dissenting.
Michael Charles Johnson, appellant, was convicted by a jury for committing the offense of delivery of heroin, a controlled substance. The jury also assessed punishment at 99 years’ confinement in the penitentiary, the maximum possible number of years it could have assessed as punishment. The majority has erroneously concluded the trial court’s error in overruling appellant’s objection to an unresponsive answer of a prosecution witness, which answer implicitly injected into the cause the subject of extraneous offenses, was harmless error.
The majority, however, correctly observes that the trial court erred by overruling appellant’s objection because: “The general rule in all English speaking jurisdictions is that an accused person is entitled to be tried on the accusation made in the State’s pleading and not on some collateral crime, or for being a criminal generally. The rule is now deemed axiomatic and is followed in all jurisdictions.” Young v. State, 159 Tex.Cr.R. 164, 261 S.W.2d 836 (1953). Thus, in Texas at least, there is a general rule of inadmissibility when it comes to the prosecution offering into evidence, either expressly or implicitly, extraneous offenses. Unless an exception is first established by the prosecution, extraneous offenses are always inadmissible evidence. Also see Albrecht v. State, 486 S.W.2d 97 (Tex.Cr.App.1972).
The facts of the commission of the offense reflect the following. Danny Green, a prosecution witness and an employee of the Texas Department of Public Safety, was working in the capacity of an undercover narcotics agent. He was contacted *539over the telephone by the appellant. The record then reflects the following questions and answers by the prosecuting attorney and the witness Green:
Q: And what did the Defendant relate to you by way of this telephone conversation that day?
A: He advised me that he had the half ounce of boy, which is slang for heroin, that we discussed earlier for a thousand dollars.
Q: A thousand dollars?
A: Yes.
Q: And did he relate anything else to you on the telephone that day, Agent Green?
A: We discussed a meeting place where we would meet where I would buy the heroin from him.
Q: And did he tell you that he had a meeting place which he preferred?
A: We both agreed that the same place we had made deals before would be fine with him. [Emphasis Added].
Appellant’s trial counsel immediately objected, “for the reason that the answer refers to extraneous offenses.” By formal order of the trial judge, the trial judge states in part the following: “There is no question in the Court’s mind but what the basis for Mr. Irwin’s objection was brought to the attention of the Court; that the Court disagreed with the objection, and overruled it or denied it, and further denied the Motion for Mistrial based thereon.”
In the context in which the answer was given, the only conceivable, plain, and common sense reading of the word “deals,” that is contained in the answer, can lead to only one inference: that Green had previously agreed to purchase from appellant controlled substances; in particular, heroin.
The State argues that the word, “deals,” only relates to the prior discussions that appellant and Green had had which led up to their meeting on the grocery store parking lot where appellant delivered to Green a quantity of heroin, after which appellant was immediately arrested. However, because the parking lot location was the site of the actual delivery of the heroin, I find implausible the construction the State places upon the word “deals.” In the context in which the answer was given, I find that the word, “deals,” most certainly does not have an innocuous connotation, as suggested by the State.
I also find that Green, who at the time of trial had been a member of the Department of Public Safety since 1969, and an undercover narcotics officer for approximately three years, knew or should have known not to have given the unresponsive answer he did, which contained an answer implicitly referring to extraneous narcotic offenses committed by appellant. See Richardson v. State, 379 S.W.2d 913 (Tex.Cr.App.1964).
The State in the appeal has never contended or established, either expressly or implicitly, that any extraneous offense was admissible against appellant as an exception to the general rule of inadmissibility. The record reflects that appellant neither testified nor offered any evidence whatsoever to rebut any part of the State’s case. It was therefore error for the trial court to overrule appellant’s objection. Also see Hines v. State, 571 S.W.2d 322 (Tex.Cr.App.1978); Logan v. State, 510 S.W.2d 598 (Tex.Cr.App.1974); Okra v. State, 507 S.W.2d 220 (Tex.Cr.App.1974). *
*540Contrary to the majority, I cannot state that there is a reasonable possibility that the inadmissible evidence was harmless error, especially when one considers the fact that appellant received as punishment from the jury the maximum possible term of years provided by law. I believe that in the jury’s assessment of punishment, it is quite conceivable that the jury could have been swayed by the suggestion that appellant had frequently in the past dealt in the delivery of the illicit controlled substance heroin.
The judgment should be reversed and not affirmed. I dissent.
ONION, P.J., and CLINTON and MILLER, JJ., join.The majority in footnote 1 of its opinion appears to take issue with the way appellant has established that his objection was overruled by the trial court. However, not mentioned by the majority is the fact that the prosecution to this day has never taken issue with the way the appellant had the record speak the truth. It also appears to me that the trial court had the authority to do as it did in order to make the record speak the truth. See Art. 40.09, Sec. 7, V.A.C.C.P.
I also observe that the majority in its disposition of appellant’s contention relies upon Shannon v. State, 567 S.W.2d 510 (Tex.Cr.App. 1978), as authority. Its reliance is sorely misplaced, especially when one considers that this Court expressly stated in Shannon the following: “The objection voiced by appellant at the trial is general, and does not comport with the contention he now makes on appeal; nothing is presented for review.” [Emphasis Added]. Anything this Court stated after this statement, which related to the contention under discus*540sion, is pure and simple dictum, and lacks the force of an adjudication. See Black’s Law Dictionary 409 (1979 Edition).