(dissenting). I do not believe that the Legislature intended to provide for multiple punishment under both the statutes in question. The main inquiry to determine whether the Legislature intended to provide for multiple punishment for one act under two statutes is whether the conduct prohibited under each statute violates a social norm distinct from that norm protected by the other statute. People v Robideau, 419 Mich 458, 487; 355 NW2d 592 (1984); People v Allay, 171 Mich 602, 607; 430 NW2d 794 (1988). However, if the two statutes in question do no more than prohibit violations of the same social norm, although in somewhat different ways, we should conclude a legislative intent to allow only one punishment. Robideau, supra at *311487; Allay, supra at 607. Here each statute seeks to prevent violation of the same social norm: the possession or carrying of a lethal weapon which could be used to inflict harm upon others. Although the conduct prohibited under each statute differs slightly, the harm sought to be prevented is the same. I would infer a legislative intent to permit only one conviction for this act.
I am not convinced that the absence of an analogous exclusionary provision such as contained in MCL 800.285(2); MSA 28.1625(2) necessarily implies a legislative intent to allow simultaneous conviction for both carrying a concealed weapon and being an inmate in possession of a weapon when the predicate factual basis is one single offense, i.e., the knife in the garbage can. Absence of a specific statutory provision should not necessarily imply the contrary in this situation. As noted by the Court in Robideau:
If no conclusive evidence of legislative intent can be discerned, the rule of lenity requires the conclusion that separate punishments were not intended. [Robideau, supra at 488.]
I would conclude that defendant’s convictions violate double jeopardy and vacate one of his convictions and sentences. See People v Jankowski, 408 Mich 79, 96; 289 NW2d 674 (1980).