be much confusion as to the distinction between judicial disqualification and recusal of judges, I turn to the Texas Constitution, the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure and the Texas Code of Judicial Conduct for proper determination of the guiding rules and principles on which the recusal judge was bound to rely.
Disqualification and recusal are not synonymous terms. Disqualification of a judge on the constitutional grounds of interest, relationship to a party or having served as counsel in the case is absolute. Tex. Const, art. V, § 11. Disqualification cannot be waived and can be raised at any time, even by a collateral attack of the *810judgment. Buckholts Independent School District v. Glaser, 632 S.W.2d 146, 148 (Tex.1982), citing Fry v. Tucker, 146 Tex. 18, 20, 202 S.W.2d 218, 220 (1947). On the other hand, recusal of a judge on any ground not enumerated as disqualifying in the Texas Constitution is governed by statute and rule. A party waives its right to recusal of a judge if it does not raise the issue in a proper motion. Recusal of a trial judge cannot be urged for the first time on appeal. Id. 632 S.W.2d at 148; Amsav Group, Inc. v. American Savings and Loan Association of Brazoria County, 796 S.W.2d 482, 485 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, writ denied). The trial judge must voluntarily recuse or refer the motion to the presiding judge of the administrative district to assign a judge to hear such motion. Dunn v. County of Dallas, 794 S.W.2d 560 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1990, no writ); Tex.R.Civ.P. 18a(c). See generally William W. Kilgarlin & Jennifer Bruch, Disqualification and Recusal of Judges, 17 St. MaRy’s L.J. 599, 652 (1986)
On December 6, 1990, the judge assigned to hear the Motion to Recuse entered his “Order on Plaintiffs’ Motion to Disqualify Judge.” The voluminous pleadings on file in the instant ease fail to advance any allegations that the trial judge was constitutionally disqualified to sit in judgment of the instant case. To the contrary, Appellants’ Motion to Recuse is based exclusively on nonconstitutional grounds. Any authorities interpreting the constitutional impediments to judges sitting on cases in which they have an interest, are related to a party to the litigation, or have previously served as counsel are not dispositive of the present dispute and thus, cannot be the basis for guiding rules and principles on which the recusal judge could safely rely in denying Appellants’ Motion to Recuse. ,
Having properly set aside provisions of the Texas Constitution as being purported guiding principles on which the recusal judge based his denial of Appellants’ Motion to Recuse, I now turn to the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, as well as pertinent portions of the Texas Code of Judicial Conduct which were in effect at the time of the hearing.
. Tex.R.Civ.P. 18b(2) (Vernon Supp.1988), in effect at the time Appellants’ Motion to Recuse was filed and heard, provided in pertinent part:
Recusal. Judges shall recuse themselves in proceedings in which their impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including but not limited to, instances in which they have a personal bias or prejudice concerning the subject matter or a party, or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding.16 [Emphasis added].
The majority opinion cites J-IV Investments v. David Lynn Machine, Inc., 784 S.W.2d 106 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1990, no writ); Rocha v. Ahmad, 662 S.W.2d 77, 78 *811(Tex.App.—San Antonio 1983, no writ); and Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 729 S.W.2d 768 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.), in support of the proposition that the recusal judge did not abuse its discretion in denying the Motion to Recuse. The separate concurring opinion cites no authorities from our jurisdiction. Texaco was a case in which our Texas Supreme Court refused writ, no reversible error.17 No application for writ of error was filed in J-IV Investments or in Rocha, neither was reviewed by our higher court and, thus, they are persuasive but not binding on the other intermediate appellate courts of our state.
In J-IV Investments, a case very similar to the instant case, the movant on a motion to recuse complained of the trial court’s failure to disclose information which may have been the basis for recusal and of the denial of its “Motion for Retroactive Recusal.” J-IV Investments, 784 S.W.2d at 107. The jury in that case returned its verdict on July 5, 1988. Both sides filed motions for judgment which the court took under advisement. In September 1988, counsel for Defendant David Lynn Machine, Inc. made a $500 contribution to the trial judge’s campaign fund. On December 21, the court granted that party’s motion for J.N.O.V. The trial judge’s term ended on December 31, 1988, and his successor took office January 1, 1989. J-IV Investments claimed no knowledge of the campaign contribution until after rendition of the judgment. J-IV Investments filed its motion for retroactive recusal which was denied by an assigned judge. While I certainly view J-IV Investments to be most persuasive, I would decline to follow its holding insofar as its opinion wholly fails to state the basis on which the motion to recuse was founded.18 Further, that court relied upon cases holding that campaign contributions do not create bias which would prompt recusal. As noted, this fails to account for the statute requiring recusal whenever a trial court’s impartiality may reasonably be questioned, regardless of any actual bias the judge may hold.
In Rocha, attempt was made to “recuse or disqualify” two justices on the San Antonio Court of Appeals who received “many thousands of dollars” from or through the law offices of the Appellees’ attorney. Rocha, 662 S.W.2d at 77. Additionally, “victory” celebrations were allegedly held at the law offices of that attorney for the two justices after their election to the Court of Appeals. Appellant asserted that the challenged judges should recuse themselves or be disqualified “in view of the provisions of the Texas Code of Judicial Conduct, Canons 2 and 3.” The Rocha Court, citing Maxey v. Citizens National Bank of Lubbock, 489 S.W.2d 697 (Tex.Civ.App.-Amarillo 1972), rev’d on other grounds, 507 S.W.2d 722 (Tex.1974), held that Canons 2 and 3 of the Texas Code of Judicial Conduct did not have the force of law and further, apparently interpreting Tex. Const, art. V, § 11, held that even assuming that Canons 2 and 3 had the force of law, there would be no constitutional impediment to the challenged justices sitting in judgment. Once again, I would decline to follow the holding of the Rocha Court insofar as its holding hinged on a constitutional interpretation of “interest” and the Code of Judicial Conduct, rather than on an interpretation of established rules of procedure then in effect. The Motion to Recuse in the instant case was premised on those Rules of Civil Procedure, not constitutional grounds.
Finally, Appellees rely on Texaco, an aberration, as authority for judicial ethics in our jurisdiction, in support of the recusal judge’s actions in denying Appellants’ Motion to Recuse. In Texaco, the motion to *812recuse the trial judge was based on Canon 3 C of the Texas Code of Judicial Conduct. In that case, the lead counsel for Pennzoil, soon after an answer was filed in the case, gave the sum of $10,000 to the trial judge’s campaign fund and also served on the trial judge’s campaign steering committee. In its motion, Texaco argued that these actions created an appearance of impropriety on the part of the trial judge; however, the First Court of Appeals held that the campaign contribution did not constitute an appearance of impropriety.19 I would decline to follow the holding of Texaco, not simply because the Texas Supreme Court refused to pass on the correctness of the appellate court’s declaration the law, but rather on the basis that the general rule that political campaign contributions by attorneys to members of our judiciary do not create an appearance of impropriety or otherwise constitute circumstances under which the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned, does not apply to the extreme facts found in the instant case. While I readily concede that a campaign contribution alone might not create a reasonable question as to a judge’s impartiality, more factors come into play in the instant case. Furthermore, the Texaco Court’s reliance on Rocha, a case which found Canon 3 C of the Texas Code of Judicial Conduct not to have the force of law and which applied the constitutional yardstick for disqualification, is tenuous at best compared to the interpretation which this Court is required to give to Tex. R.Civ.P. 18b(2) (Vernon Supp.1988) in the instant case. The Texas Rules of Civil Procedure have the same force and effect as statutes. Missouri Pacific Railroad Company v. Cross, 501 S.W.2d 868, 872 (Tex.1973); Freeman v. Freeman, 160 Tex. 148, 327 S.W.2d 428, 433 (1959).
Given the significant distinguishing features of each of the cases on which the majority seeks to rely in overruling Appellants’ Point of Error No. Five, I would find that those cases do not support the recusal judge’s ruling, and if the recusal judge based his decision to deny Appellants’ Motion to Recuse on the above cases as “guiding rules and principles,” as the majority opinion would suggest, then such decision is suspect. However, prior to a determination as to whether the decision of the recu-sal judge in denying the Motion to Recuse was an arbitrary or unreasonable act, other applicable statutory rules and principles must be analyzed.
As repeatedly noted, Tex.R.Civ.P. 18b(2) (Vernon Supp.1988), in effect at the time Appellants’ Motion to Recuse was filed and heard, provided that judges shall recuse themselves in proceedings in which their impartiality might reasonably be questioned. In that regard, the conduct of judges, who are a highly visible symbol of government under the rule of law, is guided by the Texas Code of Judicial Conduct which is intended to establish standards for ethical conduct. Thus, the primary rules and principles to which reference was to be made by the recusal judge in the determination of whether or not to grant Appellant’s Motion to Recuse are found in that Code. Texas Supreme CouRt, Code of Judicial Conduct, Amended to April 1, 1988, reprinted at Tex.Gov’t Code Ann., title 2, Subt. G, Appendix B (Vernon 1988). Given the limited but bizarre facts of the instant case, the sole issue presented in light of the rules and principles delineated in the Texas Code of Judicial Conduct, is whether a judge’s impartiality can reasonably be questioned in a case where: (1) after the judge has denied substantive procedural relief requested in pending, active litigation, (2) he personally solicits and accepts a financial campaign contribution (3) from an attorney associated with that pending, active litigation, then (4) subsequently grants the relief which had previously been denied on the same basis, this time in favor of the attorney from whom he had just received *813the financial campaign contribution. While my esteemed colleague in his separate concurring opinion would suggest that “reasonable” persons in Kansas, Alabama and Florida would be knowledgeable of the “facts of life” which surround the judiciary, I find it undeniable that the reasonable Texan might question the judge’s impartiality in such a case. I would submit that the reasonable Texan truly envisions an independent judiciary, based simply on junior high social studies classes that emphasize that all men and women are equal under our laws.
The Texas Code of Judicial Conduct, in effect at the time of the solicitation and acceptance of the financial contribution provided in pertinent part as follows:
Canon 1
A Judge Should Uphold the Integrity and Independence of the Judiciary
An independent and honorable judiciary is indispensable to justice in our society. A judge should participate in establishing, maintaining, and enforcing, and should observe high standards of conduct so that the integrity and independence of the judiciary is preserved. The provisions of this Code shall be construed and applied to further that objective.
Canon 2
A Judge Should Avoid Impropriety and the Appearance of Impropriety in All Activities
A. A judge should respect and comply with the law and should conduct himself or herself at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.
B. A judge should not lend the prestige of his or her office to advance the private interests of himself or herself or others; nor should he or she convey or permit others to convey the impression that they are in a special position to influence him or her.
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Canon 5
A Judge Should Regulate ExtraJudicial Activities to Minimize the Risk of Conflict with Judicial Duties
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C.Financial Activities.
(1) A judge should refrain from financial and business dealings that tend to reflect adversely on his or her impartiality, interfere with the proper performance of the judicial duties, exploit his or her judicial position, or involve the judge in frequent transactions with lawyers or persons likely to come before the court on which he or she serves. [Emphasis added].
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Canon 7
A Judge Shall Refrain from Political Activity Inappropriate to the Judiciary
(1) Any candidate for elective judicial office, including an incumbent judge, and others acting on the candidate’s behalf, shall refrain from all conduct which would violate the Election Code and/or this Code.
See Texas Supkeme COURT, Code of Judicial Conduct, Amended to April 1, 1988, reprinted at Tex.Gov’t Code Ann., title 2, Subt. G, Appendix B (Vernon 1988).20 [Emphasis added].
The Texas Code of Judicial Conduct, unlike its counterpart applicable to the general membership of the State Bar of Texas, lacks commentaries which by way of expla*814nation and examples are designed to provide guidance with respect to the purpose and meaning of the particular Canons. See Tex.Disciplinary R.PROf.Conduct (1989). It is nonetheless clear that the objective of the Code at the time of the solicitation and acceptance of the financial contribution, as well as at the present time, is to draw a line between approved and permissible conduct for judges and that which is disapproved and impermissible. In that regard, in interpreting the language as found in the Code, the use of the terms “shall” or “shall not” intend to impose binding obligations the violations of which can result in disciplinary action, while the use of the terms “should” or “should not” is intended as a statement of what is or is not appropriate conduct but not as a binding rule under which a judge may be disciplined. It is the use of the latter terms “should” and “should not” on which proper disposition of the instant case hinges.
Judges must uphold and adhere to standards of conduct that might be burdensome to other citizens, particularly other elected officials; however, the distinction between judges and judicial candidates and other elected officials is important to recognize. Judges are expected to be impartial, while executives and legislators are not. It is for those reasons that a judge should observe high standards of conduct so that the integrity and independence of the judiciary is preserved; conduct himself or herself at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary; refrain from conveying or permitting others to convey the impression that they are in a special position to influence him or her; and, refrain from financial dealings that tend to reflect adversely on his or her impartiality or exploit his or her judicial position. Texas Supreme Court, Code of Judicial Conduct, Amended to April 1, 1988, reprinted at Tex.Gov’t Code Ann., title 2, Subt. G, Appendix B (Vernon 1988). Judges should be committed to the Code for no other reason than it is right.
Under our current structure, the position of a jurist in the United States in general, and the State of Texas in particular, is the symbol of both the judicial system and the orderly administration of justice. See Texas Lawyer’s Creed — A Mandate For Professionalism, Section IV, subsee. 1, Texas Supreme Court adopted November 7, 1989. Public policy demands that a judge who tries a case act with absolute impartiality. CNA Insurance Company v. Scheffey, 828 S.W.2d 785, 792 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 1992, writ denied), citing Prendergass v. Beale, 59 Tex. 446, 447 (1883). It further demands that a judge appear to be impartial so that no doubts or suspicions exist as to the fairness or the integrity of the court.21 Id.; Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 106 S.Ct. 1580, 89 L.Ed.2d 823 (1986). Judicial decisions rendered under circumstances that suggest bias, prejudice or favoritism undermine the integrity of the courts, breed skepticism and mistrust, and thwart the principles on which the judicial system is based. Sun Exploration and Production Company v. Jackson, 783 S.W.2d 202, 206 (Tex.1989) (Spears, J., concurring).
The political reality of judicial elections is that candidates must be able to raise money in order to be elected. But how can a judge remain a judge in the eyes of the reasonable Texan and not simply an ill-perceived politician masquerading in robes? The reality in contemporary political Texas is that if a judicial candidate raises money for a campaign, his or her impartiality might be questioned as a result of having received money and having entered into the political arena. On the other hand, if the trial judge tries to preserve his or her integrity and maintain an appearance of impartiality by refusing to raise funds, the election is destined to be lost. Another *815reality is that to the reasonable Texan, attorney contributions, at best, create the appearance of impropriety and, at worst, given the facts of this ease, amount to the appearance that justice can be bought at wholesale prices.22 The majority opinion effectively holds that no solicitation of financial contributions by a judge can raise a reasonable question as to the judge’s impartiality. This decision is unrealistic and is an open invitation for Texas jurists to test the limits and tolerance of reasonable Texans who already are clamoring for term limitations,' ceilings on campaign spending, elimination of political action committees and subdistricts.
In the instant cast, the majority opinion, as well as the separate concurring, would suggest that the solicited and accepted “contribution was small, the trial judge maintained a voluntary policy of accepting only very limited contributions from any single source, and the contributing lawyer was not even lead attorney for defendants.” Such rationalization of the facts of this case however, is not comforting to the single mother of five, unable to afford counsel of her choice for the purpose of enforcing child-support obligations, who discovers that opposing counsel attorney made a financial contribution to the judge’s re-election campaign after her motion for contempt was filed, but prior to its disposition.23 Likewise, it is not comforting to the many attorneys who practice in the courts of our state who are often susceptible to the pressure from judges who personally request campaign contributions from them.
Solicitation of campaign funding is an evil necessity of the electoral system and ties judges to a political process in which they should not take part. Legislators and executive officials at all levels of government often rely upon express or implied promises of material benefits to those who contribute to their campaigns. However, it is a well-established principle that no man or woman may have undue influence over the judicial branch of government. Justice is impartiality which is served only if all citizens are seen as equal in the courts that adjudicate their rights, regardless of their political preference or their ability to contribute to a judicial campaign. It is this appearance of independence of the judiciary which lends an aura of respect to those elected or appointed to serve the community as judges. Even an official whose political career may have been built upon bargaining for public office is endowed with a halo of unimpeachable respect once the individual steps into the role of judge.
The judicial branch is honored and respected by the public for its independence from the other branches of government and from concerns for the political ramifications to any judge resulting from his or her decisions. Any activity, regardless of the nature of its innocence, that casts doubt upon a judge’s neutrality in a given case severely diminishes the image of the entire judicial branch of government. For this reason, Texas requires the recusal of a judge in any case where his or her impartiality might reasonably be questioned, regardless of any actual bias which may be held in a case. This rule recognizes the need for the judicial branch of government to maintain not only the utmost impartiality, but also the appearance of complete *816impartiality. Without that appearance, the public confidence in the judiciary is weakened; without that confidence, the judicial branch is powerless.
The line that determines when recusal is required and when it is not required is very fine. However, in the real world, the facts of this case would give the appearance of partiality which would mandate a recusal, notwithstanding the judge’s genuine ability to maintain neutrality. It is for the above reasons that I would find that the trial judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned, and I would accordingly sustain Appellant’s fifth point of error. Although I differ from the majority’s viewpoint on Appellant’s Point of Error No. Five, I concur in its holding on the issue of limitations. If the trial judge had been recused, any judge hearing the case would have been required to grant judgment in favor of Appellees because the statute of limitations had clearly run. Thus, there was no harm to Appellants from the denial of their Motion to Recuse. Accordingly, I would affirm the judgment of the trial court under the statute of limitations and Tex.R.App.P. 81(b)(1), which provides that no error is reversible unless it caused the rendition of an improper judgment.
. The majority opinion suggests that Appellant’s Motion to Recuse is based upon the "trial judge’s solicitation and acceptance of a campaign contribution from [an attorney] and his law firm." The issue however, is not whether the trial judge, or the attorney did anything wrong, but rather, whether what the trial judge did was such that his impartiality might reasonably be questioned. See Tex.R.Civ.P. 18b(2) (Vernon Supp.1988). For that reason, I render no opinion, either express or implied, on the actual propriety or impropriety of the actions of the trial judge in the instant case. Moreover, it is not the prerogative of this Court to either write, modify or amend any rule of procedure or code of conduct. Neither is it my intent to formulate a suggested method of compliance. Accordingly, I limit my comments to the analysis of the events of this case.
. The record shows that between the date of filing of the Original Petition commencing this action and the' date Appellant's Motion to Re-cuse was filed, that no less than 10 affidavits, 14 amendments, 4 trial briefs, 4 letters, 2 memo-randa of law, 5 motions, 12 notices, 7 objections, 9 orders, 8 responses, 3 special exceptions, 8 supplements and various other documents were in the trial court’s file. Moreover, the trial judge, at the hearing on the motion to recuse, testified that he specifically remembered telling Appellant that he thought this case had *808"gotten totally out of hand, that it seemed like almost weekly [they] were having some kind of emergency hearing of one kind or another always over petty things_”
. The nature of the summary judgment proof, i.e., the attorney's affidavit, was such that the trial judge receiving the timely campaign contribution would be asked to pass on the credibility of the attorney giving him the contribution in determining whether to grant or deny Appellee’s First Amended Motion for Summary Judgment.
. The record shows that the $300. financial contribution, representing $100 from each member of the attorney’s firm, was properly reported in the candidate’s financial disclosure form. The attorney, at the hearing on the motion to recuse, acknowledged that most law firms give money, but that under the facts in this case, “there is absolutely nothing wrong with what was done by me or by [the trial judge].”
.The Order Granting Defendants’ First Amended Motion for Summary Judgment was based on the running of the statute of limitations. The trial judge additionally granted partial summary judgment in favor of Appellees on Appellants’ claim of usury. The majority and separate concurring opinions, in their brief procedural history pertinent to this point of error, fail to note that after the trial judge denied Appellees’ initial motion for summary judgment, an amended motion for summary judgment was filed. The basis for each of the motions was essentially identical, i.e., the affirmative defense of limitations. The separate opinions likewise fail to mention that the summary judgment proof submitted with each of the motions was essentially identical. Finally, the separate opinions fail to mention that between the date the original motion for summary judgment was denied and the amended motion for summary judgment granted, was the personal solicitation and acceptance of a political contribution.
. As noted earlier, Appellants’ Motion to Re-cuse was based on Tex.R.Civ.P. 18b(2) (Vernon Supp.1988). Appellants have not asserted that the trial judge possessed a personal bias or prejudice against him so as to preclude him from obtaining a fair and impartial trial, as suggested in the Order Denying Recusal. The Order Denying Recusal is totally silent as to whether the conduct of the trial judge was such that his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.
. The record shows that the Order Denying Recusal was entered at 1:51 p.m. on December 6, 1990. Defendants’ Second Supplemental Motion for Summary Judgment was filed at 1:52 p.m. on December 6, 1990.
. Tex.R.Civ.P. 18b(2) underwent extensive revision by order of April 24, 1990, effective September 1, 1990, and currently provides as follows:
(2) Recusal
A judge shall recuse himself in any proceeding in which:
(a) his impartiality might reasonably be questioned;
(b) he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning the subject matter or a party, or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding;
(c) he or a lawyer with whom he previously practiced law has been a material witness concerning it;
(d) he participated as counsel, adviser or material witness in the matter in controversy, or expressed an opinion concerning the merits of it, while acting as an attorney in government service;
(e) he knows that he, individually or as a fiduciary, or his spouse or minor child residing in his household, has a financial interest in the subject matter in controversy or in a party to the proceeding, or any other interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding
(f) he or his spouse, or a person within the third degree of relationship to either of them, or the spouse of such a person:
(i) is a party to the proceeding, or an officer, director, or trustee of a party;
(ii) is known by the judge to have an interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding;
(iii) is to the judge's knowledge likely to be a material witness in the proceeding.
(g) he or his spouse, or a person within the first degree of relationship to either of them, or the spouse of such a person, is acting as a lawyer in the proceeding.
. The designation "writ refused, no reversible error,” in effect at the time Texaco was decided, meant that the Texas Supreme Court was not satisfied that the opinion of the court of appeals correctly declared the law. The designation simply meant that the supreme court found that the application presented no error requiring reversal. Texas Rules of Form (8th ed. 1992), Appendix A.
. As noted earlier, Tex.R.Civ.P. 18b(2) (Vernon Supp.1988) provided for recusal where a judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including but not limited to, personal bias or prejudice concerning the subject matter or a party or personal knowledge of disputed eviden-tiary facts concerning the proceedings.
. The questionable campaign contributions apparently did not stop at the trial level. Representatives of Texaco, apparently sensing that disposition of the $10.53 billion dollar case may be resolved on "sealed bids," donated $72,700 to seven justices on the Texas Supreme Court which was hearing the appeal. Attorneys for Pennzoil, in turn, donated more than $315,000 to the justices. See Bradley A. Siciliano, Attorney Contributions in Judicial Campaigns: Creating the Appearance of Impropriety, 20 Hofstra L.Rev. 217 (Fall 1991).
. On December 19, 1989, thirteen days after the date of the financial contribution, Canon 5 C(2) was amended to read as follows:
C. Financial Activities.
(1) A judge should refrain from financial and business dealings that tend to reflect adversely on the judge’s impartiality, interfere with the proper performance of the judicial duties, exploit his or her judicial position, or involve the judge in frequent transactions with lawyers or persons likely to come before the court on which the judge serves. This limitation does not prohibit either a judge or candidate from soliciting funds for appropriate campaign or officeholder expenses as permitted by state law. [Emphasis added].
. I absolutely agree with Chief Justice Osborn’s statement found in his concurring opinion that "I do not believe the ‘reasonable person on the street’ would conclude that receipt of a $100 contribution or even a $500 contribution, with today’s standards and cost of campaigns, would result in a trial judge being bias or prejudiced." However, once again I must emphasize that the question is not whether the $300 contribution in the instant case necessarily resulted In the trial judge being biased or prejudiced, but rather, whether such conduct raises a reasonable question as to the trial judge’s impartiality.
. Serious doubt is oftentimes cast upon the motives of attorneys who contribute to judicial campaigns. While some lawyers claim that they contribute to elect a higher quality judiciary, many lawyers make substantial contributions to judges who are running opposed, who are certain winners, and who are certain losers. Contributions are often sent to both sides in a race, or to the winner after the election. Furthermore, particular types of attorneys stand to gain if judges are elected whó are more sympathetic to the kinds of clients that they represent.
. A similar analogy would hold true if a member of this appellate court, after having issued this opinion, but during the pendency of a motion for rehearing, personally telephoned an attorney or other party in this case and solicited and accepted a political campaign contribution. The appearance of impropriety or the question of that judge’s impartiality cannot necessarily be weighed simply on whether the contribution was "small," was personally solicited by the judge, was solicited during the pendency of this litigation or whether the contribution was or was not made by an attorney of record. Sometimes pleasant odors have a tendency to rise to the level of distaste when smelled in combination with other odors.