substituted dissenting opinion.
The dissenting opinion issued in this case on January 13, 2000 is withdrawn, and the following opinion is issued in its place.
The issue in this case is whether the evidence was sufficient to create a bona fide doubt in the mind of the trial judge whether the defendant met the test of legal competence at the time of his sentencing hearing. See Moore v. State, 999 S.W.2d 385, 393 (Tex.Crim.App.1999).1 A person is incompetent to stand trial if he does not have: (1) sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding; or (2) a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him. See Tex.Code ÜRIM. PROC. Ann. art. 46.02, § 1(a) (Vernon 1979).
A defendant’s mental impairment does not alone warrant a competency hearing where no evidence indicates that he is incapable of consulting with counsel or understanding the proceedings against him. See Moore, 999 S.W.2d at 395. It is therefore within the purview of the trial judge to distinguish evidence showing only impairment from that indicating incompetency as contemplated by the law. See id. at *444396.2
In this case, what evidence does the majority opinion rely on to create a bona fide doubt of appellant’s ability to consult with his lawyer and understand the proceedings against him? First, there are appellant’s own self-serving representations to the trial court that: he had seizures which he stated totally incapacitated him; he took prescription drug treatment for psychosis; he had a mental illness; he had a stated memory loss, including at least five times in the sentencing hearing; he had no memory of committing the offense; his defense counsel was conspiring against him; he was incompetent; he had no control of himself; and he didn’t know what his plea was. Consistent with these representations, appellant also filed pro se motions for independent psychiatric evaluation and to offer insanity as a defense. Obviously, to the extent such actions warrant a competency hearing, few cases after this opinion issues will be conducted without one.
Second, there are indications of possible mental impairment: a head injury for which appellant was receiving prescription medication; “organic brain dysfunction (blood clot)”; appellant displaying potential signs of a seizure after being taken into custody; appellant allegedly blanking out during his incarceration; and the State’s motion for psychiatric examination stating that appellant had a history of periods of unconsciousness and subsequent loss of memory, was undergoing continuous mental evaluations and examination, and was scheduled for a CATSCAN.3
Third, appellant displayed a lack of knowledge of criminal procedure by filing motions pertaining to a trial on the merits after he had entered his guilty plea. Last is the allegation that, in broad daylight, appellant stole a green fur coat from one store and put it in a shopping bag from a different store.4
Apart from reflecting possible mental impairment and a clear desire by appellant to be found incompetent, none of the “evidence” relied on by the majority indicates an inability by appellant to consult with a lawyer or understand the proceedings against him. Although the trial court had ordered Harris County Forensic Psychiatric Services to conduct a psychiatric evaluation and file a report on appellant’s competency to stand trial, the briefs do not indicate why this order was not complied with, and appellant does not assign error to the trial court’s failure to obtain such a report. Nevertheless, in the absence of any reliable evidence raising a bona fide doubt regarding appellant’s competency, a meaningful determination of appellant’s competency could not be made based on the “evidence” relied upon by the majority. Because the trial court’s denial of a hearing to indulge in such a fruitless exercise was thus not an abuse of discretion, I would affirm the judgment of the trial court.
. Where the issue is presented, a trial court is to determine whether there is some evidence that could rationally lead to a determination of incompetency, and, in doing so, may consider only evidence tending to show incompetency, not that showing competency. See Moore, 999 S.W.2d at 393. The standard is the same during pre-trial and trial. See id. On appeal, the standard of review is abuse of discretion. See id.
. A trial judge’s appointment of a disinterested expert is also dependent on a finding of evidence which raises the issue of appellant’s incompetence. See Collier v. State, 959 S.W.2d 621, 625 (Tex.Crim.App.1997), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 929, 119 S.Ct. 335, 142 L.Ed.2d 276 (1998).
. The majority opinion further states that the presentence investigation report ("PSI”) "confirmed appellant’s memory loss, seizures and numbness of the face.” On the contrary, however, the PSI states "The defendant reports to suffer from periodic epileptic seizures, memory loss, and the left side of his face is numb. No medical proof was provided at the time of this report to confirm the defendant’s claim.”
. Would the majority ascribe greater competency to appellant if he had instead paid for such a coat?