On December 21, 1979, defendant pled guilty as charged to the offense of assault with intent to commit murder, MCL 750.83; MSA 28.278, and was subsequently sentenced to 10 to 15 years imprisonment. He appeals as of right.
Defendant argues that his conviction was the product of an illusory plea bargain and, therefore, must be reversed. Defendant agreed to plead guilty *684pursuant to a promise that the minimum sentence term imposed would be no more than 10 years. The trial judge indicated that, if defendant’s presentence report convinced him that a longer minimum term was justified, the plea could be withdrawn. At the request of defense counsel, the prosecutor agreed that he would not pursue an habitual offender prosecution. MCL 769.10 et seq.; MSA 28.1082 et seq.
Defendant’s guilty plea was accepted nearly four months after the Supreme Court’s decision in People v Fountain and People v Jones, 407 Mich 96; 282 NW2d 168 (1979). The question on appeal is whether that decision would have precluded the prosecution from filing a supplemental information had the plea negotiations broken down.
The crux of the Fountain decision is that a prosecutor must proceed promptly against a person as an habitual offender when he becomes aware of a prior felony record. Id., 98. Prompt action avoids the appearance of prosecutorial impropriety. Conceivably, a supplemental information could be used to punish a defendant who decides to appeal his conviction. Likewise, some unfairness could result from postconviction supplementation where a defendant is convicted, by plea or trial, without knowing the ultimate consequences imposed by the habitual offender statute.
Nonetheless, Fountain does not preclude the prosecution from using the possibility of a supplemental information as a bargaining point during plea negotiations, provided that the rule of promptness is not violated. As stated in People v Haywood, 97 Mich App 621, 624; 296 NW2d 127 (1980):
"The Fountain pronouncement does not preclude the *685prosecutor from proceeding with a prosecution under the habitual offender act as long as the prosecutorial action is prompt and provides fair notice to the defendant sufficiently in advance of a trial on the current charge. And, in the instant situation, at the time the plea bargain was made and accepted, defendant was, in fact, a potential subject of habitual offender supplementation. The defendant was well apprised of this fact as attested to by his plea bargain. Further, the prosecutor, absent such plea agreement, could have promptly proceeded to supplementation. Therefore, the offer by the prosecutor to forego supplementation as part of the plea agreement cannot be considered illusory.”
Had the plea agreement in the instant case fallen through, a supplemental information charging defendant as an habitual offender might yet have been promptly filed. Defendant was arrested on October 24, 1979, the day of the offense. He was arraigned on the warrant the following day. Defendant was bound over for trial following a preliminary examination on November 1, 1979. He was arraigned on the information that same day and a calendar conference scheduled for November 14, 1979. At that calendar conference, it was agreed that any pretrial motions would be heard on December 12, 1979, and that a final conference would be held on December 19, 1979. No motions were filed and defense counsel failed to appear at the scheduled conference. Proceedings were adjourned and defendant’s plea was subsequently accepted on December 21, 1979. At the time of defendant’s plea, less than two months had passed since defendant’s initial arrest. An actual trial date had not been scheduled. Had defendant not pled guilty, he could not later complain that the Fountain-required notice was lacking since he received it long before the trial date.
Defendant argues that Fountain establishes a *686strict requirement that habitual charges be filed simultaneously with the information charging the last felony when the prosecution is aware of the prior offenses. People v Fountain, supra, 99. We disagree. A supplemental information must allege the convictions upon which it is based and the dates thereof. Until plea negotiations are completed and a plea accepted there is no conviction upon which the prosecution can base the habitual information. A more appropriate rule would require the prosecutor to advise the defendant in writing of his intent to file a supplemental information.
Defendant’s guilty plea was not based upon an illusory plea bargain.
Affirmed.
V. J. Brennan, J., concurred.