*426OPINION ON STATE’S MOTION FOR REHEARING
McCORMICK, Justice.This is an appeal from a conviction of the offense of aggravated robbery enhanced by a prior felony conviction. The jury assessed punishment at fifty (50) years.
Appellant, through his attorney, raises a single ground of error relating to the failure of the trial court to charge the jury on the law of circumstantial evidence.
At trial it was shown that in the early morning hours of April 19, 1977, the complainant, Edward Strom, stopped his pickup on the freeway after being flagged down by a stranded motorist. After assisting the motorist in pushing the vehicle some distance to a convenience store, the motorist asked Strom for a cigarette, which he gave him. At this point, the motorist produced a knife and began slashing and cutting Strom. The attacker demanded Strom’s wallet, which Strom threw on the ground some six or eight feet away. While the attacker was picking up the wallet, Strom fled into the convenience store where the attendant called police and helped Strom bandage his wounds. The attacker fled the scene in Strom’s pickup. Later that same day, appellant was arrested in Louisiana while driving the stolen pickup.
At the time of trial, Strom testified that he had, shortly after the robbery, identified his assailant from a spread of photographs shown to him by Dallas police. The photograph was introduced at trial, and the following took place:
“Q. (By Prosecutor) Let me show you what’s been marked for identification purposes, Mr. Strom, as State’s Exhibit Number 1. Do you recognize that exhibit?
“A. (By Mr. Strom) Yes, sir.
“Q. And what is it, please?
“A. That’s the picture of the man that robbed and stabbed me.
U * * *
“Q. Now, with regard to State’s Exhibit 1, the photograph there, the individual that’s depicted in that photograph, that is the individual that robbed you on the morning of April 19th, 1977?
“A. Yes, sir.
“Q. Is there any doubt in your mind at all that the person in the photograph is the person that robbed you?
“A. None whatsoever.”
At no time during the trial did the witness Strom identify the appellant positively. What the evidence did reveal is that between the time of the taking of the photograph and the time of trial appellant’s hair had been cut, his moustache had been trimmed, his sideburns cut, and he did not appear as he did in the photograph.
Later in the trial, Sergeant Paul Hendrix of the Shreveport police department testified that he had arrested appellant in Louisiana on April 19,1977. He positively identified appellant at trial as the person he arrested and positively identified State’s Exhibit Number 1 as a photograph of appellant as he appeared on April 19, 1977. Appellant contends that he was, based on the evidence, entitled to a charge on circumstantial evidence since the complainant did not make a positive in-court identification.
On original submission, a panel of this Court reversed, holding that:
“While the circumstances outlined above may have been sufficient to support a finding of guilt, they clearly are not the equivalent of direct evidence of guilt. Though the State’s evidence, apart from the complainant’s uncertain identification of appellant as his assailant, may lead to an almost irresistible conclusion that appellant is guilty, and although circumstances indicating guilt are strong, the trial court is not relieved of the duty of charging the jury on circumstantial evidence where, as here, the case is based upon inference and reasoning.”
We now hold that there was no error in the trial court’s failure to charge on circumstantial evidence, and grant the State’s motion for rehearing.
*427A charge on circumstantial evidence is required only where evidence of main facts essential to guilt is purely and entirely circumstantial. Wilson v. State, 225 S.W.2d 173, 154 Tex.Cr.R. 59 (1950), Hall v. State, 278 S.W.2d 297, 161 Tex.Cr.R. 460 (1955). Put another way, a charge on circumstantial evidence is necessary only when the State’s case depends wholly on circumstantial evidence. See Article 36.14, V.A.C.C.P., note 437. Such a charge usually begins in the following terms:
“This is a case depending for conviction on circumstantial evidence.” Smith v. State, 157 Tex.Cr.R. 637, 253 S.W.2d 665 (1952).
Circumstantial evidence is proof of a fact from which an inference, based on common experience, can be drawn. Where one fact is proved from which another fact is inferred, this is circumstantial evidence. Gentry v. State, 41 Tex.Cr.R. 497, 56 S.W. 68 (1900). But there exists no authority which says that proof of one fact which is then used to directly prove (rather than infer) a second fact is circumstantial evidence. On the contrary, the proof of the second and ultimate fact does not rest in any respect on circumstantial evidence. When each link in such a chain is proven by direct, testimonial evidence which does not call for any inference, this is tantamount to direct proof.
The situations where a chain of evidence is composed solely of direct testimony are limited. Three such situations are analogous to the one at bar.
The first such analogy is in the prosecution of murder cases where evidence connects the accused with the killing of some person but other direct testimony is necessary to identify the person killed. Thus, where there is a chain of direct evidence to prove that the accused killed the person alleged in the indictment, and where there is no circumstantial evidence in that chain, no charge on circumstantial evidence is required. Hogan v. State, 496 S.W.2d 594 (Tex.Cr.App.1973), and Howard v. State, 111 Tex.Cr.R. 205, 13 S.W.2d 80 (1928).
Similarly, where a substance is taken from the possession of an accused and delivered to a third person who identifies that substance as a narcotic, there is a direct evidence chain which proves that the substance possessed by the accused was a narcotic, and no charge on circumstantial evidence is required. Cazares v. State, 488 S.W.2d 110 (Tex.Cr.App.1973).
Finally, and probably most similar to the case at bar, is the situation that often arises when fingerprints are used to identify an accused. Ofttimes, there are three steps in this chain. First, the introduction of an unknown print; then the introduction of a set of known prints; and lastly, testimony of the expert who connects the known and unknown prints. When such occurs, no change on circumstantial evidence is required. Grice v. State, 142 Tex.Cr.R. 4, 151 S.W.2d 211 (1941); Reed v. State, 516 S.W.2d 680 (Tex.Cr.App.1975).
None of the facts shown in the case at bar are proved circumstantially. Had the prosecuting witness testified that the robber looked like the man in the photograph, or had the police officer from Louisiana said the photograph looked like the appellant, this would have been circumstantial evidence from which an inference could be drawn that the person depicted in the photograph was in fact the appellant. Such was not the testimony.
The testimony of the prosecuting witness Strom that the photograph depicted the man who robbed him is direct evidence of that fact, i. e. the man who robbed him is in the photograph, and nothing is left to be inferred as to who the person in the photograph is. The officer testified that the man in the photograph is the appellant. This is direct evidence of the fact that the man in the photograph was in fact the appellant. Nothing is left to be inferred. The testimony, taken together, shows directly, not circumstantially, that the man in the photograph who robbed the witness Strom is the appellant. What inference need be drawn? Each piece of evidence is direct. Nothing is being shown by circumstantial evidence, and a charge thereon would not appear to be required. Hall v. State, supra.
*428What we have here is a chain of direct evidence pointing unequivocally to the guilt of the accused.
In a pro se brief which was not timely filed, appellant has presented four additional grounds of error. We have examined each of them and find no reversible error.
The State’s motion for rehearing is granted, and the judgment is affirmed.
ONION, P. J., and ROBERTS, CLINTON and TEAGUE, JJ., dissent.