dissenting.
There is a time-honored Danish proverb that laments: “Lawyers and painters can soon change white to black.” In my view, the majority today, in its application of the term “owner” to the facts in the case sub judice, has changed white to black.
The majority expressly recognizes the viability of the rationale in Compton v. State, 607 S.W.2d 246 (Tex.Cr.App.1979), and, in fact, recognizes that Compton, supra expanded the concept of ownership as that term is defined in V.T.C.A. Penal Code Sec. 1.07(a)(24). But the majority, hacking itself a path that would have made James Fennimore Cooper proud, holds that “before a conviction might be sustained, and it is alleged that a particular person ‘owned’ the property, it is essential that the prosecution establish the relationship of the alleged owner to the property. ” [emphasis added] The majority concluded, that, at best, Jervis White was not even a distant *149cousin to the motor vehicle in question, thereby resulting in a failure of proof on the part of the State. It is this strained interpretation of Compton to which I take issue.
In Compton, Judge Douglas, writing on State’s Motion for Rehearing, addressed the issue thusly:
“We must look to the employment relationship to determine who is the proper owner under Section 1.07(a)(24), supra. In any modern corporation, responsibility will probably extend to several different people at various levels within the organization.” [emphasis added] at pg. 250.
In Cross v. State, 590 S.W.2d 510 (Tex. Cr.App.1979), the defendant was convicted of theft for stealing a commemorative watch. The alleged owner, a supervisor for Southwestern Bell, testified that her responsibilities included ordering watches for a benefit committee for Southwestern Bell. She stated that she used a standard form that was forwarded through channels to the committee. The watch would then be sent directly to her for presentment to the honored employee. The watch was stolen from Southwestern Bell’s mail room before the supervisor had a chance to receive it. We held that it is the employment relationship that determines whether a given individual is an “owner” within the meaning of Sec. 1.07(a)(24), supra.
If we examine the employment relationship of Jervis White to the Louis Shanks entity, we find that the evidence is uncon-tradicted that White was the store manager of the Anderson Lane store. It is further clear from the record that when White answered “yes” to the prosecutor’s question concerning whether or not one of his vehicles was burgled, he meant a Shanks vehicle. This is wholly consistent with this Court’s prior holding in Eaton v. State, 533 S.W.2d 33 (Tex.Cr.App.1976), wherein we held that when property referred to in a charging instrument belongs to a corporation, it is not only permissible but the better pleading practice to allege ownership in a natural person acting for the corporation.
Additionally, the evidence is totally un-controverted that White did not give the appellant any consent or permission to enter the vehicle and that “we (Shanks) maintain about five trucks and two Econolines” in the downtown warehouse location. Where, as here, there has been no objection to such testimony and no evidence to prove the contrary as to ownership, the evidence should be clearly sufficient to show White as the special owner. See, Williams v. State, 537 S.W.2d 936 (Tex.Cr.App.1976).
Although it is certainly true that the State’s case would have been stronger if, as suggested in Judge Clinton’s concurrence, a certificate of title showing ownership of the vehicle in Shanks had been introduced into evidence and a warehouse supervisor had testified that appellant had no consent to enter the vehicle, the inescapable conclusion under the rationale of Compton, supra, is that White had the greater right of possession to the vehicle than did the appellant.
Whether one agrees with the rationale in Compton or not, it seems to me, is of little moment in the case at bar, because absolutely none of the evidence presented on the issue of ownership is controverted. Clearly, from the record, the entire thrust of appellant’s attack upon the State’s case during trial was in the area of idem sonans and not proof of ownership.
I believe that under the rationale of Compton or simply under Sec. 1.07(a)(24), supra, the evidence was more than sufficient to prove ownership, and, although the holding in Compton might well be subject to reexamination as suggested by the concurrences, I would urge that the case sub judice is not the proper vehicle.
To the majority’s misapplication of Compton, and to its turning of the term “owner” from white to black, I dissent.
TOM G. DAVIS, W.C. DAVIS and McCORMICK, JJ., join in this dissent.