I must respectfully dissent from significant portions of the majority’s opinion. To the extent that a crime was committed, I readily agree with the majority’s opinion that the corporate defendant can be guilty of the crimes charged and that the evidence convincingly establishes that the defendant corporation practiced deception as that term is used and defined in Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-512 (Reissue 1989). However, I cannot agree with the majority’s application of the facts to § 28-512 and to the grading of the offenses under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-518 (Reissue 1989).
“A person commits theft if he obtains property of another by deception.” § 28-512. Theft by deception is graded under § 28-518 based upon “the value of the thing involved.” The victims transferred only cash to the defendant. In theft by deception cases, the property obtained and the thing involved are necessarily the same. In both the crimes charged, this is cash, not the copiers. The question is, How much, if any, cash did the defendant obtain from each victim by its deceptions?
Evidence of the value of the copiers as they were presented by the defendant or as they really existed is relevant only to establish the pecuniary significance of the deceptions. If the defendant is convicted, such evidence is relevant to establish the loss sustained by the victims for restitution purposes under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-2280 (Reissue 1989). When cash is the property obtained by any sort of theft, evidence of its value is obviously unnecessary to establish the grade of the crime. The *462fact that'the victim received something of value in exchange for the cash is immaterial in grading the offense.
Other jurisdictions have considered the question of the value of property obtained by deception for purposes of grading the offense when the victim received property of value in exchange for that obtained by deception. In State v. Forshee, 588 P.2d 181 (Utah 1978), the defendant set back the odometer on the motor vehicle he sold the victims. One of the victims testified he would not have purchased the vehicle if he had known its true mileage. The defendant argued that the fair market value of the vehicle should have been subtracted from the price paid by the victims for purposes of grading the crime and that, therefore, he was guilty of only a misdemeanor. The statute made it a crime to obtain or exercise control over the property of another by deception. The court held that the degree of the crime must be measured by the value of the property obtained by the defendant as a result of the deception and that the value of any property received by the victim is immaterial. Similar holdings can be found in the following cases: People v. Ross, 25 Cal. App. 3d 190, 100 Cal. Rptr. 703 (1972); People v. Hess, 10 Cal. App. 3d 1071; 90 Cal. Rptr. 268 (1970); State v. Aurgemma, 116 R.I. 425, 358 A.2d 46 (1976); and LaMoyne v. The State, 53 Tex. Crim. 221, 111 S.W. 950 (1908). The only cases I have located holding the other view are Gaskins v. State, 38 S.W. 470 (Tex Crim. App. 1895); Perry v. The State, 39 Tex. Crim. 495, 46 S.W. 816 (1898); and Lively v. State, 74 S.W. 321 (Tex. Crim. App. 1903), and these cases were overruled by LaMoyne.
Naber’s paid $1,595 for the copier charged in count I, and the NPA paid $4,200 for the copier charged in count II. If that amount of money was obtained by deception, the crimes are felonies. However, while there is not much doubt that Naber’s was defrauded by the defendant’s deception, there is no evidence that Naber’s parted with its money because of the deception. However, Keith Naber did riot testify that he would not have bought the copier but for the deception, but, rather, that he would not have paid as much for the copier. He did not testify how must less. For this reason, I do not think the State proved that the defendant obtained Naber’s money by deception, and therefore I would dismiss count I.
*463Count II is different because the evidence would support a finding that the NPA would not have bought the copier it did buy if the deception had not been practiced. The defendant was guilty of a felony, but it was charged with only a Class I misdemeanor, and therefore that conviction should be affirmed. I would also affirm the restitution ordered, because the evidence shows that had the deception not been practiced, the copier the victim received would have been worth at least $180 more, and this is adequate proof of “the actual damages sustained by the victim.”