concurring opinion on appellant’s petition for discretionary review.
Believing the majority goes too far in its treatment of DeGarmo and McGlothlin, I join the judgment of the Court but not its opinion.
I.
Prior to trial, appellant moved to suppress evidence obtained during a traffic stop, contending the search violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, Article I, § 9 of the Texas Constitution, and/or Article 38.23 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. The trial judge overruled the motion. At trial, appellant testified and admitted possessing the cocaine but argued the search violated his aforementioned constitutional and statutory rights. Appellant requested and received a jury instruction based upon Tex.Code Crina. Proc. Ann. art. 38.23(a). The jury rejected that argument and appellant was convicted of aggravated possession of a controlled substance.
On direct appeal, appellant contended the search was unlawful. However, the Court of Appeals refused to reach the merits of that contention. Instead, the Court summarily dismissed appellant’s claims, finding appellant had waived appellate review of the search issue by testifying at the guilt phase of trial. Leday v. State, No. 09-95-361-CR, 1997 WL 354770 (Tex.App. — Beaumont June 25,1997)(not designated for publication).
We granted review to decide the following issue:
Whether because of conflicting cases on the subject the DeGarmo Doctrine authorizes an appellate court to find waiver of claims of illegal arrest, search, and seizure asserted under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, Article I, § 9 of the Texas Constitution, and/or Article 38.23 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure where a defendant testifies at the guilt and/or punishment phase of the trial and admits possession of the illegally obtained evidence, here a controlled substance, where his testimony is impelled or necessary to meet, destroy, explain, or attempt to overcome the State’s use of the illegally obtained evidence at trial?
For the reasons stated below, I believe the Court of Appeals erred in extending the De-Garmo Doctrine to conflict with established precedent.
II.
A
I begin with a discussion of a doctrine of waiver commonly referred to as the DeGar-mo Doctrine. The DeGarmo Doctrine is derived from the doctrine of curative admissibility which stands for the proposition that if an appellate court finds a trial court improperly admitted evidence, the error is “cured” if the defendant presented the same evidence or testimony to which he had previously objected. In DeGarmo v. State, we held when a defendant testifies at the punishment phase and unequivocally admits his guilt, he waives any error that might have occurred during the guilt stage of the trial. 691 S.W.2d 657, 661 (Tex.Cr.App.1985).1
*727The DeGarmo Doctrine has been described as a “common-sense rule of procedure.” Bodde v. State, 568 S.W.2d 344, 348 (Tex.Cr.App.1978). The rationale for this doctrine is based upon the premise that the basic purpose of a trial is the determination of truth. When the defendant testifies and judicially confesses to the charged offense, the purpose of the trial process has been served — the truth has been determined and the purpose of the guilt/innocence phase of the trial has been satisfied. No reversible error should occur where the defendant has satisfied the necessity of the trial process. McGlothlin v. State, 896 S.W.2d 183, 187 (Tex.Cr.App.1993).
B.
In McWhorter v. State, 911 S.W.2d 538 (Tex.App.—Beaumont 1995, no pet.), the defendant was charged with possession of cocaine. At trial, the defendant testified regarding the events surrounding his traffic stop and on cross examination, admitted possession of the alleged cocaine. The sole issue on direct appeal was “the legality of the search and subsequent seizure of the contraband in question.” Id., 911 S.W.2d at 539.
While recognizing the cases giving rise to the DeGarmo Doctrine “involved a judicial admission by a defendant during the punishment phase of the trial” ibid (emphasis in the original), the Court of Appeals held the De-Garmo doctrine was not limited to punishment testimony. In reaching this conclusion, the Court reasoned:
We are unaware of any reason why the DeGarmo doctrine, as affirmed by the McGlothlin Court, should not be applied to instances where a defendant, for whatever trial strategy purposes, takes the witness stand in the guilt/innocence phase of a trial and judicially admits to having committed the offense for which he is on trial.
Id., 911 S.W.2d at 540 (emphasis in the original).
III.
The question presented in the instant case may be stated as follows: Did the McWhorter Court correctly expand the DeGarmo Doctrine to include testimony at the guilt phase of trial? Because such an extension of the DeGarmo Doctrine would conflict with prevailing authority from this Court and the United States Supreme Court, I believe this Court can answer that question in the negative, disavow the holding in McWhorter, and still find DeGarmo and McGlothlin workable precedent.
In Harrison v. United States, 392 U.S. 219, 88 S.Ct. 2008, 20 L.Ed.2d 1047 (1968), the Supreme Court considered the case of a defendant who testified at trial alleging his confessions were coerced and offered his own version of the facts at trial. The conviction was reversed, with the Court of Appeals determining the confessions were illegally obtained and inadmissible. Harrison v. United States, 359 F.2d 214, 222, on rehearing en banc, 359 F.2d at 223 (D.C.Cir.1965). At retrial, the confessions were not used, but Harrison’s previous testimony to rebut the confessions was read to the jury, over objection by the defense. Harrison was again convicted and the Court of Appeals affirmed, holding Harrison had waived his Fifth Amendment right not to testify by taking the stand.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine “whether the petitioner’s trial testimony was the inadmissible fruit of the illegally procured confessions.” Id., 392 U.S. at 221, 88 S.Ct. at 2009. The Court determined the crux of the inquiry was based upon not whether Harrison testified but why. “If he did so in order to overcome the impact of the confessions illegally obtained and hence, improperly introduced, then his testimony was tainted by the same illegality that rendered the confessions themselves inadmissible.” Id., 392 U.S. at 223, 88 S.Ct. at 2010. The Court held the resulting inquiry was whether petitioner’s trial testimony was impelled by *728the use of the contested confessions. As the Court stated:
... It is, of course, difficult to unravel the many considerations that might have led the petitioner to take the witness stand at his former trial. But, having illegally placed his confessions before the jury, the Government can hardly demand a demonstration by the petitioner that he would not have testified as he did if his inadmissible confessions had not been used. ‘The springs of conduct are subtle and varied,’ Mr. Justice Cardozo once observed. ‘One who meddles with them must not insist upon too nice a measure of proof that the spring which he released was effective to the exclusion of all others.’ Having ‘released the spring’ by using the petitioner’s unlawfully obtained confessions against him, the Government must show that its illegal action did not induce his testimony.
Id., 392 U.S. at 224-25, 88 S.Ct. at 2011, (citing DeCicco v. Schweizer, 221 N.Y. 431, 438, 117 N.E. 807, 810, L.R.A.1918E 1004).
In Thomas v. State, 572 S.W.2d 507 (Tex.Cr.App.1976), the issue was not an illegally obtained confession, but evidence from an illegal search and seizure. The issue was whether Thomas, by testifying, had waived the error of the illegal search. In applying the holding of Harrison, Presiding Judge Onion explained:
... The [Supreme] Court ... found that the burden was on the government to show that its illegal action in obtaining and introducing the confessions had not impelled the petitioner’s testimony ...
* * * *
Under Harrison, the “question is not Whether the petitioner made a knowing decision to testify, but Why. If he did so in order to overcome the impact of the confessions illegally obtained and hence improperly introduced,” the testimony is tainted by the same illegality that rendered the confessions themselves inadmissible.
We find that Harrison does in fact add a corollary to the doctrine of curative admissibility, i.e., the harmful effect of improperly admitted evidence which is obtained by illegal police practices is not cured when a defendant gives testimony on direct examination which establishes the same or similar facts unless the State can show its illegal action in obtaining and introducing the evidence did not impel the defendant’s testimony.
Id, 572 S.W.2d at 516 (Tex.Cr.App.1976) (Opinion on State’s Motion for Rehearing). The holding in Thomas has been reaffirmed many times by this Court.
In Sherlock v. State, 632 S.W.2d 604 (Tex.Cr.App.1982), the State contended the defendant had waived any objection to the search and seizure of the guns in his home by testifying “to the same or similar facts as those objected to by the motion to suppress.” Id., 632 S.W.2d at 606. This Court held:
The rule relied on by the State is the doctrine of curative admissibility, which provides that “the admission of improper evidence cannot be urged as grounds for reversal where the defendant gives testimony on direct examination which establishes the same facts as those objected to.” Thomas v. State, 572 S.W.2d 507. However, where a defendant testifies in order to overcome the impact of illegally obtained and improperly admitted evidence, that testimony is tainted by the same illegality that renders the evidence inadmissible. Thomas v. State, supra. See Harrison v. United States, 392 U.S. 219, 88 S.Ct. 2008, 20 L.Ed.2d 1047.
Id., 632 S.W.2d at 606.2
In Sweeten v. State, 693 S.W.2d 454 (Tex. Cr.App.1985), Judge Teague explained:
*729Notwithstanding that we agree with the district attorney that the facts of Harrison v. United States, supra, are obviously distinguishable from either Thomas v. State, supra, or this cause, we find that the principles of law stated in Harrison, which we find fall under the rationale of the “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine, see Wong Sun v. United States, supra, which principles this Court held in Thomas v. State, supra, were but a corollary to the doctrine of curative admissibility, are more than applicable to the situation where a defendant is impelled to testify because of the admission into evidence over objection of illegally seized or obtained evidence.
Sweeten, 693 S.W.2d at 458.
In applying and explaining this doctrine, Judge McCormick wrote in Bush v. State, 697 S.W.2d 397, 404 (Tex.Cr.App.1985):
The doctrine of curative admissibility provides that the improper admission of evidence over objection is rendered harmless by the admission into evidence of the same facts without objection at another point during the course of the trial. Thomas v. State, 572 S.W.2d 507 (Tex.Cr.App.1978) (Opinion on State’s Motion for Rehearing); Nicholas v. State, 502 S.W.2d 169 (Tex.Cr.App.1973) (Opinion on State’s Motion for Rehearing). A corollary to this rule, however, is that the harmful effect of improperly admitted evidence is not cured by the introduction of rebuttal evidence designed to meet, destroy, or explain the improper evidence. Howard v. State, 599 S.W.2d 597, 605 (Tex.Cr.App.1979) (Opinion on State’s Motion for Rehearing); Thomas v. State, supra; Nicholas v. State, supra. In Thomas v. State, supra, this Court altered the Texas rule on curative admissibility in light of Harrison v. United States, 392 U.S. 219, 88 S.Ct. 2008, 20 L.Ed.2d 1047 (1968).
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“We find that Harrison does in fact add a corollary to the doctrine of curative admissibility, i.e., the harmful effect of improperly admitted evidence which is obtained by illegal police practices is not cured when a defendant gives testimony on direct examination which establishes the same or similar facts unless the State can show that its illegal action in obtaining and introducing the evidence did not impel the defendant’s testimony....” Thomas v. State, supra at p. 516.
In light of this overwhelming precedent, the law is clear: when a defendant testifies to meet, rebut, explain, or in an attempt to overcome the State’s use of illegally obtained evidence, that testimony is not a waiver of error for appellate review purposes. The Court of Appeals failed to acknowledge this line of cases.
IV.
As noted in part II of this opinion, neither DeGarmo, nor McGlothlin, hold that a defendant who testifies at the guilt phase of the trial waives appellate review. To so hold would conflict with the prevailing cases discussed in part III of this opinion. I believe DeGarmo and McGlothlin should be applied as written; only when a defendant testifies at the punishment phase, and unequivocally confesses, does he waive any error that might have occurred during the guilt stage of the trial.3 The corollary to this holding should be that the DeGarmo Doctrine has no application where the defendant testifies at the guilt phase of trial to meet, rebut, explain, or attempt to overcome the State’s use of illegally obtained evidence. This rule should also apply when a defendant testifies at both phases of the trial. If the guilt phase testimony was necessary to meet, rebut, explain, or attempt to overcome the State’s use *730of illegally obtained evidence, then the defendant’s testimony at the punishment phase does not waive appellate review.
For these reasons, I join only the judgment of the Court.
. DeGarmo did not announce a new rule of law. Indeed, in challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, DeGarmo "acknowledge^] that the present law in Texas is that if a defendant does not testify at the guilt stage of the trial, but does testify at the punishment stage of the trial, and admits his guilt to the crime for which he has been found guilty, he has, for legal purposes, entered the equivalent of a plea of guilty.” Id., 691 S.W.2d at 660-61. See, Gordon v. State, 651 S.W.2d 793, 793 (Tex.Cr.App.1983); Brown v. State, 617 S.W.2d 234 (Tex.Cr.App.1981); Reeves v. State, 566 S.W.2d 630, 633 (Tex.Cr.App.1978); Dugger v. State, 543 S.W.2d 374, 377 (Tex.Cr.App.1976); Hunnicutt v. State, 531 S.W.2d 618, 622 (Tex.Cr.App.1976); Garcia v. State, 522 *727S.W.2d 203, 205 (Tex.Cr.App.1975); McKenzie v. State, 487 S.W.2d 65, 66 (Tex.Cr.App.1972); Sheridan v. State, 485 S.W.2d 920, 921 (Tex.Cr.App.1972); Palmer v. State, 475 S.W.2d 797, 798 (Tex.Cr.App. 1972); Mullane v. State, 475 S.W.2d 924, 926 (Tex.Cr.App.1972); Boothe v. State, 474 S.W.2d 219, 221 (Tex.Cr.App. 1972); and, Richardson v. State, 458 S.W.2d 665, 666 (Tex.Cr.App.1970).
. Additionally, the Sherlock Court enunciated the following factors as relevant criteria in determining whether the State had met its burden to show the defendant’s testimony was not impelled by the introduction of illegally obtained evidence. The Court
(1) evidence that defendant’s counsel would not have called his client to the stand but for the overruling of his objection to illegally obtained evidence;
(2) even if he would have called the defendant to the stand, evidence that his client would have testified in the same manner but for the introduction of that evidence;
*729(3) whether the State introduced other evidence of guilt, and the strength of that evidence; and,
(4) whether there is other evidence, aside from the evidence objected to, that would have induced the defendant to testify in the same manner.
Id.., 632 S.W.2d at 607.
. It is well settled that decisions of a court of last resort must be regarded as law and should be followed by intermediate courts, regardless of their views as to the correctness thereof, until reversed or overruled by the court rendering them. Abdnor v. Ovard, 653 S.W.2d 793 (Tex.Cr. App.1983).