concurring.
Utilyzing the analytical framework of Autran v. State, 887 S.W.2d 81 (Tex.Cr.App. 1994), I agree that we should adopt the definition of seizure announced in California v. Hodari R, 499 U.S. 621, 111 S.Ct. 1547, 113 L.Ed.2d 690 (1991).
I.
Autran presented both a substantive and a procedural issue. The substantive issue was whether art. I, § 9 provided greater protection than the Fourth Amendment in the context of inventories. The procedural issue was what analytical framework should be employed when determining whether the Texas Constitution provides greater protection than the United States Constitution.
When we decided Heitman v. State, 815 S.W.2d 681 (Tex.Cr.App.1991), Judge McCormick dissented, criticizing the majority for adopting the doctrine of independent state grounds without an analytical framework for its application. Id. 815 S.W.2d at 691. The problems caused by the Heitman Court’s failure to provide such a framework was dramatically seen in the Court of Appeals’ opinion in Autran. Autran v. State, 830 S.W.2d 807 (Tex.App.—Beaumont 1992). In that case, each of the three justices wrote separately, expressing their frustration in attempting to interpret the Texas Constitution without some guidance from this Court. The frustration was most forcefully stated by Chief Justice Walker:
By adopting the doctrine of ‘independent state grounds,’ without directions, the fourteen courts of appeals have been parachuted into the Okefenokee Swamp, at night, without a compass.
Id., 830 S.W.2d at 817.
Consequently, our opinion in Autran was written in part to establish an analytical framework to be employed by this Court and the courts of appeals when asked to determine whether the Texas Constitution provides greater protection than the United States Constitution. Specifically, we stated:
... To determine whether our Constitution provides greater protection than its federal counterpart, we find the following factors helpful, although not independently dispositive: (A) a textual examination of the constitutional provision; (B) the Framer’s intent; (C) history and application of the constitutional provision; (D) comparable jurisprudence from other states; and, (E) the practical policy considerations.
Id. 887 S.W.2d at 37 (emphasis added).1 These factors have been frequently cited for consideration when conducting an independent state constitutional analysis. Ibid. n. 6 *237(citing Catherine Greene Burnett and Neil Colman McCabe, A Compass in the Swamp: A Guide to Tactics in State Constitutional Law Challenges, 25 Tex.Tech L.Rev. 75, 79-104 (1993)).2 And today, the plurality employs the following Autran factors in its analysis: a textual examination of the constitutional provision, ante, 912 S.W.2d at 232; the Framer’s intent, ante, 912 S.W.2d at 233-234; history and application of the constitutional provision, ante, 912 S.W.2d at 232-233; and, the practical policy considerations behind the constitutional provision, ante, 912 S.W.2d at 230, 235. Thus, the plurality employs Au-tran ’s analytical framework.
II.
In dissent, Judge Clinton attacks the plurality’s independent constitutional analysis, stating the Court “all but abdicates its role— its only role as a discretionary review court— as ‘the caretaker of Texas law.’ ” Post, 912 S.W.2d at 237-238 (quoting Arcila v. State, 834 S.W.2d 357 (Tex.Cr.App.1992)). Such criticism seems rather odd coming from the author of Crittenden v. State, 899 S.W.2d 668 (Tex.Cr.App.1995). In Crittenden, a majority of this Court ignored the considerations the dissent pleads for today, and adopted the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals’ “objective approach” to pretextual arrests simply on the basis of “judicial convenience.” Id., 899 S.W.2d at 673 (Baird, J., dissenting). Thus, the dissent’s desire to “review the critical response of legal scholars, ascertain what judges in other jurisdictions have said ... and then, ultimately, follow our own lights,” Post, 912 S.W.2d at 240, is diametrically opposed to this Court’s position in Crittenden.3
III.
After considering the Autran factors, I conclude we should adopt for art. I, § 9 purposes, the definition of seized utilized by the Supreme Court when resolving alleged violations of the Fourth Amendment. That is, a seizure occurs when a person is physically forced to yield or a reasonable person would believe he is not free to leave and yields to a show of authority. Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 624-29, 111 S.Ct. at 1550-52. See also, Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 433-35, 111 S.Ct. 2382, 2386, 115 L.Ed.2d 389 (1991). Under this, definition, appellant was not seized.
With these comments, I join only the judgment of the Court.
. Notably, the dissent in Autran employed the same analytical framework to conclude art. I, § 9 did not provide greater protection in the context of inventories.
. It is important to note the Supreme Court considered several of these factors in deciding Hodari D., namely, the common sense definition of “seized,” the historical approaches taken by the courts, several scholarly articles and public policy considerations.
. In truth, the dissent is less of an evaluation of the factors critical to independent constitutional analysis and more of a generalized attack on Hodari D.
Judge Clinton takes exception to my stating his dissent is "diametrically opposed” to the position he took in Crittenden. Post at n.*. My observation is borne out by a reading of those opinions and my description is tame when one considers that Judge Clinton accused six members of this Court of being “intellectually dishonest.” See, Cook v. State, 902 S.W.2d 471, 480 (Tex.Cr.App. 1995) (Clinton, J., concurring). Judge Clinton can not have his cake and eat it too. I think he protests too much.