The people appeal by leave granted a May 26, 1993, order permitting the admission of evidence regarding subsequent sexual acts between defendant and the victim, defendant’s wife, in this prosecution of defendant for two counts of third-degree criminal sexual conduct, MCL 750.520d; MSA 28.788(4). We vacate that portion of the order.
The charges arise out of an alleged incident that occurred in the early morning hours of September 27, 1992. Although a complaint for divorce had been filed before this date, defendant and the victim both continued to reside in the marital home with their children. Defendant and the victim worked different shifts and the victim resided in the lower level of the tri-level home. The victim testified she was sleeping in the basement when defendant entered the room and sexually assaulted her. Before trial, defendant filed a motion to admit evidence showing he and the victim had subsequent consensual sexual relations, that he and the victim during the course of their marriage engaged in acts similar to those which form the basis of the charges, and that the victim had engaged in sexual relations with a third party. At issue on appeal is the trial court’s ruling admissible evidence showing subsequent sexual contact between defendant and the victim occurring within thirty days of the alleged assault.
The admissibility or inadmissibility of evidence regarding a victim’s sexual conduct in criminal sexual conduct cases is governed by the rape-shield statute, MCL 750.520j; MSA 28.788(10). The statute reads in pertinent part:
(1) Evidence of specific instances of the victim’s sexual conduct, opinion evidence of the victim’s sexual conduct, and reputation evidence of the *290victim’s sexual conduct shall not be admitted under sections 520b to 520g [MCL 750.520b-750.520g; MSA 28.788(2)-28.788(7)] unless and only to the extent that the judge finds that the following proposed evidence is material to a fact at issue in the case and that its inflammatory or prejudicial nature does not outweigh its probative value:
(a) Evidence of the victim’s past sexual conduct with the actor.
(b) Evidence of specific instances of sexual activity showing the source or origin of semen, pregnancy, or disease.
Defendant argues the statute is inapplicable because the acts at issue involve subsequent rather than "past sexual conduct.” We find no merit to this contention. As this Court previously stated in People v Stull, 127 Mich App 14, 17; 338 NW2d 402 (1983):
Contrary to defendant’s claim, this statute does not only bar evidence of complainant’s sexual activity prior to the alleged rape. It bars, with two narrow exceptions, evidence of all sexual activity by the complainant not incident to the alleged rape.
Having found the conduct at issue falls within the exclusionary language of the statute, we must next determine whether one of the exceptions to exclusion apply. Subsection b regarding evidence showing the source or origin of semen, pregnancy, or disease has no relevance to the evidence defendant seeks to admit. MCL 750.520j(l)(b); MSA 28.788(10)(l)(b). However, subsection a, permitting under certain circumstances the admission of "[ejvidence of the victim’s past sexual conduct with the actor,” was utilized by the trial court in support of its ruling that evidence of subsequent sexual conduct between the victim and defendant *291occurring within thirty days of the assault was admissible. MCL 750.520j(l)(a); MSA 28.788(10)(1) (a). The trial court found "past” conduct referred to conduct that occurred before the date of trial, not only conduct that occurred before the date of the offense. We believe the trial court erred in so holding.
To read the statute as suggested by the trial court renders the Legislature’s use of the word "past” meaningless. When construing a statute, this Court presumes that every word has some meaning and will avoid any construction that renders a statute or any part of it surplusage or nugatory. Saint George Greek Orthodox Church of Southgate v Laupmanis Associates, PC, 204 Mich App 278; 514 NW2d 516 (1994). We therefore find the reference in subsection a to "past conduct” encompasses conduct that occurs before the incident underlying the charges and not to conduct subsequent thereto.1
Concluding the proffered evidence is inadmissible pursuant to the rape-shield statute does not end the inquiry. Our Supreme Court has noted that under certain limited situations exclusion of evidence under the rape-shield statute may unconstitutionally abridge a defendant’s right to confrontation. People v Hackett, 421 Mich 338; 365 *292NW2d 120 (1984). As examples, the Court noted situations involving the proffer of evidence of a complainant’s prior sexual conduct for the narrow purpose of showing bias or ulterior motive for making a false charge as well as evidence indicating the victim had made false accusations in the past. Id. at 348.
To raise properly a claim that exclusion of evidence under the rape-shield statute violates a defendant’s constitutional right to confrontation, a defendant must make an offer of proof and demonstrate its relevance to the purpose for which it is sought to be admitted. The motion is to be denied unless there is a "sufficient” showing of relevancy. Only if there is a sufficient offer of proof concerning a defendant’s constitutional right to confrontation, "as distinct simply from use of sexual conduct as evidence of character or for impeachment,” will an in camera evidentiary hearing be warranted. Id. at 350.
The evidence at issue herein does not fall under any of the categories noted by the Court in Hackett. Defendant wishes to use evidence of subsequent sexual conduct for impeachment purposes. Defendant’s defense is that the incident never occurred. Defendant believes evidence that the victim engaged in subsequent sexual contact with defendant will indicate she is lying when she states sexual contact occurred on the date in question. We do not believe this follows. We agree evidence of prior as well as subsequent sexual contact between complainant and defendant may be relevant when the defense is consent. Consent however is not defendant’s defense. Moreover even if we determined the proposed evidence possessed some probative value, there are many instances under the law where logically relevant evidence is excluded because of competing policy interests, i.e. *293the protection of inquiry into privileged communications, the preclusion of hearsay, and the limitation of prior bad act evidence, MEE 404(b). These are familiar examples of instances in which the admissibility of probative evidence is restricted because of competing and superior policy. Hackett; supra at 345-346. Additionally, the law bars evidence that may prejudice and mislead the jury and is only of arguable probative worth. People v Arnenda, 416 Mich 1; 330 NW2d 814 (1982).
Here, defendant attempts to introduce evidence of the victim’s sexual conduct merely for impeachment purposes. This does not rise to the level of a "sufficient” showing of relevance necessitating an in camera hearing. Hackett; supra; People v Byrne, 199 Mich App 674; 502 NW2d 386 (1993), let alone a finding of a violation of defendant’s right to confrontation. Exclusion of the evidence will not unduly infringe defendant’s constitutional right to confrontation.
That portion of the order permitting the introduction of the contested evidence, therefore, is vacated.
Shepherd, J., concurred.Although we interpret the plain meaning of the statute to include only that conduct that occurs before the incident at issue, we can not say the Legislature intentionally excluded the application of the exception to subsequent conduct. Rather, we believe the Legislature more than likely failed to consider the issue at all. At the time of the statute’s enactment the typical criminal sexual conduct case rarely involved the question of subsequent sexual conduct between the defendant and the victim. However, given the amendment of MCL 750.520(1); MSA 28.788(12) to abolish the marital rape exception to prosecution for criminal sexual conduct, see 1988 PA 138, and the ever increasing recognition of the growing number and complex nature of abusive relationships, it is likely the issue of subsequent sexual conduct between the victim and the actor will continue to arise. Nonetheless, it is the Legislature’s, and not this Court’s, function to keep legislation current.