(concurring).
I concur only in the disposition of appellant’s initial contention concerning application of the collateral estoppel doctrine.
In Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 90 S.Ct. 1189, 25 L.Ed.2d 469 (1970), the Court said:
“. . . Where a previous judgment of acquittal was based upon a general verdict, as is usually the case, this ap*919proach requires a court to ‘examine the record of a prior proceeding, taking into account the pleadings, evidence, charge, and other relevant matter, and conclude whether a rational jury could have grounded its verdict upon an issue other than that which the defendant seeks to foreclose from consideration.’ . . . ”
In the instant case we have only the transcription of the court reporter’s notes from the first trial. The pleadings, the court’s charge, and other relevant matter are not before us. Under these circumstances, we are not in a position to determine the applicability of Ashe v. Swenson, supra. See Hutchings v. State, 466 S.W.2d 584 (Tex.Cr.App.1971, concurring opinion).
For this reason, I concur in the result reached.
MORRISON, J., joins in this concurrence.