ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
CALVERT, Chief Justice.In their motion for rehearing respondents state that they are having difficulty in interpreting our opinion and that they are particularly troubled by the following sentence:
"We therefore hold that Haulers are parties ‘at interest’ within the meaning of Art. 6453 authorizing appeals from orders of the Commission prescribing and adopting rail freight rates, and that they may enjoin enforcement of prescribed rates if they can discharge the burden placed on them by Art. 6454 of showing that the rates are unjust and unreasonable to them in that there is a reasonable likelihood that their businesses and their services, for which there is a public necessity, will be destroyed or substantially curtailed.”
Respondents interpret the sentence in this language:
“It seems plain enough that the Court holds that if the plaintiffs can convince the jury that ‘their businesses and services’ will be destroyed or substantially curtailed (as distinguished from ‘some loss of profits or revenues’) they will *197have established, as a matter of law,that the rates under attack are unjust and unreasonable to them. Such rates must be set aside regardless of any other factor.”
In their reconstruction of the sentence, respondents omit the modifying phrase “for which there is a public necessity.” The language of the sentence was chosen with care, and to omit the modifying phrase not only does violence to the wording of the sentence but completely distorts its meaning.
The sentence is to be interpreted as written and not as respondents have rewritten it. Moreover, it should be read in context with the remainder of the opinion wherein these statements appear: “The point [petitioners’ sixth point of error] asserts * * that the Commission’s order may be declared invalid because of the hurtful effect of the prescribed rates on competing carriers and on the needs of commerce in this State. * * * While we can agree that Haulers’ right of survival must be viewed from the standpoint of public interest, we are unable to agree that under governing regulatory legislation the public interest turns alone on low rates for one segment of the transportation industry. * * * They [statutes authorizing regulation of carriers] have objectives also of providing transportation services to all segments of business and industry where such services are necessary and of protecting those services against unfair and destructive practices, thus developing and preserving ‘a complete transportation system adapted to the needs of commerce of this State.’ These objectives cannot be attained if rates prescribed for one segment of the transportation industry for part of a total service, even though fairly compensatory to that segment, are so lozv as to destroy another segment of the industry which is necessary to performance of the total service in meeting the needs of commerce.”
Haulers had the burden of showing a “probable right” to a permanent injunction. The statements quoted above from our opinion were made for the purpose of showing a legal basis for Haulers’ “probable right,” as is pointed out in the opinion. The net effect of the criticized sentence is that there is a legal basis upon which Haulers may obtain a permanent injunction against enforcement of the prescribed rates. We then held that the affidavit of the witness Hardin tended, to prove a factual basis for a permanent injunction within the requirements of governing authorities cited in our opinion. All of the requirements for invoking the trial court’s discretion to grant the temporary injunction were thus established: (1) a legal basis for granting a permanent injunction; (2) evidence tending to show that Haulers could prove a factual basis therefor, and (3) admitted probable injury in the interim if the temporary injunction were not granted. ,
Respondents’ motion for rehearing is overruled. A further motion for rehearing will not be entertained.