dissenting.
I disagree with the majority opinion because it is clearly an overt effort to legislate by judicial fiat. Under the guise of adopting a better rule for the award of rehabilitative, temporary support and maintenance, the majority ignores the intent of *740the Legislature, and in effect, rewrites T.C.A. § 36-5-101.
The issue involved here, clearly stated in appellant’s brief, is whether rehabilitative alimony paid in monthly installments for a specified term, without any conditions for termination based upon future contingencies, constitutes alimony in futuro instead of alimony in solido.
This case has followed a long and tortuous course in reaching this Court. I agree largely with the statement of facts related in the majority opinion with a few exceptions pertinent to the issue. The final decree of divorce in this case was entered on 20 May 1986. The trial court ordered $300 per month to the wife as temporary rehabilitative alimony until 30 September 1986, for the express purpose of permitting her to finish her nursing studies and secure a certificate as a Licensed Practical Nurse. A request for permanent alimony was specifically denied. The trial court did decree that at such time as the husband began to draw his retirement benefits, from whatever source, that the wife was awarded forty percent (40%) of such amount, calculated as of the date of the divorce.
The Court of Appeals, after considering relevant factors including those set forth in T.C.A. § 36-5-101(d), decided that the temporary rehabilitative alimony was insufficient to allow the wife to rehabilitate herself. They found it reasonable that she should be afforded the opportunity to secure the additional education leading toward an RN degree which would equip her to provide a better life for herself and the children. In view of her potential for rehabilitation they agreed with the trial court decision that rehabilitative alimony was indicated. However, they concluded that modification in the amount and duration of the award was necessary to enable her to obtain her objective. They modified the final decree of the trial court to award $900 per month as rehabilitative alimony beginning 20 May 1986, and continuing each month thereafter for a period of four (4) years. Application for appeal to this Court was denied on 31 August 1987. The case was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.
The trial court enforced the Court of Appeals judgment until 22 June 1989. When on application of Mr. Isbell the monthly rehabilitative alimony was suspended, effective 14 June 1989, based on the stipulation that plaintiff had entered into a marriage with Wayne Frazier on 2 May 1989. A final order was entered on 11 September 1989 terminating the rehabilitative alimony due to plaintiffs remarriage. This judgment was appealed by the plaintiff to the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals considered the entire record in the court below, from the origin of the ease. They then proceeded to analyze the issue in accordance with the opening paragraph of T.C.A. § 36-5-101(d) which reads as follows:
It is the intent of the general assembly that a spouse who is economically disadvantaged relative to the other spouse be rehabilitated whenever possible by the granting of an order for payment of rehabilitative, temporary support and maintenance. Where there is such relative economic disadvantage and rehabilitation is not feasible in consideration of all relevant factors, including those set out in this subsection, then the Court may grant an order for payment of support and maintenance on a long-term basis or until the death or remarriage of the recipient except as otherwise provided in subdivision (a)(3). (Emphasis supplied).
Whether or not the Court of Appeals has erred in the application of T.C.A. § 36-5-101(a)(3) in this case is not pertinent to the error of the majority in amending the statute and holding that “where the rehabilitative award has been made for a fixed amount, the award must be considered non-modifiable even if it is to be paid in installments and not in a lump sum.” In reaching this conclusion they rely on the opinion in Gerlach v. Gerlach, an unreported case of the Court of Appeals, Eastern Section, at Knoxville, 6 October 1988.
Since at least as early as the year 1918, an unpublished opinion of a court has not *741been regarded as general authority. This Court has discouraged citing unpublished opinions of its members. Phoenix Cotton Oil Co. v. Royal Indemnity Co., 140 Tenn. 438, 443, 205 S.W. 128 (1918); Board of Commissioners of Union City, et al v. Obion County, et al, 188 Tenn. 666, 222 S.W.2d 7 (1949); Fisher v. State, 197 Tenn. 594, 277 S.W.2d 340, 341 (1955); Shepherd v. Henderson, 1 Tenn.Cr.App. 694, 449 S.W.2d 726, 735 (1969); Cook v. State, 506 S.W.2d 955, 958 (Tenn.Cr.App.1973). This case is a bright line example of why unpublished cases should be confined to their facts and not considered as general authority. In Gerlach the wife was granted a divorce and “rehabilitative alimony.” The decree provided the rehabilitative alimony was to be paid at the rate of $400 per month for 42 consecutive months. When she remarried the husband stopped the payments. In a subsequent hearing the trial court found that the alimony payments were alimony in solido. The Court of Appeals sustained that finding. There was no appeal taken from that ruling.
In the present case the plaintiff testified that she dropped out of school because of stress and poor grades. It is obvious from her testimony that she had great difficulty in maintaining the grade average necessary to attain her goal. A strong possibility exists that she may never resume her training. To require the defendant to continue to pay $900 per month as rehabilitative, temporary support and maintenance to an ex-spouse who may have remarried to a destitute, or just plain lazy husband, as suggested in Gerlach, is purely punitive. As the court remarked in that case, “the possibilities are endless” and to state, as this Court presumes to do, that where the rehabilitative award has been made for a fixed term, the award must be considered non-modifiable, even if it is to be paid in installments, is a prohibitive, unwarranted, alteration of the statute which is beyond the authority of this Court.
The second sentence of T.C.A. § 36-5-101(d) distinctly provides that “Where there is such relative economic disadvantage and rehabilitation is not feasible in consideration of all relevant factors, including those set out in this subsection, then the Court may grant an order for payment of support and maintenance on a long-term basis or until the death or remarriage of the recipient ...” When read in the disjunctive it is plain that subsection (d) conforms precisely with subsection (a)(1) of the statute to leave a decree for suitable maintenance and support, either rehabilitative and temporary or on a long-term basis, entirely within the trial court’s control subject to the proscription of T.R.A.P. 13(d).
The amount of alimony to be allowed in any case is a matter for the discretion of the trial court in view of the particular circumstances. Newberry v. Newberry, 493 S.W.2d 99 (Tenn.App.1973). The appellate courts are disinclined to review such discretion except in cases where it has manifestly been abused. Crouch v. Crouch, 53 Tenn.App. 594, 385 S.W.2d 288 (1964).
I dissent.