Appellant Eleanor Matstappeals ice. of the Arkansas Workers’ Compensation Commission denying her claim for benefits for bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome from her employer, Appellee Jefferson Hospital Association. The Commission found that Appellant failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that her injury arose out of and in the course of her employment with Appellee, and that a work-related injury was the major cause of her disability and need for medical treatment. The Arkansas Court of Appeals affirmed the Commission’s decision, by a tie vote, in Matthews v. Jefferson Hospital Ass’n, 67 Ark. App. 55, 991 S.W.2d 629 (1999). We granted Appellant’s petition for review of that decision pursuant to Ark. Sup. Ct. R. l-2(e)(i). When we grant review following a decision by the court of appeals, we review the case as though it had been originally filed with this court. Burlington Indus. v. Pickett, 336 Ark. 515, 988 S.W.2d 3 (1999). We affirm the Commission’s decision.
In appeals involving claims for workers’ compensation, we view the evidence in a light most favorable to the Commission’s decision and affirm the decision if it is supported by substantial evidence. Id.; Ester v. National Home Ctrs., Inc., 335 Ark. 356, 981 S.W.2d 91 (1998). Substantial evidence is evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Williams v. Prostaff Temps., 336 Ark. 510, 988 S.W.2d 1 (1999). There may be substantial evidence to support the Commission’s decision even though we might have reached a different conclusion if we had sat as the trier of fact or heard the case de novo. Brower Mfg. Co. v. Willis, 252 Ark. 755, 480 S.W.2d 950 (1972). See also Arnold v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 64 Ark. App. 245, 983 S.W.2d 444 (1998). In other words, we will not reverse the Commission’s decision unless we are convinced that fair-minded persons with the same facts before them could not have reached the conclusion arrived at by the Commission. Pickett, 336 Ark. 515, 988 S.W.2d 3; Ester, 335 Ark. 356, 981 S.W.2d 91. With this standard in mind, we examine the Commission’s findings.
The Commission’s opinion reflects that Appellant first became employed with Appellee on March 1, 1981. She held a number of administrative positions with Appellee over the years. At the time of her claim, Appellant was employed as a receptionist and assistant to the administrator of the Davis Life Care Facility. She had held that position since August 1992. While employed at the Davis Facility, Appellant sought workers’ compensation benefits for symptoms of bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome that she reportedly began experiencing in February 1996. Appellant ultimately came under the care of Dr. John Lytle, an orthopedist. Dr. Lytle diagnosed Appellant as having bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome. He also observed a cystic-type mass in one of her hands. Dr. Lytle performed carpal-tunnel-release surgery on Appellant’s right wrist on December 31, 1996. The medical evidence submitted to the Commission consisted of a letter to Appellant’s counsel from Dr. Lytle and five office notes recorded by Dr. Lytle. In an office note dated January 9, 1997, Dr. Lytle wrote: “This is, in my opinion, a work-related problem from her long-term history of being a typist.”
A hearing was held before the administrative law judge (ALJ) on April 16, 1997. In a September 2, 1997" opinion, the ALJ denied Appellant’s claim on the ground that she failed to demonstrate that she sustained a compensable injury established by objective medical evidence. Appellant then appealed to the Commission.
After conducting a de novo review of the entire record, the Commission concluded that Appellant “failed to show by the greater weight of the credible evidence that she sustained carpal tunnel syndrome arising out of and in the course of her employment” with Appellee. The Commission found that Dr. Lytle’s opinion that her injury was causally related to a long-term history of employment as a typist was based on an erroneous impression that Appellant engaged in some form of hand-intensive job duties for Appellee. In making this finding, the Commission relied on Appellant’s testimony that she performed various work activities at the Davis Facility including answering telephone calls; handling all filing, photocopying, payroll, and personnel records; interviewing applicants; keeping minutes of all meetings; working with Medicare and Medicaid forms; and running various errands for the facility. The Commission also pointed to Appellant’s testimony that only twenty-five to forty percent of her time was spent typing. The Commission thus found that Dr. Lyde’s opinion regarding the etiology of Appellant’s injury was based on a misunderstanding of her actual work duties at the Davis Facility.
The Commission also relied on inconsistencies in Appellant’s testimony regarding the onset of her symptoms. On direct examination, Appellant testified that she first experienced pain and numbness in her right arm and hand in February 1996, while she was at home laying in bed. On cross-examination, however, Appellant testified that she had previously felt numbness in her right hand in 1994, while exercising at a health club. Dr. Lytle’s opinion made no reference to Appellant’s 1994 symptoms, leading the Commission to infer that his diagnosis was not based on an accurate history. The Commission thus concluded that Dr. Lytle’s opinion was entitled to very little weight.
The court of appeals affirmed the Commission’s decision primarily on the basis that Appellant’s argument, which consisted of only two paragraphs, failed to cite any convincing argument or relevant citation of authority. Additionally, the court of appeals noted that Appellant’s brief erroneously relied on the ALJ’s findings rather than the findings of the Commission.
On review to this court, Appellant’s argument is again only two paragraphs long.1 The only legal authority cited by Appellant does not provide any support for her argument; rather, it merely sets out the relevant standard of review. Thus, given the lack of any convincing argument or legal authority, we, too, affirm the Commission’s decision. We have stated on occasions too numerous to count that we will not consider the merits of an argument if the appellant fails to cite any convincing legal authority in support of that argument, and it is otherwise not apparent without further research that the argument is well taken. See, e.g., Womack v. Foster, 340 Ark. 124, 8 S.W.3d 854 (2000); National Bank of Commerce v. Dow Chem. Co., 338 Ark. 752, 1 S.W.3d 443 (1999). Moreover, as noted by the court of appeals, Appellant’s argument challenges only the findings of the ALJ, not those made by the Commission. The ALJ’s findings are irrelevant for purposes of this appeal, as we are required by precedent to review only the findings of the Commission and ignore those of the ALJ. See, e.g., Scarbrough v. Cherokee Enters., 306 Ark. 641, 816 S.W.2d 876 (1991); Graham v. Turnage Empl. Group, 60 Ark. App. 150, 960 S.W.2d 453 (1998); Crawford v. Pace Indus., 55 Ark. App. 60, 929 S.W.2d 727 (1996). We thus affirm the Commission’s decision.
Brown and Thornton, JJ., dissent. SMITH, J., not participating.Pursuant to Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 2-4, when a petition for review is granted, the parties are required to file fourteen additional copies of the briefs previously submitted to the court of appeals. Additionally, any party may request permission to submit a supplemental brief. No such request was made by Appellant here.