STATE’S MOTION FOR REHEARING
CLINTON, Judge.On original submission a unanimous Court reversed this cause on the ground that the written statement confessing to this capital murder was taken under coercive circumstances rendering such statement inadmissible under the authority of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1975), Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 96 S.Ct. 321, 46 L.Ed.2d 313 (1975) and cases decided by this Court. We denied leave to file the State’s motion for rehearing; however, the factual recitation and consequently, the legal conclusions evidenced by the opinion on original submission were vigorously questioned by the dissent to the denial of the State’s leave to file and a majority of this Court therefore ordered a stay of the mandate, as well as the State’s leave to file.
The only seriously disputed fact issue revealed by this record is whether appellant advised the interrogating officers that he desired the advice of counsel. Because the trial court as the sole trier of fact, found that no such request was made, this Court is not at liberty to disturb such finding. McKittrick v. State, 541 S.W.2d 177 (Tex.Cr.App.1976). All of the officers observed through a one-way mirror the conversations had by each of the other officers with appellant, unless otherwise indicated. The following recitation is of relevant facts and circumstances adduced at the hearing on the motion to suppress which are substantially uncontradicted unless so designated.
On April 20,1977, appellant was extradited from Colorado on a warrant for his arrest for the offense of theft in the amount of $320.00. The next morning, he was taken before Justice of the Peace Charles Cashell, who advised appellant he was charged with the offense of theft, read appellant his magistrate’s warning and set his bond at $50,000.00. Appellant understood the warning and did not at that time request the assistance of counsel because he intended to enter a guilty plea to the theft and felt he did not need one. The next morning, a Friday, appellant met with Captain Bill Roach of the Gregg County Sheriff’s Department and Department of Public Safety Texas Ranger Glenn Elliott in Roach’s office in the Gregg County Courthouse. He was advised of his Miranda rights and a brief discussion of the theft offense ensued.
According to Elliott, he and Roach “then informed [appellant] that [they] were inves*636tigating a homicide in Gladewater ..., which was a capital offense, and that [they] were interested in his activities on or about July 8, 1975.” Appellant advised the officers of where he thought he had been, and they in turn asked whether he would be willing to submit to a polygraph examination regarding the capital murder. Upon appellant’s agreement, Elliott arranged the polygraph for April 25, the following Monday, at 2:00 p. m. in Tyler. Roach, Elliott and appellant arrived in Tyler at approximately 1:45 p. m. on the appointed day after a forty five minute trip in which the murder was not discussed.
On arrival at D.P.S.1 headquarters in Tyler, appellant was placed in a holdover cell for a short while during which Elliott and Roach briefed the polygraph examiner, Officer Marvin McLeroy, on the subject to be examined. McLeroy then brought appellant into the polygraph room2 and spent approximately 30 minutes with appellant completing a “pre-test interview” in which he obtained personal data, such as appellant’s general health, physical condition that morning, education, criminal record and the like. McLeroy then explained the process of a polygraph test and advised appellant:
I told him that polygraph tests were simply a voluntary test, that he could not be forced to take it, that if he knew that he could not pass the test that my advice to him would be to not take the test. I told him that there were basically three things which could probably make him fail the polygraph test. I told him, number one, that if he actually did do what it was that he was suspected of doing that he would probably fail the test; that if he knew for a fact who did do what he was suspected of doing or if he was intentionally withholding knowledge from me about, or from the investigators about what he was accused of doing, that this would probably make him fail this polygraph test. At this point in time the subject indicated to me that he better not take the polygraph test, that it was his desire, that it was his wish that he did not take the polygraph test.
Appellant refused to sign the polygraph consent form.
McLeroy then asked appellant whether he would talk to him about why he, appellant, was there. According to McLeroy appellant replied: “I just as well talk to you; I’ve talked to just about everybody else.” McLeroy then read appellant his rights and apparently it was at this point that a discussion of the electric chair commenced, the content of which was disputed.3 According *637to McLeroy, he then began interrogation of appellant regarding the murder which lasted for approximately 30 more minutes. McLeroy was asked:
Q: He didn’t talk to you about that, did he? So, in essence, he did not ... talk to you or answer any questions of yours concerning this accusation, did he?
A: No.
McLeroy left appellant in the room and explained to the other officers that appellant had refused to consent to taking the polygraph. Ranger Elliott then went into the room with appellant.
Elliott warned appellant and asked him why he did not want to take the polygraph. According to Elliott, appellant “said he’d never had a test before and he wasn’t sure it was the right thing to do.” Elliott then told appellant he was investigating this capital murder and asked about appellant’s associates in Longview. Elliott testified:
I tried to get better acquainted with him. I tried to get a little bit closer to him so he could talk freely to me and during this conversation he indicated to me that he would like to have a couple of days to get this straight in his mind, and I talked to him.
On cross examination, Elliott was asked:
Q: Did you ask him any facts concerning this capital murder in Gladewa-ter?
A: Yes, sir, I asked him.
Q: Did he want to talk to you about it at that time ?
A: He indicated that he knew about the murder and that he just, but he wanted to wait a little but, a little while, a couple of days to put it down.
Q: He wanted to wait a couple of days in regard to giving a statement about it ?
A: That’s the way I took it.
After 20 to 30 minutes of interrogation in which appellant continued to give no incriminating information, Elliott left.
Captain Roach then entered the polygraph room and orally advised appellant of his rights. According to Elliott,4 who was observing through the mirror:
[This interview] was along the same lines. Stan had already — Mr. Faulder had already indicated to us that he — to me that he had knowledge of the crime that we were talking about, but he wasn’t ready to talk about it. And Mr. Roach started his interview along the same lines that I did, to get better acquainted with him and trying to persuade him to go ahead and tell us his story about what happened on July the 8th, 1975, over at Mrs. Inez Phillips’ home in Gladewater.
After approximately 15 minutes, Roach left and McLeroy reentered.5 The only salient testimony regarding the content of this portion of interrogation was elicited on cross examination from McLeroy:
A: —subject then told me orally, I said to him, I said, “You don’t need a couple of days to get this straight. You know right now, today, as to whether or not you could pass a polygraph test; isn’t that correct?” He said, “Yes.”
Q: All right. What brought up the couple of days? Why did you say, “You don’t need a couple of days?” Hadn’t Mr. Faulder told you that he wanted a couple of days to think—
A: I overheard him tell Roach or Elliott that he needed a couple of days.
*638After approximately 15 minutes, McLeroy left and Elliott came back into the room with appellant for about 15 minutes. According to Elliott,
A: I went back in and talked to him again briefly, myself.
Q: All right. And what then occurred?
A: Well, he still said that he just would like to think about it and get it all a little bit clearer in his mind, all the details, and this was about the only thing that he said about the crime to me. He indicated, as I said, testified before, that he had knowledge, but he just wasn't quite ready to discuss it.
After Elliott left, Roach re-entered the room. It was about 4:30 p. m. According to Roach, appellant had at this point made no incriminating statements, and had given no indication that he wanted to talk with anyone about his involvement in the murder. Roach took into the polygraph room a pad of paper on which he had written the date: “July 8, 1975.” Roach testified that he then turned the note pad around and wrote the names of six people, names he had obtained from Elliott. He questioned appellant about each item on the paper. Roach stated, “when I got to the name Stormie Summers, Stan sat there for a minute. He said, T can’t at this time tell you about it, but if you’ll give me a piece of paper, I’ll try to write it down’.” Roach provided the requested items and appellant wrote one long paragraph.6 Roach continued, “He handed the paper to me. He told me to read it and said, ‘After you read this I think I can talk to you about it’.”
After Roach read the paragraph, he brought appellant out of the polygraph room into McLeroy’s outer office and went outside to his car to get Gregg County statement and waiver forms. Back inside, Roach filled out the waiver, read it to appellant, handed it to appellant and had appellant recite a line of the content in order to confirm that appellant was literate. Appellant signed the waiver of rights form.
Appellant then drew a diagram of the house in which the capital murder occurred and began relating the details of the offense. Roach chronicled the events by hand, had it typed, and at 7:22 p. m., after appellant had both been read the statement, including warnings at the top, and had himself read the statement, he signed, dated and wrote down the time on it. Ranger Elliott testified that appellant “seemed relieved.”
Appellant, as well as the three law enforcement witnesses, testified that he had been advised of his rights several times through the day, that he understood his rights, that he had been allowed to drink, smoke and use the restroom, that no firearms had been displayed, no overt threats were used7 and that appellant was in no way mistreated. Additionally, it is uncon-tradicted that appellant had refused to involve himself in the murder and never gave any indication that he wanted to talk about his involvement during what was described by the witnesses as “continuing interrogation.” The officers all agreed that they had not “taken” appellant’s statements regarding “needing a couple of days ...” as a request to stop interrogation, but rather, an expression of his lack of desire to give a final statement at that time.8 On cross *639examination, the prosecutor asked appellant whether the “real” reason for his having wanted “a couple of days” was that he was wondering “who all” to implicate. Appellant acknowledged that this had been a consideration but denied that it was the prime reason.9 Appellant was asked why he signed the statement and he replied that he thought it was the only way to “get out of there.” The prosecutor asked appellant, “Did you tell them I’d like to think about it and get it clear in my mind before I sign that page [of the statement] after you read it?” Appellant replied, “I spent the whole afternoon telling them that and it didn’t do any good.”
In Miranda, supra, the Supreme Court of the United States expressed its concern for the atmosphere of custodial interrogation of criminal suspects, in which no overt physical coercion nor patent psychological ploys have been applied. Identifying as its goal the specification of proper limitations upon custodial interrogations, the Court set out procedural requirements to be therein employed by law enforcement officials. The Court made clear the necessity of advising persons criminally accused of their right against self-incrimination and their right to counsel, and the requirement that once a defendant invokes a Miranda right, all interrogation must cease. Stated the Court at p. 1612 of 86 S.Ct.:
The defendant may waive effectuation of these rights, provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. If, however, he indicates in any manner and at any stage of the process that he wishes to consult with an attorney before speaking there can be no questioning. Likewise, if the individual is alone and indicates in any manner that he does not wish to be interrogated, the police may not question him. The mere fact that he may have answered some questions or volunteered some statements on his own does not deprive him of the right to refrain from answering any further inquiries until he has consulted with an attorney and thereafter consents to be questioned.
In Michigan v. Mosley,10 supra, the Supreme Court was confronted with a question as to whether the Miranda guidelines had been violated where the accused invoked his right to remain silent regarding some robbery offenses, and after a two hour interval, on being again advised of his rights, implicated himself in an unrelated homicide. The Court stated in this regard:
“A reasonable and faithful interpretation of the Miranda opinion must rest on the intention of the Court in that case to adopt ‘fully effective means ... to notify the person of his right of silence and to assure that the exercise of the right will be scrupulously honored ....’ [citations omitted] The critical safeguard identified in the passage at issue is a person's ‘right to cut off questioning.’ [citations omitted] Through the exercise of his option to terminate questioning he can control the time at which questioning occurs, the subjects discussed, and the duration of the interrogation. The requirement that law enforcement authorities must respect a person’s exercise of that option counteracts the coercive pressures of the custodial setting. We therefore conclude that the admissibility of statements obtained after the person in custody has decided to remain silent depends under Miranda on whether his ‘right to cut off questioning’ was ‘scrupulously honored’.” Mosley at p. 326 of 96 S.Ct.
Where the facts are in dispute, the trial court is the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony; however, the threshold question presented here is not one regarding credibility of the interrogating officers, *640nor of the good faith of the officers in their subjective interpretations of appellant’s un-contradicted assertions of wanting “to wait a couple of days ...,” but whether appellant “in any manner” invoked his right to remain silent and, if so, whether such right was “scrupulously honored.”
We believe that the inescapable conclusion from the verbatim testimony of the law enforcement officers recited ante, is that appellant did “indicate” in “some manner” his “desire” to invoke his right against self incrimination. Appellant’s refusal to incriminate himself in some three hours of continuous interrogation is an additional circumstance which corroborates his assertion that his statements of “needing” or “wanting a couple of days ...” were intended to indicate in some manner that he was invoking his right to remain silent. Further support for this conclusion is found in testimony showing that Captain Roach deemed it necessary to try to “persuade [appellant] to go ahead and tell ... his story about what happened ...,” as well as that Marvin McLeroy felt obliged to argue with appellant about his need for a couple of days. [See, ante, at 633-634.]
Finally, it is clear that even if we agreed with the officers’ asserted interpretation of appellant’s statements — that he was not requesting that interrogation cease, but rather, expressing his desire to wait a couple of days before giving a final statement — no different conclusion would be impelled. In Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 97 S.Ct. 1232, 51 L.Ed.2d 424 (1977),11 the Supreme Court concluded that the accused’s “statements ... that he would tell the whole story after seeing [his lawyer] were the clearest expressions by Williams himself that he desired the presence of an attorney before any interrogation took place.” Brewer at p. 1242 of 97 S.Ct. [Emphasis original.] See also Hearne v. State, 534 S.W.2d 703 (Tex.Cr.App.1976).
Likewise, we are unpersuaded by the State’s assertion that appellant’s reason for “wanting a couple of days ...” was to give him time to decide “who all” to implicate. Even if this were established by the record, which it is not, there is nothing inherent in such a consideration which negates the accused’s desire to refrain from incriminating himself.
We hold that this appellant did indicate to the interrogating officers that he wished to invoke his right against self incrimination, and there is no dispute that thereafter, the interrogation did not cease. Accordingly, appellant’s right was not “scrupulously honored” and the guidelines specified by Miranda were thereby violated. Brewer; Mosley; Ochoa v. State, 573 S.W.2d 796 (Tex.Cr.App.1978); Hearne v. State, supra.
The State nevertheless urges that appellant ultimately waived his Fifth Amendment right and his statement was thereby rendered admissible. The State points to the facts found by the trial court that appellant never requested an attorney and never stated: “I request that the interrogation cease,” or words to that specific effect. Furthermore, according to the State’s assertion, appellant signed two documents entitled “Waiver of Rights Form” — one at 2:30 p. m. and another at 5:47 p. m. — which reflect his acknowledgement that he was given all warnings required by Miranda; additionally, when appellant signed the typed statement admitting his guilt, such statement included a specific waiver of his rights. Finally, the State assigns great significance to the fact that appellant, after approximately three hours of interrogation advised Captain Roach that “I can’t at this time tell you about it, but if you’ll give me a piece of paper, I’ll try to write it down,” citing North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 99 S.Ct. 1755, 60 L.Ed.2d 286 (1979).12
In Butler, the accused refused to sign a waiver of rights form offered him by F.B.I. *641agents at the outset of interrogation. Upon ascertaining that Butler understood his rights, the agents advised him they would like to talk, and the accused replied “I will talk to you but I am not signing any form.” Thereafter Butler incriminated himself. The Supreme Court discussed the concept of waiver at length: “[In Miranda ] this Court said that
If the interrogation continues without the presence of an attorney [a request for which invokes the Fifth Amendment right to silence per se ] and a statement is taken, a heavy burden rests on the government to demonstrate that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege against self incrimination and his right to ... counsel, [citations omitted]”
Further interpreting Miranda’s waiver prescriptions the Court in Butler continued at p. 1757 of 99 S.Ct.:
An express written or oral statement of waiver of the right to remain silent or of the right to counsel is usually strong proof of the validity of that waiver, but is not inevitably either necessary or sufficient to establish waiver. The question is not one of form, but rather whether the defendant in fact knowingly and voluntarily waived the rights delineated in the Miranda case. As was unequivocally said in Miranda, mere silence is not enough. That does not mean that the defendant’s silence coupled with an understanding of his rights and a course of conduct indicating waiver, may never support a conclusion that a defendant has waived his rights. The courts must presume that a defendant did not waive his rights; the prosecution’s burden is great; but in at least some cases waiver can be dearly inferred from the actions and words of the person interrogated.
The Court concluded that “the question of waiver must be determined on ‘the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused.’ Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023, 82 L.Ed. 1461.... ” Butler at p. 1758. See also Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 99 S.Ct. 2560, 61 L.Ed.2d 197 (1979).13
Initially we observe that the trial court found as a fact that appellant waived his constitutional rights.14 The question of waiver, however, is not a question of fact, but an issue of Federal Constitutional Law. Brewer. It is apparent then that the trial court applied an incorrect constitutional standard in determining the issue of waiver by which this Court is not bound. Id.
Applying these principles to the circumstances of this case, it is clear that the State has failed to meet its “great” burden of showing a relinquishment of the right to silence on the part of this appellant. The only evidence of waiver contained in this record is the appellant’s signed confession which included a waiver recitation at the top, and which followed his statement that he could not talk about it, but would “try to write it down.”
Miranda teaches that no weight is to be given a failure on the part of the accused to specifically request an attorney’s assistance or that interrogation cease in the exact language of that case, or, for that matter, at all; likewise, “the mere fact” that appellant answered the officers’ questions raises no presumption of waiver. Here, appellant indicated his intention to invoke his Fifth *642Amendment right soon after the outset of interrogation, but was denied a “full and fair opportunity to exercise that option.” See Miranda; cf. Mosley. Unlike Mosley the case before us is one “where the police failed to honor a decision ... to cut off questioning ... by refusing to discontinue the interrogation upon request [and] by persisting in repeated efforts to wear down [appellant’s] resistance and make him change his mind.” Id. at p. 327 of 96 S.Ct. In contrast to the circumstances shown by both Fare and Butler, there has been no showing that appellant “clearly” indicated a willingness to waive his constitutional right against self incrimination.
Having found no evidence to support the trial court’s finding that appellant did not invoke his Fifth Amendment right against self incrimination, and having rejected the standard applied by the trial court in concluding that the State met its burden of proving appellant waived such right, we hold that the trial court committed reversible error through its failure to suppress appellant’s statement obtained in violation of his right to remain silent.
The State’s motion for rehearing is overruled.
. Department of Public Safety.
. Testimony of McLeroy described the polygraph room thus:
Q: And your statement is that that room is isolated from the rest of the building.
A: That room is isolated, closed off, yes, sir.
Q: O.K. And it’s closed off to the extent that there’s a one-way mirror, a lie detector table, an inter-com system between the two rooms and it’s actually towards the back. You have to walk through the lab to get back to it, do you not?
A: You walk down a hall.
Q: Walk down a hall and the lab is on the right-hand side?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: So, that’s not a place where the public freely wanders around getting driver’s license is it?
A: That’s correct.
Q: All right. Would you then say that the interrogation of the Defendant in the lie detector room was in a pretty secluded, out-of-the-way spot?
A: Yes.
.According to appellant, McLeroy described for him the physical effects on the human body of the administration of electrocution. While admitting he discussed the electric chair with appellant “prior to the first interview,” McLer-oy denied that its effects on the human body were discussed, and testified that the discussion was based upon his asking appellant what he thought should happen to the person who committed the murder.
. The witness Roach gave very little testimony about this interview other than that it was short, lasting about 15 minutes.
. It is unclear whether Ranger Elliott did not witness all or only portions of McLeroy’s second interview with appellant.
. All three officers testified that appellant wrote “one long paragraph.” However, this writing, identified as State’s Exhibit No. 4, reveals two short paragraphs.
. Appellant did testify that McLeroy had discussed with him the prison social structure in which McLeroy allegedly told him that he would be the object of sexual assaults. McLer-oy, however, testified that he did not “recall” such a conversation but conceded that he “could have” had it.
.A reason offered by Elliott for this interpretation was that appellant continued to answer his questions. Elliott admitted, however, that appellant gave him no incriminating information.
. Appellant testified that one reason was that he wanted legal advice.
. Hereinafter cited as Mosley.
. Hereinafter cited as Brewer.
. Hereinafter cited as Butler.
. Hereinafter cited as Fare.
. Also found as a fact was that appellant waived his rights under Article 38.22, V.A.C. C.P. As a conclusion of law in these regards, the trial court stated:
“Joseph Stanley Faulder, after repeated warnings, knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his rights under Art. 38.22, V.A.C.C.P., including his right to counsel, and his right to remain silent, prior to and during the making of the statement.”