OPINION ON APPELLANT’S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW
TEAGUE, Judge.In an unpublished opinion, the Austin Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction of Kenneth Dingier, appellant. See Dingler v. State (Tex.App. Austin No. 3-82-066-Cr, 9-21-83). It rejected his contention that because there was a variance between what was alleged in the indictment and the proof that was adduced this rendered the evidence insufficient to sustain the conviction. We granted appellant’s petition for discretionary review to make the determination whether the court of appeals correctly resolved the issue against him. We find it did not and reverse its judgment.
The record reflects that in a trial to the court appellant was found guilty of committing the offense of burglary of a motor vehicle. Punishment was assessed at eight (8) years’ confinement in the penitentiary, probated.
The indictment in this cause alleges in pertinent part that appellant “did then and there, with intent to commit theft, knowingly and intentionally break and enter a vehicle without the effective consent of Jeruis White, the owner.” [Emphasis added].
The facts adduced reflect that in plain view of an Austin police officer appellant committed the offense of burglary of a motor vehicle.
Jervis White testified that he was an employee of and the store manager for the Anderson Lane store of Louis Shanks, a corporation specializing in retail furniture in the City of Austin. Without specifying how or under what circumstances he learned of the burglary, White testified that he had occasion to learn that a burglary of “one of [his] vehicles had taken place on or about the 27th day of November, 1981.” White also testified that he did not *145know appellant and that “we did not give him permission to break into the vehicle.” Other than testifying that he was an employee and a store manager for Louis Shanks, White did not testify what other employment functions he performed for the company; in particular, he was not questioned nor did he testify as to just what his relationship was to the burglarized vehicle, nor what his job with Louis Shanks entailed, nor did he expressly state that he had the care, custody, control, or management of the burglarized vehicle at the time in question. He also did not testify that he was the “special owner” of the burglarized vehicle. Cf. Hudson v. State, 675 S.W.2d 507 (Tex.Cr.App.1984) (Rehearing Denied Sept. 26, 1984).
White’s testimony also reflects that Louis Shanks Corporation was the title owner of the burglarized vehicle. The burglary occurred at the company’s warehouse location, which is situated in the downtown area of Austin. The company kept all of its vehicles, “about five trucks and two Econolines,” at the warehouse location when they were not in use.
The court of appeals rejected appellant’s contention that the evidence was insufficient to prove that White was the “special owner” of the burglarized vehicle.
When the offense was committed, V.T. C.A., Penal Code, Section 1.07(a)(24) defined the word “owner” to mean “a person who has title to the property, possession of the property, whether lawful or not, or a greater right to possession of the property than the actor.” Art. 21.08, V.A.C.C.P., provides: “Where one person owns the property, and another person has the possession of the same, the ownership thereof may be alleged to be in either.”
This Court has long held that when property referred to in a charging instrument belongs to a corporation, it is not only permissible but the better pleading practice to allege ownership in a natural person acting for the corporation, the true owner of the property. Eaton v. State, 533 S.W.2d 33 (Tex.Cr.App.1976). Thus, it was permissible for the State to allege ownership in the name of “Jeruis White.” However, it was then incumbent upon the State to prove that “Jeruis White” was in fact the special owner of the affected property. We find it did not do so.
In this instance, the State alleged that Jeruis White was the owner. However, Jervis White testified for the State. We agree with the court of appeals that the rule of idem sonans applies to what is obviously a spelling error. The rule of “idem sonans” is that absolute accuracy in spelling a name is not required in a legal document or proceedings, either civil or criminal; that if the name, as spelled in the document, though different from the correct spelling thereof, conveys to the ear, when pronounced according to the commonly accepted methods, a sound practically identical with the correct name as commonly pronounced the name thus given is a sufficient identification of the individual referred to, and no advantage can be taken of the clerical error.
White testified that the name “Jervis” is frequently misspelled, and had in fact been misspelled “Jeruis,” as stated in the indictment in this cause, on a prior occasion. Judge Thurman, who was the sole fact finder, heard White pronounce his name and was thus in a better position than we are to make the determination whether the names “Jervis” and “Jeruis” are not patently incapable of being sounded the same. Furthermore, there is no evidence in the record that appellant was misled to his prejudice by the spelling error. We hold that the court of appeals correctly overruled appellant’s contention that the names “Jervis” and “Jeruis” were patently incapable of sounding alike. Also see Flanagan v. State, 620 S.W.2d 591 (Tex.Cr.App.1981); Grant v. State, 568 S.W.2d 353 (Tex.Cr. App.1978); Martin v. State, 541 S.W.2d 605 (Tex.Cr.App.1976).
Although we disagree with appellant and find that the names “Jervis” and “Jeruis” are capable of sounding alike, we find we must agree with his contention that the State failed in its proof that White was the “special owner” of the burglarized vehicle.
*146We have carefully read the transcription of White’s testimony and find that it does not inform us whether White had lawful (1) possession or (2) a right to possession greater than appellant had to the burglarized vehicle. From the record, all we know about White’s responsibilities as an employee of Louis Shanks Corporation is that he was the store manager of the store located on Anderson Lane that was owned by Louis Shanks Corporation. The burglary, however, did not occur at that location, but occurred at the downtown warehouse location of Louis Shanks Corporation. There is also no evidence in the record of appeal that would establish the employment relationship of White to the warehouse location, which is where the burglary occurred.
In Compton v. State, 607 S.W.2d 246 (Tex.Cr.App.1979), and since Compton, see Hudson v. State, supra, this Court has expanded considerably the scope of the word “ownership,” as defined by Section 1.07(a)(24), supra, in order to sustain convictions. Nevertheless, we still hold that before a conviction might be sustained, and it is alleged that a particular person “owned” the property, it is essential that the prosecution establish the relationship of the alleged owner to the property. Thus, there must be some evidence from which the fact finder might infer that the alleged owner had some right to possession of the property, because it is self-evident that a person who has no right to possession of the property cannot have a greater right to possession than the accused. In this instance, all we know about White’s employment responsibilities with Louis Shanks Corporation is that he is an employee of the corporation and is the manager of the store located on Anderson Lane in the City of Austin. The evidence is clearly insufficient to establish that White was either the owner or a special owner of the burglarized vehicle. The fact that White was a manager of the title owner’s store at a location other than where the burglary occurred is inadequate to show ownership — in the absence of any evidence to show that he had the care, custody, or control over the burglarized vehicle. We agree with the court of appeals that it is not enough to allege ownership in some high-ranking management person. “Proof of a management position alone is insufficient to sustain the ownership allegation absent some showing the named individual had exercised some degree of care, custody, or control over the stolen [sic] property.” (Page 4 of the slip opinion). However, we are unable to agree with the legal conclusion of the court of appeals that the record contains sufficient evidence to establish that White had the requisite control over the burglarized vehicle that would establish he was the “special owner” of the vehicle at the time it was burglarized. We do not believe that White’s use of such terms as “we” and “our,” when referring to property owned by Louis Shanks Corporation is indicative that the vehicle was particularly identified with the Louis Shanks’ store located on Anderson Lane.
The court of appeals also placed great emphasis upon the following question and answer: “Q: Okay. And you park vehicles there for all the stores? A: Yes, sir. We maintain about five trucks and two Econolines.” [Emphasis supplied by the court of appeals]. It held: “This could be reasonably interpreted to mean that he was personally responsible for the parking of all of the company’s vehicles, or for the parking of a company vehicle used by his particular store.” We disagree.
The State of Texas is not permitted under our law to prove its allegations through speculation, guesses, or surmises, but is required to prove its allegations beyond a reasonable doubt through either direct or circumstantial evidence. In this instance, White’s testimony, viewed in the most liberal light, belies the fact that he was in charge of the motor pool of Louis Shanks Corporation, as the court of appeals implicitly held.
We hold that the evidence is insufficient to establish that White was the “special owner” of the burglarized vehicle. The judgment of the court of appeals is reversed and the cause remanded to the trial *147court where a judgment of acquittal shall be entered.
ONION, P.J., concurs.Before the court en banc.