ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
The City contends, in its motion for rehearing, that this court erred by applying the wrong emergency exception in section *352101.055(2)1 of the Texas Tort Claims Act (TTCA), and by reviewing the City’s actions in the operation of an emergency vehicle under an incorrect ordinary negligence standard of care. Because we remain convinced that our original disposition is correct, both under the previous points of error as well as the new ones, we will address the City’s contentions and overrule the motion.
By its first point of error, the City contends we ignored the applicable exception to the waiver of immunity found in section 101.055(2) of the TTCA, and erroneously applied the wrong exception. The pertinent portion of section 101.055, as it existed at the relevant time, states:
This chapter does not apply to a claim arising:
* * # * * *
(2) from the action of an employee while responding to an emergency call or reacting to an emergency situation if the action is in compliance with the laws and ordinances applicable to emergency action, or in the absence of such a law or ordinance, if the action is taken with conscious indifference or reckless disregard for the safety of others; ...
The City asserts we should have analyzed the trial court’s decision based upon the portion of the statute addressing an employee’s action “... if the action is in compliance with the laws and ordinances applicable to the emergency action_” It asserts unequivocally that article 6701d, sections 24, 33, and 75,2 are applicable laws which control our analysis, and therefore, the second part of the statute, “... in the absence of such a law or ordinance, if the action is taken with ... reckless disregard ...” does not apply.
Because the trial court based liability upon section 75(b) of article 6701d, and the City also relies upon it, we will review the judgment under the requirements of section 75, in order to determine whether the action taken was in compliance with that law.
Section 75 provides the proper actions to be taken by drivers of non-emergency vehicles when those vehicles are approached by an authorized emergency vehicle, and states in relevant part:
(b) This section shall not operate to relieve the driver of an authorized emergency vehicle from the duty to drive with due regard for the safety of all persons using the highway.
The City asserts that exercising due regard does not mean avoiding ordinary negligence, but actually means not acting in reckless disregard, and that we therefore erroneously applied an ordinary negligence standard of review.
In support of this position, the City cites article 6701d, section 24, which provides the exercisable privileges of a driver of an emergency vehicle, and also states,
the foregoing provisions shall not relieve the driver of an authorized emergency vehicle from the duty to drive with due regard for the safety of all persons, nor shall such provision protect the driver from the consequences of his reckless disregard for the safety of others.
It urges that because both due regard and reckless disregard are used in section 24, they mean the same thing. It also asserts because due regard has not been defined by either statute or case law, and because reckless disregard has been defined, reckless disregard is a specific term which controls over the general term, due regard. Therefore, because reckless disregard defines the standard in section 24, it should also be the standard by which we measure due regard in section 75. Consequently, the City submits we should decide the finding of no reckless disregard on the part of the City’s driver precluded any liability on the part of the City, without further reference to the due regard language. We disagree.
Under general rules of construction, we are required to use the ordinary *353meaning of a term when that term is undefined, Monsanto Co. v. Cornerstones Mun. Util. Dist., 865 S.W.2d 937, 939 (Tex.1993), and we cannot say that ordinarily, due regard means reckless disregard. Furthermore, just as every word of a statute must be presumed to have been used for a purpose, every word excluded must also be presumed to have been excluded for a purpose. Laidlaw Waste Systems (Dallas), Inc. v. City of Wilmer, 904 S.W.2d 656, 659 (Tex.1995). In that regard, we note that unlike section 24 discussed above, section 75(b), upon which the trial court based its judgment, does not contain the term reckless disregard. We therefore will not supply a statute with an additional term in order to give it a meaning it would not ordinarily have.
We also remain convinced that the City’s proposed statutory construction is not supported by existing case law. A careful analysis of recent cases implicitly examines due regard under an ordinary negligence standard of care. In City of Lancaster v. Chambers, 883 S.W.2d 650, 653 (Tex.1993), the Supreme Court stated the duty to drive with due regard encompassed the officer involved in a high speed chase, and discussed a proximate cause analysis with respect to the potential for his liability. The Court agreed with the Dallas Court of Appeals that:
[T]he motorcycle’s wreck may have been caused in part by the policeman’s failure to drive with due regard for Chambers’ safety.... Here, the [defendants’] summary judgment proof does not conclusively prove that the illegal conduct which caused the accident — was an unforeseeable result of their negligence, i.e., their failure to drive with due regard for the safety of all persons using the road. (Emphasis added).
The Supreme Court, in Travis v. City of Mesquite, 830 S.W.2d 94, 98 (Tex.1992), also stated with respect to police, as drivers of emergency vehicles, that deciding to initiate or continue pursuit may be negligent, and a driver is not relieved of “the duty to drive with due regard for the safety of all persons. ...” It agreed with the lower court that the policy of the statute does not shield officers from liability. See also Guzman v. City of San Antonio, 766 S.W.2d 858, 860 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1989, no writ).
In agreement with the City, we see no reason to distinguish the members of the class of emergency vehicle drivers and hold them to differing standards of care depending upon whether they are police officers, ambulance drivers, or fire fighters. However, we also can find no justification for ignoring the import of existing case law, which addresses due regard in terms of negligence. Consequently, we must conclude, as used in section 75(b), due regard does not equate to reckless disregard.
The City lastly attempts to shield itself from liability by pointing out the driver’s ability to assert and prove qualified immunity. The Supreme Court has held that a “violation of art. 6701d does not preclude application of the official immunity doctrine to negligent emergency vehicle operators,” City of Lancaster v. Chambers, 883 S.W.2d at 661 n. 6, and the City is correct in its statement that it could also assert and prove its employee’s immunity as a defense to liability. Harris County v. Ochoa, 881 S.W.2d 884 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, writ denied).
However, the City did not establish the affirmative defense of official immunity, see City of Lancaster v. Chambers, 883 S.W.2d at 653, and without the protection of official immunity, the driver could be held personally liable for negligence under section 75(b)’s due regard standard. We note the City did plead governmental immunity, but as the City is well aware, its municipal immunity is separate and distinct from the official immunity available to its employees.
Concluding the driver violated the applicable law as addressed in section 101.055(2), by failing to exercise due regard as required in section 75(b), the claim again would fall squarely within the framework of section 101.021, the general provision of the TTCA which provides the requirements for a waiver of immunity, and our analysis would proceed in accordance with our original opinion.
*354Accordingly, the motion for rehearing is overruled.
. All references herein to sections 101.021, 101.055, and 101.055(2), are to those provisions of Tex.Civ.Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. §§ 101.021, 101.055, and 101.055(2) (Vernon 1986 & Supp. 1987), known as the Texas Tort Claims Act.
. All references herein to sections 24, 33 or 75, are to Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 670 Id, §§ 24, 33, and 75 (Vernon 1977).