dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. I would hold that the jury’s finding that Granite Construction Company was grossly negligent is so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be manifestly unjust.
GROSS NEGLIGENCE
In its charge to the jury, the court defined “gross negligence” as follows:
“GROSS NEGLIGENCE” means such an entire want of care as to indicate that the act or omission in question was the result of conscious indifference to the rights, welfare, or safety of the persons affected by it.
The court also instructed the jury that “[a] corporation has a duty to provide rules and regulations for the safety of its employees, to furnish safe machinery and instrumen-talities, to provide a safe place to work and to select careful and competent fellow servants.”
For a party to recover exemplary damages on the basis of gross negligence requires that the defendant exercise such an entire want of care that it raises the belief that the act or omission complained of was the result of a conscious indifference to the rights or welfare of the person or persons affected by it. Gross negligence means more than momentary thoughtlessness, inadvertence, or error of judgment. Burk Royalty Co. v. Walls, 616 S.W.2d 911, 920 (Tex.1981). The jury must consider the phrase “entire want of care” in the context of the whole sentence. The jury must find such an entire want of care that it shows the acts or omissions resulted from conscious indifference. Ordinary negligence becomes gross negligence as a result of the mental attitude of the defendant. The plaintiff must show that the defendant was consciously or knowingly indifferent to the plaintiff’s rights, welfare, or safety. The plaintiff must show that the defendant knew about the peril, but his acts or omissions, whether passive or active, demonstrated that he did not care. Id. at 922.
When determining a factual sufficiency point of error, this Court must consider and weigh all the evidence in the case. It should set aside the verdict and remand the cause for a new trial if it concludes that the verdict is so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be manifestly unjust, regardless of whether the record contains some evidence of probative force in support of the verdict. Pool v. Ford Motor Co., 715 S.W.2d 629, 635 (Tex.1986). It is an erroneous ruling of law that the existence of any evidence of probative force in support of the verdict determines *768that the verdict is not contrary to the overwhelming weight of all the evidence. In re King’s Estate, 150 Tex. 662, 664-65, 244 S.W.2d 660, 661 (1951).
Mendoza asserted that the following acts or omissions by Granite Construction evidenced gross negligence:
1. Failure to provide rules and regulations for the safety of employees.
2. Failure to properly train Mr. Mendoza before he began work.
3. Failure to provide Mr. Mendoza with a visible safety vest.
4. Failure to close the adjacent lane of traffic or otherwise divert traffic from it.
5. Failure to provide safe equipment for the employees to use.
1.Failure to Provide Rules and Regulations for the Safety of Employees.
The record reflects that Granite Construction had an extensive safety program led by trained professionals — a safety booklet, safety rules, a safety videotape, paid mandatory monthly and weekly safety meetings, safety awards, and daily safety talks. I believe the majority, citing Burk Royalty, 616 S.W.2d at 923, erroneously concludes that the jury could infer that Granite Construction’s safety program was just for show. In Burk Royalty, some crew members had never attended a safety meeting, never been instructed about safety or fires, and never been shown a copy of the safety rules. Further, although the men worked around a highly flammable material, several crew members smoked and were unaware of any rule against it. They testified that they did not believe there was a no smoking sign on the rig, and did not know whether there were any fire extinguishers on the rig. Under those facts, the inference that the safety program was just for show was reasonable.
Under the facts in this case, that inference is unreasonable. Thierault and Chil-dress, the only two employees present at the time of the accident besides Mr. Mendoza, both testified. Although Thierault admitted that he never read the safety booklet, he stated that he knew of its existence, had attended the monthly safety meetings, and had been told to always watch the traffic. Although Childress testified that he did not remember signing the safety booklet, he stated that he had received it, had watched the safety videotape, had attended the weekly safety meetings, and had been told never to turn his back on the traffic. Further, Childress's actions on the day of the accident evidence the effectiveness of the program:
1. He asked for an orange safety vest prior to starting the job, when he thought he would be working close to traffic.
2. He watched the traffic and saw the pickup truck when it was a half block away.
3. He faced the traffic at all times.
Other testimony showed that on the day he was hired, Mr. Mendoza received a copy of the safety booklet, received a copy of the safety rules, and viewed the safety videotape. The next day, prior to beginning work, he was given a hardhat, he was checked for proper shoes, and his supervisor discussed the importance of watching the traffic and wearing a safety vest when actually working in traffic. Further the evidence shows that, up until the time Mr. Mendoza reacted to the pipe rolling forward, he had followed the company’s safety rules.
At the time their supervisor assigned the men to the job, he was under the impression that the brief job would take the men away from the roadway and received no information to the contrary until after the accident. I believe that it is wrong to conclude that one man’s judgment not to provide a safety vest or take further safety measures under these facts raises an inference that the safety program was for show. The safety program reflects Granite Construction’s concern for its employee’s rights, welfare, and safety.
The only evidence introduced to support a jury finding in this area was Mendoza’s expert, Abrahamson’s, testimony. He stated that Granite Construction’s safety program was nonexistent and only consisted of showing some slides and handing out a *769pamphlet. Abrahamson, however, ignored the “Rules of Conduct” and the frequent safety meetings in reaching this opinion and admitted that he never viewed the slides. He also discounted the daily safety talks that Wade gave his crew as having no effect after the first few times, without taking into consideration that Mr. Mendoza had heard it for the first time on the morning of the accident.
2. Failure to Properly Train Mr. Mendoza Before he Began Working.
Granite Construction hired Mr. Mendoza as a manual laborer. His job included doing tasks like shoveling dirt or concrete and lifting materials. It did not include running heavy equipment or doing any type of masonry work. His job required no special skill or training. Mendoza introduced no evidence of what additional training Mr. Mendoza should have received before beginning work as a manual laborer. Further, even though OSHA originally cited Granite Construction for a training violation, this alleged violation was ultimately dismissed. Given Mr. Mendoza’s job description, I find no support for the jury’s finding that Granite Construction’s failure to give Mr. Mendoza additional training demonstrated such an entire want of care as to reach the level of conscious indifference.
3. Failure to Provide Mr. Mendoza with a Visible Safety Vest.
The evidence showed that Granite Construction’s policy was to provide their employees with safety vests when they were working in traffic. It also showed that Mr. Mendoza’s supervisor was under the impression that Mr. Mendoza would be moving away from rather than toward and into the traffic. Mendoza’s own experts testified that Granite Construction did not plan for anybody to be in the roadway. Further, one expert testified that the wearing of an orange vest would not have prevented the accident and the other testified that “[i]f the driver of the pickup had no time to react, then a vest would not be much of a deterrent.” Since the need for a safety vest was not apparent and the wearing of one would not have prevented the accident, there is no support for the jury finding of gross negligence for this omission.
4.Failure to Close the Adjacent Lane of Traffic or otherwise Divert Traffic Away from the Work Area.
Evidence showed that Granite Construction closed traffic lanes or used flagmen to redirect traffic when it knew that its employees would be working on the road itself. Several times in the past the State had denied Granite Construction permission to close a lane. Further, the State required notice of the lane closure the day before so that the public could be notified. Nothing of a physical nature was more dangerous on this job than closing a lane. It required that men be exposed to traffic for a period of twenty to thirty minutes. Additionally, because of the road’s configuration at the accident site, a very long lane closure would be required.
The men were not working on the road itself. They were working next to the road and eight to ten inches below the surface of the road. Pursuant to the traffic control plan approved by the State, Granite Construction also erected signs warning traffic of construction activity and placed highly visible barrels along the edge of the road to warn cars away from the drop off. Accordingly, these barrels further distanced the traffic from the men working adjacent to the road.
Mendoza introduced evidence that various persons had the authority to close the lane and had done so in the past. Further, Mendoza’s experts testified that although the supervisor anticipated that the men would move away from the road, Granite Construction should have foreseen the events that occurred. In other words, Mendoza asserts that Granite Construction should have foreseen that the pipe would roll forward, that Mr. Mendoza would ignore the safety rules and place his back to the traffic, that he would place himself in front of the pipe, and that Mr. Mendoza would get pushed on to the road just at the *770moment that a speeding pickup truck was passing.
Arguably closing the adjacent lane of traffic may have prevented the accident, but at the same time closing the lane would have exposed other persons to traffic for twenty to thirty minutes. The evidence showed that Granite Construction's supervisor did not anticipate that any of the workmen would be on the road. The supervisor stated that he thought the job would take five to ten minutes to complete and that it would take the men away from the road. Under these facts, the failure to close the lane does not show such an entire want of care by Granite Construction as to show conscious indifference of Mr. Mendoza’s rights, welfare, and safety.
5. Failure to Provide the Employees with Safe Equipment.
The evidence showed that the engine on the front loader stalled causing the loader to jerk forward toward the road. This caused the pipe to start rolling off the bucket. In response to the pipe’s motion, Mr. Mendoza moved between the pipe and the road placing his back to the traffic. The movement of the pipe pushed him backwards, causing him to stumble into the road. Although the loader’s stalling caused the pipe to move, it was Mr. Mendoza’s own actions, in direct contradiction to company rules, that placed him in peril. Childress, without supervision, in the identical situation followed the safety rules and avoided injury. Although Mendoza introduced evidence that this was an older loader that occasionally stalled, Mendoza introduced no evidence of mechanical failure or faulty brakes. These facts do not provide sufficient evidence of an entire want of care as to show conscious indifference by Granite Construction of Mr. Mendoza’s right, welfare, or safety.
CONCLUSION
Since the jury had to find that Granite Construction was consciously indifferent to Mr. Mendoza’s rights, welfare, or safety, the jury’s finding to the contrary is against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence and is manifestly unjust. I would sustain Granite Construction’s first point of error that the evidence was factually insufficient to support the jury finding that Granite Construction was grossly negligent.
I would reverse the trial court’s judgment.