(dissenting).
The court of appeals and the majority opinion of this court properly hold that the trial court erred in denying defendant’s request for an instruction on accomplice testimony. It is only from this court’s conclusion that the error is amenable to the harmless error analysis that I respectfully dissent.
Newman was an accomplice as a matter of law, his complicity in the murder being undisputed. State v. Hopfe, 249 Minn. 464, *483471-72, 82 N.W.2d 681, 686 (1957). The accomplice corroboration requirement, mandated by Minn.Stat. § 634.04 (1988), must be communicated to the jury to afford its intended protection against untrustworthy accomplice testimony. Shoop’s written requested jury instruction requiring corroboration of Newman’s testimony was denied by the trial court without discussion. The general instructions given do not state that no conviction may be had without corroboration as required by our cases. State v. LaJambe, 300 Minn. 539, 541, 219 N.W.2d 917, 919 (1974). In Hopfe this court granted a new trial because the trial court failed to give the accomplice corroboration instruction even though there was sufficient evidence of corroboration. Such a result is required in this case. State v. Adams, 295 N.W.2d 527 (Minn.1980) was a step in the wrong direction. When we begin to cut corners, the quality of justice is strained. Will we find harmless error when the court fails to instruct on the presumption of innocence?
I would affirm the court of appeals. The failure to give a jury instruction on the requirement of an accomplice’s testimony, where such an instruction was requested, is fundamental error requiring a new trial. State v. Skoop, 429 N.W.2d 259, 263 (Minn.App.1988).
KEITH, Justice.
I join in the dissent of WAHL, J.