(dissenting). I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that this case is controlled by the limited definition of an improved roadway set forth in Scheurman v Dep’t of Transportation, 434 Mich 619; 456 NW2d 66 (1990). While the Supreme Court in Scheurman, supra at 633, may have clearly stated that there is no duty to provide street lighting because it is not part of the improved portion of a roadway, it did reserve its decision with respect to the duty to post and maintain traffic signs, citing the previous case of Salvati v State Hwy Dep’t, 415 Mich 708; 330 NW2d 64 (1982). Scheurman, supra at 637, n 29. While the Supreme Court was split over the correctness of the trial court’s findings of fact in Salvati, supra, six members agreed with the legal proposition that a governmental unit may incur liability for failing to erect any sign or warning device "at a point of hazard.” See Salvati, supra at 715 (opinion by Coleman, J.), and 721 (opinion by Levin, J.), and the cases cited therein. The analysis of both opinions in Salvati makes it clear that "the question of the adequacy of a particular system of traffic signs is to be resolved by the trier of fact.” Salvati, supra at 716 (Coleman, J.); similarly, Salvati, supra at 722 (Levin, J.); see also Soule v Macomb Co Bd of Rd Comm’rs, 196 Mich App 235, 238; 492 NW2d 783 (1992).
I would reverse and remand for trial. Defendant road commission should not be entitled to governmental immunity where there is a question whether the particular intersection was a "point of hazard” requiring the erection of traffic signs or signals.