(concurring specially in part, concurring in result in part).
I write specially to agree with the adoption of the United States Supreme Court’s determination that a state court may presume, “at least initially, that a final judgment of conviction offered for purposes of sentence enhancement was validly obtained.” Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. -, -, 113 S.Ct. 517, 524, 121 L.Ed.2d 391, 404 (1992).
We noted in State v. Randen, 497 N.W.2d 107, 109 n. 2 (S.D.1993), the “lack of any apparent conflict between Parke and the burdens of proof we outlined in Stuck.” * See also State v. Lownes, 499 N.W.2d 896, 902 (S.D.1993) (stating in dicta that a silent record would not create a presumption the prior conviction was unconstitutional). Moreover, this court has previously referred to the pre*814sumption of regularity that attaches to a final judgment. Alexander v. Solem, 383 N.W.2d 486, 488 (S.D.1986).
The burden-shifting procedure formulated by this court in Stuck v. Leapley, 473 N.W.2d 476, 478-79 (S.D.1991) is consistent with Parke’s presumption of validity attaching to a final judgment. In Stuck the defendant challenged the state’s use of prior convictions to enhance his sentence, claiming the prior convictions were infirm as they failed to establish he had been advised as to his Boykin rights and relying heavily upon Dunn, which struck down Kentucky’s burden shifting scheme as unconstitutional. Stuck, 473 N.W.2d at 477 (distinguishing Dunn v. Simmons, 877 F.2d 1275 (6th Cir.1989) abrogated by Parke, 506 U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 517, 121 L.Ed.2d 391). In Stuck we determined the records of the prior convictions did establish Stuck “knowingly and voluntarily entered his prior pleas.” Stuck, 473 N.W.2d at 479. Adoption of Parke simply adds that where the record of a prior conviction is silent, there is a presumption that the conviction is valid, absent credible evidence presented by the defendant that the conviction was obtained in violation of a constitutional right. Therefore, I do not view adoption of Parke as a departure from precedent in this court.
I join Justice Amundson’s concurrence in result concerning the evidence brought in to show the victim’s state of mind was relevant in a charge of aggravated assault.
In Randen, we declined to adopt Parke's presumption of validity from a silent record as to Boykin rights. Randen, 497 N.W.2d at 109. I agreed because Randen dealt with uncounseled pleas which were silent as to Boykin rights and in which the state made no showing that the defendant had knowingly waived counsel. Id.; see Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109, 114-15, 88 S.Ct. 258, 262, 19 L.Ed.2d 319, 324 (1967) ("presuming waiver of counsel from a silent record is impermissible”) (citing Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 82 S.Ct. 884, 8 L.Ed.2d 70 (1962)); accord State v. Cashman, 491 N.W.2d 462, 463 (S.D.1992) (holding prior uncounseled convictions may be used for sentence enhancement purposes only where defendant validly waives counsel) cert. denied, - U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 1401, 122 L.Ed.2d 774 (1993).